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ABSTRACT 
The performance of public utilities in low-income countries with respect to service to all 
customers, and particularly lower-income urban consumers, is understood to be limited 
in many cases. The Government of Ghana chose to implement a private sector 
management contract in order to deliver significant change in service delivery and 
financial viability. The five year management contract with Aqua Vitens Rand Limited 
ran from 2006 to 2011 and was not renewed. 
This study investigates the public utility outcomes, both as a state owned corporation 
and a state owned limited liability Company, and compares those outcomes with the 
achievements of the private operator through a Management Contract. The latter two 
management models operated under the oversight of the newly formed economic 
regulator, the Public Utility Regulatory Commission in 1999 and any effect of that 
regulation is considered. The hypothesis of the study developed in 2008 was that “a 
management contract would not provide the necessary level of empowerment, 
incentives and commitment and access to resources for a private operator to 
adequately and efficiently perform even where there is an established economic 
regulator with a clear mandate”. 
The case study approach was employed for the study data was gathered on the 
operations, activities, regulation and management of the urban water utility through 
documentary review, key-informant interviews, household surveys, public hearing 
meetings and user observations. However, three major cities including Accra, Kumasi 
and Tamale were used for the household survey. These three cities were carefully 
picked out taking into account the political, economic, geographical, social and cultural 
significance that each of the them represents and commands in Ghana. 
 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Paired t-Tests were performed to compare the 
financial and operational/technical performances between GWSC and GWCL, GWSC 
and AVRL, and GWCL and AVRL in view of the fact that all observations were taken 
from the same or matched subjects. In addition, post-hoc tests were conducted after 
performing ANOVA tests using Tukey’s HSD tests to determine which of the groups in 
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the sample differ. And finally, results of the study were analysed and interpreted using 
secondary data from the literature review. 
The study found that, both operationally and financially, there were no significant 
improvements during the period of the private operator compared with that of Ghana 
Water and Sewerage Corporation and Ghana Water Company Limited in areas such 
as water production, customer metering, non-revenue water, billing efficiency, bill 
collection efficiency, days receivables, liquidity, operating, profitability and labour 
productivity ratios, water tariff, creditworthiness and level of investment. Not only that, 
but also, the study revealed that the two previous reorganisations failed to make any 
significant difference. Averagely, the private operator reduced non-revenue water from 
51.62% to 49.22% over the 5-year period. Overall, all three regimes exhibited high 
levels of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in reducing non-revenue water. Political 
patronage, nepotism, cronyism, tribalism and corruption have eaten deep into the 
fabrics of the public water utility resulting in a high labour productivity.  
Finally, the anticipated capital required for investment could not be accessed, a 
responsibility that remained with government, and the capability of the contractor did 
not appear to be strong enough to overcome the resulting challenges. 
In a single urban water supply system of Ghana, the research investigated and 
compared performances of three different regimes of management models over a 27-
year span and also assessed the suitability of the form of private participation and net 
improvement the management contract brought to the urban population. The study 
showed that the two previous reorganisations or management models failed to make 
any significant difference and thus provide a unique contribution to academic 
knowledge and understanding. It shows that the success or failure of the urban water 
utility of Ghana is independent of the management models employed in view of the fact 
that all management models employed under all three regimes showed no significant 
differences. Instead, its success may be residing in other factors including competence 
of system managers, political will of governments, good institutional culture, level of 
investments, quality of management contractor, leadership style and finally the attitude 
of consumers towards such reforms as in the case of Uganda.   
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Overall, it appears that further research into the role of the private sector and the 
capabilities, or otherwise, of the particular approach of management contracts is not 
required. Nonetheless, the underlying challenge of delivering potable water to all 
urban consumers in an efficient and sustainable manner remains. How this can be 
financed, facilitated, encouraged and achieved is clearly an area deserving of further 
research. Finally, further research is required to determine the extent to which 
managerial performance and the local environment of a water utility influence non-
revenue water. 
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1 
1 Background of the study 
1.1 Introduction 
Water is vital to human life and has no substitute. Nevertheless, human attitude, 
behaviour and activities in addition to the ever increasing human population continue to 
make drinking water scarcer around the globe every day, now becoming more 
expensive than petrol and diesel as in the case of Oman and Dubai. The United 
Nations estimates that by 2050, the world’s population will rise to between 7.8 and 11.9 
billion with a ‘medium variant’ estimate of 9.2 billion people (UNESA, 2007) as cited by 
(Black et al., 2008). For that number of people, it is estimated that 1.1 billion people do 
not have access to improved water supply and 2.6 billion people are without improved 
sanitation globally with sub-Saharan Africa having the highest proportion of the people 
without improved water (UNICEF/WHO JMP, 2012). Within the last two decades, the 
major cities of Ghana, the focus of this study, have seen a worsening situation in water 
services supplied to the urban population - a situation which cannot be said to be 
peculiar. In many low income countries, urban water supply systems are facing an 
acute crisis (Nickson, 1997). 
Urban population growth has greatly outpaced the rate of growth of infrastructure in 
many developing countries. When coupled with poor infrastructural development 
policies of their respective governments, this somewhat accounts for the negative trend 
in the urban water supply sector. For instance major industries, and for that matter job 
opportunities, could only be found in the large cities of low-income countries. 
Ultimately, the growth of the cities and towns together with rapid increase in urban 
populations implies that the peri-urban areas will grow much more quickly than formal 
urban centres (Osumanu et al, 2010).This situation poses additional water and 
sanitation service challenges, particularly to the poor in the cities. Ghana is a typical 
example of Africa’s poor water supply and sanitation situation. The 2000 population 
census confirms the JMP's position to the extent that Ghana’s statistics on water 
supply and sanitation reflect the bigger picture of continental situation in Africa: one in 
three Africans do not have access to adequate water supply and sanitation. Admittedly, 
it is a huge burden and becoming a difficult task for many governments in the 
developing world to fix. Consequently, lack of these services affects the health and the 
environments of the people living in the peri-urban and formal urban areas (Mulenga et 
al., 2004).  
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In an attempt to address these water challenges, the third target of the seventh goal of 
the UN Millennium Declaration, signed in September, 2000 seeks to halve the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation by the year 2015. The adoption of this target within the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) is laudable. However, this target can only be achieved if 
the challenge of lack of capital investment for infrastructural development and 
expansion are critically and carefully considered along with a similar focus on 
improving the management of existing and new infrastructure. Furthermore, it must be 
noticed that even though some of these countries naturally have scarce water 
resources, which are a legitimate reason for limited water supply, lack of good quality 
drinking water in some other countries, including Ghana could hardly be attributable to 
scarcity of water resources. It is largely due to a lack of sufficient capital investment in 
the sector coupled with fragmented responsibilities of sector institutions, corruption, 
lack of autonomy of the utility due to political interference, and inefficient management 
of the available resources. According to Cosgrove and Rijsberman, (2000) it is not 
about having too little to satisfy our needs. It is a crisis of managing water so badly that 
millions of people and the environment suffer badly.  
1.1.1 The challenges in the urban water supply sector in Ghana 
The endemic abysmal performance that spread across the entire spectrum of the 
public sector during the late 1970s and early 1980s in Ghana inevitably resulted in the 
massive reforms that swept through the entire public sector in the 1980s. These 
challenges became an integral part of the Economic Reform Programme (ERP) which 
started in 1983, primarily supported by the International Development Association 
(World Bank). Poor performance within the public sector at the time led to its over-
reliance on government and so privatisation and decentralisation were considered 
appropriate for addressing these challenges (Amis, 1998). During the same period, 
GWSC was identified as one of the most critical and important State Owned 
Enterprises that needed restructuring due to its financial and social significance. 
Apparently, direct privatisation was considered as the better option by the World Bank 
rather than institutional reforms at the time through “hard budgets” and autonomy of the 
public sector (Amis, 1998). Critics alternatively argued that privatisation damages the 
quality of public services and undermines public accountability (Cook, and Minogue, 
2005).  
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These institutional developments were aimed at creating a water supply organisation 
that could meet the changing environment in which it had to operate. Rapid growth in 
the urban population in Ghana had significantly contributed to the ever-increasing 
demand on the water utility in the urban areas in Ghana and in Accra, problems of both 
water supply and distribution remaining serious (Van Rooijen, 2008; Rakodi, 1996). 
The Ghana Living Standard Survey, Round 4 (GLLS4) revealed that approximately 
forty percent of urban families were relying on neighbours and vendors for their water 
in Accra and only 45% of the population had a household or at best a yard connection 
including the urban rich (Van Rooijen, 2008). What really worsens the situation is that, 
in Accra, boreholes are not a viable alternative for unserved peripheral communities 
because of unsuitable ground-water conditions which further compound the water 
problems in the city (Rakodi, 1996).Along the coastal zone of Ghana, the potential of 
increasing the use of groundwater is limited by saline intrusions in shallow aquifers. In 
other areas, inadequate borehole yields lead to “borehole dryness” in the Upper East, 
Northern, Upper West and some other parts of the Brong-Ahafo regions (MWRW&H, 
2007). Available figures previously mentioned, reveal that surface water can sufficiently 
meet the present and future water demands of the country. It is therefore obvious that the 
challenge of the urban water supply sector could hardly be attributable to scarcity of 
water resources in the country. Nevertheless, the researcher takes consolation in the 
fact that “problems that result from a failure to expand supply as fast as demand or 
from mismanagement are easier to address than those that stem from scarce and 
costly raw water”(Alcazar et al., 2002). For cities, the availability of surface water 
sources requires capital intensive and operationally expensive abstraction and 
treatment systems, necessarily demanding some form of centralised organisation to 
develop bulk water provision. Mis-management of such organisations, although in 
principle being ‘easier to address’, often appears to be more intractable than the lack of 
water itself – some consolation? 
Generally, low water tariffs, macro-economic crises, general mismanagement, bad 
water policies and corruption, coupled with weak regulatory frameworks, have 
significantly affected the effectiveness and efficiency of the public water utility resulting 
in the water utility’s heavy indebtedness and its perennial dependence on the meagre 
resources available from central government. From the financial analysis that will be 
reported later and the reports that some of the equipment was obsolete ( over half a 
century old), therefore operating well below design capacities, the challenges that 
faced managers daily become ever more apparent. Consequently, generating sufficient 
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funds to meet financial obligations (maintenance and operational expenses, debt 
service charges, depreciation, and development costs) became a perennial challenge 
to the water company.  
In 1998, the urban water utility (GWSC) had a total of 210 water systems throughout 
the country. This has since reduced to 84 systems by 2003 following the transfer of 
some of the small systems to the district assemblies (GWCL, 2003) and by July 2006, 
GWCL was operating only 82 urban systems with an average daily output of 570,000 
m3/day as against an estimated daily demand of 1,050,000m3/day (i.e. 54.5% 
coverage). From 1990 to 2002, water coverage had drastically decreased from 76% to 
60% while unaccounted-for water was 50% throughout this period (Nyarko, 2007). 
Water rationing to many customers became common with only a few consumers able 
to get 24-hour continuous supply (MWRW&H, 2007; Conteh, 2008). Throughout the 
1990s, Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation became notoriously insufficient, with 
unaccounted-for water constantly remaining at about 50% (Fuest, 2006). 
Residents of most urban communities including Accra, Kumasi, Ho, Takoradi, Cape 
coast, Koforidua, Sunyani, Tamale, Wa and Bolgatanga almost invariably rely wholly 
on piped water supplied by the urban water utility. The problem of direct interference of 
politicians in the hiring, transfer, promotion and firing of utility personnel, especially at 
the highest level of management, was common in Ghana (Nickson and Franceys, 
2003)which is evident in GWSC/GWCL having seven managing directors within a 
period of 6 years (i.e. between 1987 and 2003). By Statute, the Board of Directors and 
Managing Directors of GWSC/GWCL are appointed by government thereby making 
them more vulnerable and accountable to the politicians rather than the customers in 
order to protect the positions they occupy. GWSC operations were conducted more as 
a social service with government subvention ranging between 30% and 60% of the 
recurrent expenditure from 1965 to 1986 (Gyau-Boakye and Ampomah, 2004). One of 
the mandates of the public utility that is crystal clear in the Act 310 of 1965 under 
section 7 which established the public utility stipulates that “the corporation shall cause 
its affairs to be managed in accordance with the practices observed in public utility 
enterprises and in particular shall cause its functions under this Act to be carried out so 
as to ensure that, taking one year with another, its revenue are equal to or greater than 
its outgoings” (Amis, 1998). Conversely, throughout the existence of the utility, it has 
not been able to fulfil this mandate satisfactorily due to very weak institutional 
frameworks and lack of autonomy within the sector.  
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Even though subsidy systems were often in place, a high proportion of the finance 
benefited higher-income residents because they were connected to the piped network 
while low-income settlements were excluded (Mitlin, 2004). It is estimated that the urban 
poor are charged between 3 and 15 times more than the normal utility price by water 
vendors (Nyarko et al, 2006). This trend further explains the underlying reasons for the 
government of Ghana in 1999 to incorporate the Ghana Water Company Limited as a 
public limited liability company in order to pave way for its planned privatisation, a plan 
that eventually saw the involvement of the private sector in June, 2006. 
Meanwhile, the general justifications provided for the inefficiencies in the public sector 
are usually based on three theoretical models including;  
 The property right theory (there is no ownership transference in the public 
sector); 
 The public choice theory (bureaucrats maximise their own profit and not the 
common interest); 
 The principal-agent theory (endorsed by information asymmetries (Marques, 
2008) 
In summary, prior to the involvement of the private operator in June, 2006, the urban 
water sector was faced with a number of challenges including: 
 A need for improved management in operation and maintenance of water 
supply; 
 Low service quality and coverage and the inability to link tariffs to level of 
service; 
 Difficulty in setting tariffs to achieve cost-recovery in view of the high level of 
wastage; 
 Inadequate revenue and investments (Sarpong and Abrampah, 2006). 
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1.2 Justification for the research 
The rate of increase in the use of improved drinking-water sources from 77 to 87 
percent between 1990 and 2012 was sufficient to achieve the relevant MDG targets 
globally. Nevertheless, in the World Health Organisation (WHO) African region 
including Ghana, the percentage of the population using improved drinking water 
increased from only 50 to 61 percent in 2008 which remained well short of the 68 
percent needed in that year to remain on course to achieve the MDG targets (WHO, 
2010). Fundamentally, Ghana’s development agenda is driven by the Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) and draws its commitments from the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs – legally part of the constitution), New Partnership for 
Development (NEPAD), and the obligations set out in the constitution of Ghana. 
Evidently, Ghana’s commitment to the principles of the MDGs was exhibited through 
the endorsement of the principles for water to improve access to safe water supply and 
sanitation of the population without access to basic water supply and sanitation by 50% 
by 2015 and 75 percent by 2015 (MWRW&H, 2007).  
However, as pointed out earlier, all signs in the urban water supply sector in Ghana 
suggested that the situation was getting worse and worse and until corrective steps 
could be taken to reverse the trend, it would continue to do so. It is commonly quoted 
that "The water crisis is mainly a crisis of governance, much more than a crisis of water 
shortage" (Global Water Partnership, 2013) and the real tragedy is its effects on the 
lives of the urban poor. However, the question is what are truly the underlying reasons 
for the challenges in the urban water supply sector over the years? Could it be 
institutional, political, social, cultural, attitudinal, technological, economic, financial, or a 
combination of all?  Compounding the sector dynamics further, is the involvement of 
the private operator making it yet more complex? 
Additionally, negative perceptions that are usually held by the public and some 
politicians against private operators in the water sector stems from lack of knowledge 
about positive contributions that private operators have made in other countries leading 
to a widespread resistance to private participation in water supply (Marin, 2009), as is 
the case in Ghana. This makes this research even more relevant in order to explore the 
sector challenges and determine whether or not the arrangements with private 
management contractor, AVRL, in any way brought improvement to the urban 
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population. This will be determined through a careful assessment of the regulatory 
frameworks, political, economic, legal and social environment against the set targets of 
the management contract with Aqua Vitens Rand Limited 
1.3 Research aim, hypothesis and objectives 
The overall aim of the research is to assess the suitability of the form or model of private 
sector participation that was introduced in the regulated urban water supply sector in 
Ghana and also to assess the net improvement that the arrangement brought to the urban 
population. The research seeks to contribute to the understanding of the suitability of the 
management contract with Aqua Vitens Rand Limited in the urban water supply sector. 
According to the World Bank, (1994), the regulatory capacity of most African countries 
including Ghana is limited and therefore the involvement of the private operator in the 
management and operation of the public water utility poses a special challenge. 
Generally, political interference, lack of investment and political patronage have continued 
to work against service goals set, cost minimisation targets, and investment incentives of 
the water utility. In addition, the design of a good contract and efficient monitoring require 
sophisticated institutional capacity; however these tasks are difficult to be undertaken in 
most developing countries. In view of the above reasons, the hypothesis of this research 
is that: 
“A management contract does not provide the necessary level of 
empowerment, incentives, commitment and access to resources for a 
private operator to adequately and efficiently perform even where there is 
an established economic regulator with a clear mandate” 
The objectives of this research are to: 
a) Investigate the context within which Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation 
(GWSC), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), Aqua Vitens Rand Limited 
(AVRL) and Public Utilities Regulatory Commission(PURC) operated in Ghana; 
b) Evaluate the performance of Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation/Ghana 
Water Company Limited (Public utility) over the period preceding the 
management contract; 
c) Evaluate the performance of Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (management contract); 
d) Investigate the effectiveness of the Public Utility Regulatory Commission; 
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e) Evaluate the level of empowerment, incentive, commitment and access to 
resources necessary for efficient service delivery by service providers. 
Taking into account the numerous challenges facing the urban water sector in Ghana 
prior to the involvement of the private operator (AVRL), one may be tempted to ask 
whether the appalling catalogue of failures within the sector could have any immediate 
solution in sight through the new arrangement with AVRL. Nevertheless, the researcher 
took consolation in the claim that “problems that result from a failure to expand supply 
as fast as demand or from mismanagement are easier to address than those that stem 
from scarce and costly raw water” (Alcazar et al., 2002).  
This research therefore attempts to answer the following questions: 
 To what extent have the activities of the economic regulator influenced the 
performance of GWCL or AVRL by way of ensuring that service delivery is 
efficient, effective and sustainable? 
 How have national policies and institutional frameworks in the past influenced 
the service delivery of the public utility? 
 What is the appropriate set of evaluation indicators for public and privatised 
water utility and could there be a new way of assessing or evaluating the 
performance of the urban water utility under the present management contract 
in Ghana? 
 How could data be effectively generated to populate the performance indicators 
for analysis?  
 What aspects of, and possibly to what extent, the management contract have 
empowered or conflicted with the organisational behaviour of service provision? 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This section of the thesis investigates the research literature on the general concept of 
public private participation (PPP) in water supply management in lower-income 
countries with a major emphasis on management contracts. It discusses the different 
modes of partnerships or arrangements that exist between the private sector on the 
one hand and governments or public institutions on the other. Overall, the chapter 
reports brief descriptions of different modes of private sector partnership, explaining 
how each model is engaged and how the sector is regulated. From the literature, the 
limitations and advantages associated with each approach are highlighted, taking into 
account the political, institutional, legal, economic and social context within which they 
may occur. It is however important to state that the academic literature on management 
contracts is limited.  
2.2 A brief historical background of Ghana 
The republic of Ghana is located in West Africa and bordered by three francophone 
countries namely; Burkina Faso to the North, Cote d’Ivoire to the West, Togo to the 
East and to the south is the Gulf of Guinea. Ghana covers a total land boundary of 
2,094 kilometres with a total land mass of 238,533 square kilometres (i.e. land: 
227,533 square kilometres and water: 11,000 square kilometres) and its climate is 
tropical. The word ‘Ghana’ means ‘warrior king’. Before independence, the Republic of 
Ghana was known and called “Gold Coast” until it was renamed Ghana in 1957. The 
Republic of Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to gain her political 
independence from their colonial masters (the British) on the 6th of March, 1957. 
Administratively, there are ten regions in Ghana, with Accra as the capital city, the 
regions being further sub-divided into districts. From time to time additional districts and 
municipalities are created for both administrative and political reasons. For instance, in 
the year 2007, twenty-five more districts and three municipal assemblies were created 
by President John Agyekum Kufuor bringing the total number of districts in Ghana to 
166. In February 2008, additional districts were created and some were also upgraded 
to municipal status thereby further increasing the number to 170. It is explained that the 
division of the country into regions and districts is largely done to maintain the large 
cultural groups as homogenous units and also ensure efficient administration of 
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districts and regions (Dickson 1971, 1975; Bening 1999; Ofori 2002 as cited by 
(Aryeetey et al., 2009). It is unclear to what extent such ongoing divisions further 
administrative and local service management goals. 
The population of Ghana has more than quadrupled since 1957 and forty-four percent 
(44%) of the 18.9 million people live in the urban areas. Almost half of Ghana’s 8.3 
million urban residents live in the country’s largest cities: Accra and Kumasi (GSS, 
2002) - a trend that clearly explains the extreme level of pressure that the urban 
population may be exerting on public utility services. About 50.9 percent of the national 
population is urban (GSS, 2012) with an annual rate of urbanisation of 3.4 percent (CIA 
World Factbook, 2011). The country’s urban system is dominated by Accra, Kumasi, 
Tamale, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Tema (Owusu 2005, and 2008; as cited by (Aryeetey 
et al., 2009)). 
Table 2-1Population Trend of Ghana 
Year Total Population 
1960 6,726,815 
1970 8,559,313 
1984 12,296,081 
2000 18,912,079 
2010 24,658,823 
Source: Compiled from the 1960, 1970, 1984 and 2000 Population Census reports 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Ghana Statistical Service  
By Ghana Statistical Service’s (GSS) definition, an urban locality is any human 
settlement with a population size of 5,000 or more; a definition that has greatly 
conflicted with the definitions for small towns by the Community Water and Sanitation 
Agency (CWSA) and that of the National Water Policy (NWP). Like in many African 
countries, about 60 to 70% of the urban population in Ghana lives in informal 
settlements with little or no access to basic services such as water, electricity, and 
sanitation. Most of these low-income dwellers live in the multi-occupancy building with 
single meters also known as the tenement houses or “compound houses” (UN Habitat, 
2003). 
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Figure 2-1 Maps of Ghana showing its boundaries and the ten regions [source: 
http://mapsof.net/ghana] 
2.2.1 The political economy of Ghana 
Historically, there have been a series of military coups that followed independence in 
1957. This greatly interrupted the smooth democratic process and for that matter the 
development agenda of Ghana. Barely 8-years into independence, the first military 
coup was staged on the 24th of February, 1966 leading to the overthrow of the first 
democratically elected government under the leadership of Dr Osagyefo Kwame 
Nkrumah. From 1966 to 1981, Ghana experienced four further coup d’états. 
Nonetheless, since 1981 Ghana has enjoyed a stable political climate that has 
apparently made it a viable destination for international investments, assisted by the 
discovery of viable quantities of oil in 2007. Generally, the return of the country to 
democracy in 1993, continuing through multi-party elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 
and 2008, marks a significant landmark in the socio-economic development and 
political history of Ghana. Undoubtedly, since 1993 to date, Ghana has been widely 
considered as one of Africa's most stable democracies which has subsequently made 
Ghana win for herself the (self-proclaimed) accolade “Ghana, the gateway to West 
Africa”. Compared to the state of democracy practised in other African countries today, 
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Ghana could be said to be politically stable with good governance practices. Overall on 
governance, the respect for the rule of law makes Ghana perceived to be one of the 
better administered countries in the sub-region.  
The economy of Ghana is ‘mixed’ according to economist’s definition but has 
significantly or predominantly been driven by agriculture (see table 1.2). Data from the 
2000 population census reveals that the agricultural sector alone absorbs 55 percent of 
the country’s labour force and accounts for about 40 percent of the Gross Domestic 
Product (Aryeetey and Kanbur, (2008) as cited by (Aryeetey et al., 2009). 
Table 2-2 Percentage distribution of GDP by sector and some other Economic 
indicators of Ghana 
Item 1970 1984 1989 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Agriculture 47 52 47 42 41 41 40 40 30.4 29.1 31 31.7 
Industry 18 11 14 15 15 15 14 14 20.8 20.7 20.4 18.9 
Services 35 37 39 46 47 47 48 48 48.6 50.2 48.6 49.5 
Source: Ghana statistical Service, April, 2011 
Economic Indicators 
 Year 
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP 
(US$x10
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) 
4.98 5.31 6.17 7.63 8.88 10.73 12.74 15.02 16.65 15.51 17.89 
GDP per 
capita (US$) 
270.63 281.47 318.41 384.32 436.04 513.76 594.51 683.57 739.13 671.33 754.71 
Average 
annual 
inflation (%) 
25.15 32.91 14.82 26.68 12.63 15.11 10.15 10.73 16.52 19.25 10.60 
Deficit  
(% of GDP) 
-7.77 -5.41 -1.08 -1.64 -3.98 -8.25 -9.93 -12.0 -18.7 -5.10 -12.78 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April, 2011 
Historically, Ghana has experienced very volatile and high inflation rates derived from 
external shocks, unsustainable macroeconomic policies and, sometimes uncertain 
politics. The structure of the economy of Ghana has not changed significantly from 
what was inherited from the colonial period (Aryeetey and McKay, 2007) during the last 
three decades. However, by improving policies and institutions and investing in 
infrastructure and basic services, Ghana has experienced high economic growth rates 
averaging around 5 percent per year and has since become one of the best-performing 
economies in Africa, attracting significant foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
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(Dagher, et al., 2010). Steadily, the Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
increased from 3.7 percent in 2000 to 7.3 percent in 2008. In 2002significant debt relief 
provided the country with some fiscal space to undertake critical infrastructure 
investments, particularly in the energy and road sectors. In addition there has been 
targeted social spending, all under the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS). 
The combination of higher output growth, declining inflation, and improved social 
spending under the GPRS framework significantly contributed to reduced poverty 
levels (Duffuor and Acquah, 2009). The implication of the foregoing for the urban water 
utility therefore is that, with the establishment of a relatively stable economic and socio-
political environment, which has won the confidence of many countries and investors, 
the water utility should be able to effectively plan, formulate and implement its 
objectives with a reasonable degree of predictability. 
1.2.3 Water resources and its potential in Ghana  
Ghana is a riparian state and its water resources potential is classified under surface 
and groundwater sources with the surface water resources mainly coming from three 
river systems that drain the country. They are the Volta river system (composed of the 
Red, White and Black Volta Rivers and the Oti River), South-Western river system 
(composed of the Bia Tano, Ankobra and Pra rivers) and Coastal river system 
(composed of the Tordzie/Aka, Densu, Ayensu, Ochi-Nakwa and Ochi-Amissah) 
constituting 70%, 22% and 8% of the Ghana’s total land area of 238,533 square 
kilometres respectively. Generally, Ghana’s rainfall decreases from the south-western 
part (2,000mm/year) towards the northern part (950mm/year) and the south-east 
(800mm/year) of the country. The total average annual runoff is estimated to be 56.4 
billion cubic metres, with the Volta river alone accounting for about 41.6 billion cubic 
metres.The Volta, South-Western and Coastal systems contribute 65%, 29% and 6% 
respectively. From surface water sources Ghana has access to about 39.4 billion cubic 
meters of water annually. The country is “underlain by three major geological 
formations including the basement complex comprising crystalline igneous and 
metamorphic rocks; the consolidated sedimentary formations underlying the Volta 
basin (including the limestone horizon) and the mesozoic and cenozoic sedimentary 
rocks” representing 54%, 45% and 1% of the country respectively (MWRW&H, 2007).  
In the basement complex and the Volta basin, the depth of aquifers is usually between 
10m and 60m with borehole yield seldom exceeding 6m3 /h while the aquifer depth in 
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the mesozoic and cenozoic formations is normally between 6m and 120m with average 
yields of 184m3/h especially in the limestone aquifer. Groundwater occurrences in 
limestone formations are typically located within 120m and 300m depth yielding about 
180m3/h. It appears therefore that Ghana does not face any acute water resource 
issues. However, the population growth rate, particularly the urban growth rate, means 
that the urban water supply sector faces the challenge of: 
 Increasing and improving existing water sources, tapping new sources and 
managing catchments to eliminate or abate depletion and degradation of water 
sources; 
 Meeting increasing demand with finite supplies; and  
 Increasing degradation of water quality resulting in high treatment cost 
(MWRW&H, 2007). 
2.3 The evolution of water supply sector in Ghana 
The development of urban water supply systems in Ghana began during the colonial 
era in 1928 in Cape Coast. The service was run as a public utility enterprise by the 
Hydraulic Division of Public Works Department under the Ministry of Works and 
Housing, now known as the Ministry of Water Resources Works and Housing. 
Subsequently, the responsibilities of the Public Works Department were extended to 
include the planning and development of water supply systems in the whole country. In 
1948, the Rural Water Development Department was established to take care of water 
supply in rural areas separately. Later, the Water Supply Division of the Public Works 
Department was created in 1958, under the Ministry of Works and Housing and 
charged with the responsibility for both urban and rural water supply. 
Following the investigations and recommendations of WHO during a severe shortage 
of water in 1959, when Ghana faced significant health challenges, the Act 310 of 1965 
was enacted to establish the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC), and 
mandated to provide water and sewerage services to both the urban and rural 
population with the additional responsibilities of: 
 conducting research relative to water and sewerage. 
 making engineering surveys and plans.  
 constructing and operating water and sewerage works.  
 setting standards, prices and collection of the revenues. 
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By the late 1970s to early 1980s, the effectiveness of the operations of Ghana Water 
and Sewerage Corporation declined significantly (GWSC, 1993). According to (Listorti 
and Doumani, 2001), “the water supply systems in Ghana deteriorated rapidly during 
the economic crises of the 1970´s and early 1980´s when Government’s ability to 
adequately operate and maintain essential services was severely constrained.”  
2.3.1 Background to reforms in Ghana’s water supply sector 
The declining performance of Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation in the late 
1970s and early 1980s called for interventions in 1971, 1981 and 1988 to reverse the 
trend with the support of external financial institutions, countries and funding agencies. 
From the mid 1990s, various governments have implemented a string of reforms in the 
water sector in attempts to enhance efficient production and utilisation of water. These 
reforms resulted in the re-alignment of key institutions in the sector. Meanwhile, in spite 
of these interventions, lack of an effective interface among key holder institutions and 
interest groups remained a major concern in the water sector (MWRW&H, 2007). 
Therefore, in a bid to achieve the initial objectives for which GWSC was established in 
1965, a Californian consulting firm, Public Administration Services (PAS), was engaged 
in the 1970s to advise the government on the restructuring of the water sector. That 
advice culminated in several changes in the organisational structure of the utility. 
Significant among these changes was the appointment of Regional Managers to 
decentralise decision making within the corporation, also devolving authority to the 
regions where Regional Managers were assigned to become representatives of the 
Chief Engineers, acting as heads of the utility in their respective regions (Halcrow, 
1995).  
Nevertheless, after operating with this arrangement for almost a decade, it became 
apparent that there was the need to undertake further revision of the organisation’s 
framework. In 1985, (PAS) was engaged for a second time to undertake a strategic 
review that led to the creation of two positions of Deputy Managing Directors (one in-
charge of operations and maintenance, the other in-charge of Finance and 
Administration) thereby replacing the post of Chief of Operations. Another change that 
was effected due to the reform was the strengthening of the role of the Regional 
Managers to Regional Directors in order to give yet more power and autonomy to the 
regions. Despite the changes that were made in the organisation’s framework, the 
status-quo reportedly remained unchanged to the extent that the head office of 
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“GWSC, which was still responsible for payments of chemicals, imported goods, 
electricity consumption and Income Tax and Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT) for all GWSC staff, regained financial control over these activities and 
severed autonomy in 1990” (Halcrow, 1995). It is significant to indicate that apart from 
the above mentioned reforms and counter reforms that took place in Ghana’s water 
sector, several studies have also been undertaken to improve the performance of the 
public water utility. Many of the recommendations that these studies provided could 
seldom be efficiently and effectively implemented if there were any attempts at all to 
implement them.  
In 1994, the Government of Ghana engaged a new group of consultants, Sir William 
Halcrow and Partners Limited to undertake a further feasibility study on the water 
sector. At the end of this study on the feasibility and implications for restructuring the 
non-rural water sector, the following options were recommended for implementation 
(Halcrow, 1995): 
1. Convert Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation into one public limited liability 
company with substantial decentralisation and private sector participation (PSP) 
in selected key functional activities; 
2. Establish a joint venture between GWSC and an external company (or multiple 
companies) in a new operating company; 
3. GWSC to become a producer and wholesaler of bulk water with private sector 
water distribution; 
4. Public Private Partnership Lease arrangement(s) of self-contained systems 
from source to end user; 
5. Spin-off (make into a separate legal entity) Accra-Tema Metropolitan Area 
(ATMA) and the largest urban centres and then commercialise the remaining 
regions in a downsized GWSC; 
6. Engage an international operator to assist in the interim management of all 
GWSC’s regions with a view to an early transfer of the profitable urban centres 
to a long term concession; and  
7. a refocusing of objectives of the remaining GWSC regions to facilitate their 
longer term transfer to a private concession; 
8. Retain GWSC as existing entity to own the infrastructure assets and engage an 
operator to undertake GWSC’s revenue collection and customer service 
activities.  
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Additionally, a number of combinations were considered that gave alternatives to the 
primary options stated above. These alternatives fall under option 1 where; 
1a. GWSC would be retained as a central procurement agency with a mandate to 
provide operational and commercial support to autonomous regional units through 
the use of annual or term contracts for the private sector supply of goods and 
services 
1b. Each autonomous regional unit would be encouraged to pursue private sector 
participation (PSP) by maximising the outsourcing of services in accordance with 
good business practices and at economic costs; the regional unit itself being 
responsible for the consequence resulting from any failure.  
In parallel to this consideration of the best means of managing in the urban sector, 
Ghana’s review of the water and sanitation sector during the International Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-1990) influenced the policy direction of 
government in the water sector in 1994 to undertake another major water sector reform 
that brought about the historical launching of the National Community Water and 
Sanitation Programme (NCWSP). Later, the NCWSP was given a semi-autonomous 
status and became the Community Water and Sanitation Division and finally to the 
present the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) through Act 654 in 
1998. This led to the transfer of most small systems of Ghana Water Company Limited 
to the district assemblies as community managed water systems starting 1998 
(MWRW&H, 2007; GWCL, 1999) as shown in Table 1.3. Ghana Water and Sewerage 
Corporation was converted into a limited liability utility to function solely as an urban 
water supply company.  
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Table 2-3 Ghana’s universal water supply systems since independence (1957) 
Year Total number of water systems Total number  of smaller 
systems transferred to the 
district assemblies  Available Operational  
1957 35 35  
1961 69 69  
1979 194 194  
1995 210 138  
1996 208 182  
1998 210 190  
1999 100 100 115 
2000 98 81 120 
2001 84 82 124 
2002 84 83 124 
2003 84 82 124 
2006 82 82 124 
To be successful in delivering services, these organisational re-arrangements required 
access to capital for new investment, capital which consumers and the Government of 
Ghana (as ultimate owners of the systems) were either unable or unwilling to provide. 
A multiplicity of local, international multi-lateral and bilateral financial institutions over 
the years have therefore significantly supported and influenced the policies and 
management of Ghana’s urban water supply sector. These have included the World 
Bank (International Development Agency), the African Development Bank (ADB), the 
United Kingdom’s Department For International Development (DFID), Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) of Germany, France (AfD), Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan, Finland, 
Netherlands, Italy, and Australia. In addition the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT) was one local institution that provided funding to the public utility. Each 
of these donors/contributors have had their own, often differing, views on how to 
develop, and most critically manage, sustainable water services in Ghana.  
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2.3.2 Engaging the private operator in the urban water supply sector 
The poor performance of the urban water utility, Ghana Water and Sewerage 
Corporation/ Ghana Water Company Limited could not go unnoticed in the mid-1990s, 
a period that experienced ambitious reforms in the international water sector. The 
water sector in Africa had little or no success story to tell in spite of all efforts directed 
towards improving the sector through various economic, structural and infrastructural 
development programmes. Many governments in the 1990s embarked upon reforms in 
the sector in order to restore them to sound operational and financial footing after long 
periods of poor performance. Even though the urban water sector was earmarked for a 
major reform by embarking on public-private partnership projects during this period, the 
sector saw only limited restructuring.  The late 1990s through to 2006 saw a perennial 
oscillating trend of limited water production and poor service provision by the public 
water utility (Ghana Water Company Limited). This trend during this period became a 
normal and daily phenomenon which attracted the attention of government and the 
World Bank. And at the behest of the World Bank, following earlier attempts to offer 
private ‘concessions’, later ‘enhanced leases’, to Business Units ‘A’ and ‘B’ (focussed 
upon Accra and Kumasi respectively, with smaller towns variously assigned) a 5-year 
management contract was entered into with an International Consortium, Aqua Vitens 
Rand Limited (AVRL), in June, 2006 to distribute water and collect revenue to make the 
operations of public water utility profitable; a contract model with limited responsibility 
both in scope and time. The intended goal of the paradigm shift sought to bring new 
expertise, financial resources, cutting-edge technology and a commercial orientation 
that the private sector is understood (not by all) to deliver. However, the introduction of 
the private operator (AVRL) into the urban water supply sector in June, 2006 by the Mr 
John Agyekum Kufuor’s-led New Patriotic Party government (January, 2001- January, 
2009) in Ghana saw various degrees of agitations from opponents of private sector 
involvement in the urban water supply sector. Some indeed interpreted this force of 
change as a sale of Ghana’s sovereignty. Others stressed the point that it would lead 
to the imposition of higher tariffs on poor consumers whose salaries and wages would 
be too low to pay for services that the private operator may provide.  
The increasing demand for massive capital and infrastructural investment and the need 
to bring to bear a new managerial approach with a commercial orientation to the public 
utility could be said to necessitate the involvement of the private sector in Ghana’s 
urban water supply sector. However, what is unclear is whether it was the good 
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appreciation of the role of the private sector in public utilities in injecting managerial 
and economic efficiency that promoted the sector reform or not. Whatever the 
justification might be, the reason for the government’s decision or action is no longer 
relevant now. What matters is how or indeed whether, government and society used 
the skills and entrepreneurship of the private sector (AVRL) to bring about the desired 
results. This was also seen to require a strong and efficient legal and regulatory policy/ 
framework to protect the investor (government in this case), the private operator and 
customers by enforcing and implementing the service targets of the contract towards 
the realisation of the reform objectives. The key objectives of the policy reforms in the 
urban water sector in Ghana sought: 
 "to attract greater capital inflows for the rapid expansion and rehabilitation of the 
water sector in order to increase accessibility to potable water that is affordable 
and reliable; 
 to improve efficiency  and cost effectiveness in the provision of water through 
improved sector management and the inducing of private sector entrepreneurial 
skills and culture; 
 to minimise the financial burden on government as the sole equity owner and 
primary provider of needed sector infrastructure improvements and expansion; 
and 
 to consciously expand both water supply and sanitation coverage to effectively 
impact positively on the health of the people" (MWRW&H, 2007). 
One thing that is evident during the reform process was that little public consultations 
were undertaken. This could account for the hostile attitude of the consumers towards 
the private operator which could be a precipitating factor for future disputes and 
conflicts. Information on the earlier performance of urban water systems in Ghana was 
limited. Hence the lack of information hindered clear and undisputed target 
specifications in the contract, a condition which could be disastrous for the private 
operator and the contract awarder.  
The overall urban water project had four components. The first component of the project 
was the system expansion and rehabilitation designed to: 
 increase the amount of treated water for sale; 
 extend service to low-income areas; 
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 rehabilitate existing network to reduce non-revenue water; and 
 upgrade dam safety, deliver upgrades, procurement and installation of meters, 
provide engineering services, vehicles and equipment for regional and district 
offices (MWRWH, 2005). 
The rest of the components included the public-private participation development, 
capacity building and project management, and severance programme. Funding for the 
project was provided by the World Bank (US$103,000,000), the Republic of Ghana 
(US$12,000,000) and Nordic Development Fund (US$5,000,000) all amounting to 
US$120,000,000. Under this arrangement, the private operator, as management 
contractor, was required to turn the fortunes of the urban water sector around over the 5-
year contract period with the overall objective of restoring GWCL to a sound financial 
footing and also to make a significant improvement in the commercial operations of the 
urban water supply company. However the bulk of the much required new investment, 
supported by the World Bank’s ‘$100m’, was to be procured and managed separately by 
the remnant of GWCL acting as public sector ‘asset holder’. 
 
2.3.3 Public agitations against the involvement of the private sector in 
urban water supply sector of Ghana 
Customarily, in Ghana water is regarded as a natural resource that God has freely given 
to humankind and therefore must be free for all. Naturally, water is a resource that is 
essential for the survival of the human race and the socio-economic development of 
every nation. Its commercialization through the involvement of the private sector 
therefore cannot easily be accepted without opposition from consumers who for several 
years have treated water as a ‘social good’ rather than an ‘economic good’, whilst 
knowing that the primary aim of any private enterprise is to make profit.  
The arguments of consumers, civil society groups, experts and government for and 
against privatisation in the urban water sector, generated further anxiety as to whether 
the argument is about a “subsidy for the rich”, rather than the welfare of the poor, and a 
financial burden for the government? While some argued that the only option available to 
government to rescue GWCL was to privatise its operations and management, others 
were vehemently opposed to it. Prior to the arrangement, civil society groups and Non-
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Governmental Organisations such as the Committee for Joint Action (CJA), the 
Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) and the Coalition Against Water 
Privatisation persistently resisted the reform in Ghana through demonstrations and radio 
talk shows, calling on the government not to engage the private operator. After the 
private operator was engaged they continually asked for the abrogation of the contract. 
Consequently, the partnership has generated a heated debate from two opposing 
groups. The major justification of the proponents of private sector participation is the 
inability of the public utility (GWCL) to provide the urban population with adequate, 
efficient and sustainable water supply. The proponents of public sector provision believe 
that water is a basic necessity of life which must be treated as a public or ‘social good’ 
rather than an ‘economic good’ and must therefore be managed by the public sector, 
recognising that a water enterprise exhibits a natural monopoly due to the cost of the 
distribution network. Human rights arguments were also advanced, similar to the case of 
Johannesburg where human rights activists took the private operator to court for using 
prepaid water meters. They maintained that government would not have adequate 
control over any private company that may be engaged which would lead to higher water 
tariffs, profiteering, poor water quality supply and the neglect of the urban poor. Others 
agreed that this was a risk because the contracts being envisaged were limited, typically 
5years, and did not directly link investment to service provision. Therefore they could 
well focus only on improving service to existing customers rather than reaching the 
urban poor (Weitz and Franceys, 2002). K'Akumu (2006)however contends that no 
matter how natural a monopoly it may be, that does not explain why a natural monopoly 
must only be a public one and that after all, “it is easier to regulate (a private operator) 
rather than the public one”. Nellis (1994), as cited by (K'Akumu, 2006), reaffirms this 
position by stating that, “private ownership will perform better than public ownership 
because:  
 it establishes a market for managers, leading to higher quality management; 
 capital markets subject private enterprises to greater security;  
 private enterprises are much more subject to exit;  
 politicians interfere less in the affairs of private enterprises than they do for public 
enterprises; and 
  private firms are supervised by self-interested board members and shareholders, 
rather than by disinterested bureaucrats. 
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Conversely, Saal and Parker (2001) as cited by (K'Akumu, 2006) maintain that 
privatisation only increased profits, not productivity in the United Kingdom. It is 
therefore recognised that the mere transfer of a public utility to the private partner 
may not necessarily translate into improved performance. 
 
2.1 The Public-Private Partnerships concept 
Partnerships take different forms involving individuals, institutions, organisations on the 
one hand and governments or public institutions on the other with differing levels or 
degrees of responsibility, reward and risks. Privatisation is “the entire process of 
expanding the sphere of the market through a host of regulations that create an 
enabling environment for free enterprise to operate as a strategy for sustainable 
economic development” privatisation (UN-HABITAT, (1998) as cited by (K'Akumu, 
2004). Public-private partnership has variously been defined by different scholars, 
institutions and governments around the world. In its narrow sense, “public-private 
partnerships are considered as distinct institutional models employed principally to 
develop infrastructure, including build-own operate-transfer (BOOT), build-operate-
transfer (BOT) and lease-build-operate (LBO)” (Savas, 2000). The BBC (2003) 
describes PPP simply as any collaboration between public bodies, such as local 
authorities or central government, and private companies. The term ‘Public-private 
partnership’ has no legal meaning and can be used to describe a wide variety of 
arrangements involving the public and private sectors working together in some way” 
(The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2009). 
A legally-binding contract between government and business for the provision of assets 
and the delivery of services that allocates responsibilities and business risks among the 
various partners is referred to as public private partnership and in such an 
arrangement, government remains actively involved throughout the project’s life cycle 
(Partnerships British Columbia, 2011).  
In its broadest sense, public-private partnerships are simply about “every type of 
interaction between public and private-sector actors” (Greve and Hodge, 2007). Two 
Dutch scholars, Klijn and Teisman, (2005) as cited by (Greve and Hodge, 2007), 
broadly explain the entire concept of PPP as “more or less sustainable cooperation 
between public and private actors in which joint products or services are developed 
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and in which risks, costs and resources are shared”. Baxter et al. (2010) describe PPP 
as arrangements that are typified by joint working between the public and private sector 
and added that in the broadest sense of it, PPPs can embrace all types of collaboration 
across the interface between the public and private sectors to deliver policies, services 
and infrastructure. These arrangements are about challenging the principal-agent 
relationships normally associated with public-sector contracting and entering the area 
of principal-principal relations and win-win situations (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007).  
Budgets of governments for infrastructure spending in the water and sanitation sector 
have always been a drain on economies of most low-income countries where urban 
population growth continues to outpace the rate of growth of infrastructure. 
Consequently, funding for urban water supply projects towards network expansion has 
always been limited. Poor service delivery, poor performance and mismanagement are 
the hallmarks of most publicly owned water utilities in these low income countries and 
thus pose a major challenge to all categories of consumers but particularly the urban 
poor living in slums. “Normally, at the confluence of overpopulation, economic 
deprivation and environmental degradation, people living in slums occupy a precarious 
position at the very fringes of urban life” (Ali, 2010).  
In the early 1990s, many of the governments in low income countries attempted to 
rescue their respective urban water sectors through a range of institutional, operational 
and governance reforms but were unsuccessful. Subsequently, public-private 
partnerships became increasingly popular as a form of organising the interface 
between public and private sector organisations around the world in the expectation 
that private finance would bridge the investment gap (Hodge and Greve, (2005) as 
cited by Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). Increasing demand for capital investment 
therefore continues to drive the participation of the private sector in the urban water 
sector in the low income countries. According to (Marin, 2009), one of the key 
objectives of involving the private operator is to improve operating efficiency. 
By the end of 2007 excluding China and two large private operators in Cote d’Ivoire 
and Senegal, there were more than 220 active water public-private partnership projects 
or schemes in 41 developing and emerging countries and  served as many as 67 
million consumers or more than 40 percent of the market (Marin, 2009). Overall, the 
concept of public-private partnerships raises the awareness that no single organisation 
can solve problems alone and that, to find solutions to complex public policy tasks, 
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public- and private-sector actors must form new institutional arrangements that allow 
for participation from both sectors (Greve and Hodge, 2007).  
 
2.2 The debate on Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the water sector 
Since the early years of the 1990s, the policies, interest and influence of the World 
Bank, other international finance institutions and bi-lateral donor agencies developed 
towards the use of privatisation of the public sector to deliver reform and therefore 
improve services. The multi-laterals required indebted countries to subject national 
service institutions to public-private partnerships in the framework of structural 
adjustment programmes in exchange for loan guarantees (Green, 2003; Lobina and 
Hall, 2003; Sohail and Cotton, 2004) as cited by (Fuest and Haffher, 2007). Most lower-
income economies were advised, and sometimes forced or pushed by the these donor 
agencies (in exchange for further disbursements of loans and or aid), to promote more 
efficient operations, increased investment and service coverage through privatisation of 
public utilities in order to reduce the financial burden on government budgets. 
Although the World Bank and others pulled back from such a clear ‘pro PPP’ position in 
recent years, the question remains as to whether or not this policy has brought about 
the needed change or results that PPP projects or schemes have always suggested 
and expected to bring to the urban population most especially the urban poor who 
usually live in the slum areas? The debate over the contribution of the private sector in 
the urban water supply sector has continued to rage over the extent and quality of 
water supply services they provide and whether the new paradigm shift has served its 
original aims and objectives. According to Marin, (2009), experience has shown that 
the main attraction of the private sector into the water sector which had been presumed 
to be the ability to supply financial investment was the wrong focus. According to him 
“the biggest contribution that the private operator can make is improving operational 
efficiency and service quality”. Persistently, multilateral agencies have been blamed for 
insisting on the promotion of a “one-size-fits-all model”. “Public-private partnerships are 
simply seen “as a ‘softer’ option for governments to draw a private sector expertise 
than the more direct strategy of privatising or shifting responsibility for service 
production to the private sector” (Greve and Hodge, 2007). Marin (2009) maintains that 
the worst enemy of public utilities is complacency and this problem is rooted in the 
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assumption that poor service has no consequences and that it is only those public 
water utilities that have applied sound commercial management principles, 
emphasising financial viability, accountability and service have succeeded in improving 
performance.  
Presently, evidence emerging from some PPP schemes have re-kindled the debate 
about the relevance of PPPs in the water supply sector. Variously, public-private 
partnerships have been criticised on the grounds of poverty aggravation since they are 
usually perceived to be linked to the objective of cost recovery (Fuest and Haffher, 
2007). On the contrary, it is advocated or explained that the basis for involving the 
private sector is to turnaround poor-performing utilities and bring new expertise, 
financial resources and a more commercial orientation to bear on them. For instance, 
(Budds and McGranahan, 2003); (Marin, 2009a); and (Braadbaart, 2002) argue that 
the main goals intended to be achieved by engaging private operators in the water 
sector for direct service provision are to improve upon the poor services provided by 
water utilities and increase efficiency and coverage. Fuest and Haffher, (2007) however 
consider the involvement of the private sector as a strategy to improve the 
development of sustainable and efficient water supply systems. “Public-private 
partnerships offer policy-makers an opportunity to improve the delivery of services and 
the management of facilities and mobilise private capital” (World Bank, 2009). 
 On the contrary, the prescription of public-private partnership policies or schemes to 
most governments of developing countries by the World Bank and other donors, 
referred to as the new paradigm in the water and sanitation sector, could rather be 
seen to be stemming from the assumption that the private sector has the ability to 
undertake capital investments and in addition has the technical and managerial 
capacity and capability to perform more efficiently and effectively than the public sector. 
In whatever way one critically looks at the concept or paradigm, it is most likely that 
one can comfortably provide some justifications for the choice. This is because while 
“investors say it brings efficiency, opponents say it hurts the poor. Whatever one 
believes, the poor have no say in the matter” (Akande, 2002). 
 In most developing countries, public water utilities are beset by widespread illegal 
connections, high water losses due to obsolete pipe networks, political interference and 
patronage, financial weakness, poor billing and bill collection, corruption and very weak 
cost recovery. Ironically, at the confluence of overpopulation, economic deprivation and 
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environmental degradation, people living in slums occupy a precarious position at the 
very fringes of urban life” (Ali, 2010). In conclusion, the poor are those who bear the 
disproportionate share of the negative impact (Fuest and Haffher, 2007). Marin (2009) 
however believes that the performance of public-private partnership projects in practice 
depends largely on the action of both the contracting government and the private 
operator – with the government playing a more or less important role depending on the 
type of PPP scheme that is adopted, buttressing the point that different PPP schemes 
will produce different results in different environments in which they operate. 
Albeit some PPP projects have brought about appreciable levels of improvements to 
many people around the world, the concept could not be said to be welcomed and 
popular among many people and institutions that hold very strong but opposing views 
and ideologies to it. Therefore, “proposals to involve the private sector have often been 
met with concerns-about tariff hikes, staff cutbacks, and limited ability to reduce 
inefficiency and expand access to service among the poor” (Ringskog et al., 2006). 
While the World Bank and other institutions and individuals strongly argue that the 
involvement of the private sector in the public services will lead to the creation of 
efficient markets resulting in economic growth and also directly finance investments 
leading to quality service and access expansion, its opponents or critics contend that 
privatisation destroys or damages the quality of public services and undermines public 
accountability (Cook, and Minogue, 2005). According to Biswas, (2003), as cited by 
(Mycoo, 2007), “policies promoted and implemented by the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and other donor agencies have often strangled public authorities 
and utilities by denying them funding for renewal or extension of infrastructure 
investment to upgrade their service” and that “the myths of privatisation experience 
need to be substituted by objective analysis of empirical facts”. The implementation of 
PPP projects in developing countries has attracted further criticism in the pre-contract 
stages “on account of agreements structured in favour of the contractor, of the neglect 
of the interests and representation of the poor, the over-emphasis on technical and 
financial issues, misconceptions about the potential consequences of competition in 
the public sector and the lack of a base of information about low income groups, often 
caused by time constraints” (Green, 2003; Hukka and Katko, 2003; Sohail and cotton, 
2004 as cited by(Fuest and Haffher, 2007). Nevertheless available information has it 
that, often, the challenges of the public sector in the provision of water services have 
been exacerbated when not provoked by public policy decisions (PRINWASS, 2004, as 
cited by (Mycoo, 2007). Greve and Hodge (2007) strongly argue that “some private 
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companies might even think of public-private partnerships as a necessary step in order 
to lure the public sector into sharing some of its authority and expertise, while the long-
term aim of the private sector is to take over the business completely”. This argument 
is in line with the interpretation of scholars who see PPPs merely as a rhetoric device 
that paves way for the more wholesome privatisation and private-sector performance 
(Linder 1999; Savas, 2000). 
From the literature on comparative public management reform “we cannot expect a 
global convergence around single ideas or concepts” (Christensen and Lægreid, 2001; 
Pollitt and Bouckaet, 2004 as cited by (Greve and Hodge, 2007). According to 
Broklehurst and Janssens, (2004), every sector reform must be viewed in the context 
of the overall environment in the country. Water reforms are sometimes undertaken 
due to droughts, change of government, poor performance of the water utility, political 
orientation and will of a particular political party in power, economic challenges due to 
huge public wage bill, big government spending and uncompetitive economy. Different 
governments face different challenges in the water and sanitation sector and the level 
of involvement of the private sector in the public sector depends on the specific 
challenges confronting the sector at a given time, the prevailing economic conditions, 
and the political environment in which it occurs. Variations in reform practice from one 
country to another are the rule rather than the exception (Christensen and Lægreid, 
2007). It is said that “reform is most likely to occur when the water sector is in crisis, but 
only if the causes of the crises are tractable” (Alcazar and Brook-Cowen, (1996) as 
cited by (Alcazar et al., 2002)). In whichever way one looks at the new paradigm, many 
of the newcomers (private operators) are now increasingly coming from developing 
countries and are changing the face of the water market radically which in the 1990s 
looked like an oligopoly among a few multinationals (Marin, 2009). It is therefore not 
surprising that many public-private-partnership (PPP) projects have suffered 
controversy including abrupt contract terminations and reneging on contracts by both 
the contracting authorities and the private operators since the inception of the concept 
of public-private participation. In the researcher’s view, unless the ideological 
dichotomy about PPP is fully and carefully moderated, the raging controversies over 
the involvement of the private sector in the public sector will continue unabated. In 
trying to have a better understanding of the viability and impact of public-private 
partnership in the water sector in developing countries it is important to carefully 
examine these PPP projects.  
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What is critical in terms of assessing organisational performance is to determine the 
objectives against which performance should be judged (Nickson and Franceys, 2003). 
Marin, (2009), emphasises the point that “the debate has sometimes been driven more 
by ideology than by objective results, and the performance record of many PPP 
projects has never been scrutinised” and added that lack of data on the populations 
served and on the quality of services rendered has made it difficult to assess the 
overall contribution of PPP projects in developing countries. According to Clarke et al., 
(2004) as cited in Marin, (2009), out of 25 projects studied in developing countries, 
private participation had a “broadly” positive impact in sixteen cases, a negative impact 
in five, and mixed results in four. He added that, it is difficult to state that consistently, 
PPP projects have performed better than public utilities in expanding access. However, 
their contributions have been significant. For instance, in Brazil, Morocco and 
Colombia, private concessionaires could not convince or demonstrate that their 
performance was better than the public utilities based on the data available unlike in 
the Sub-Saharan Africa, where clearly the performance of the private operator has 
been better than the public utilities in expanding access through household 
connections. Furthermore, Marin, (2009), stated that much of the diversity in 
performance among PPP projects can be traced to differences in financial design and 
availability for investment and that the assumption that private lenders would be ready 
to give large amounts of non-recourse project financing to private operators proved 
unrealistic. He reported that, public financing has been identified as one of the 
elements in the designs of many successful projects through concessional loan and 
grants. Cote d’Ivoire presented a special case of a crossbreed between concession 
and affermages where investments were totally financed through cash-flow generation 
 
2.3 Forms of PPPs in the urban water supply sector 
Collaboration between the private sector and public organisations leading to the private 
operation and management of public utilities comes in various forms depending on the 
working environment. However, the success of PPP projects or schemes are believed 
to be contingent upon several conditions including the political environment, socio-
cultural characteristics, nature of the legal and regulatory frameworks, level of 
commitments on the part of both the contracting authority and private operator among 
other things. Reportedly, the performance of public-private partnership projects in 
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practice depends largely on the action of both the contracting government and the 
private contractor – with the government playing a more or less important role 
depending on the type of public-private partnership scheme that is adopted (Marin, 
2009). He however emphasises that different PPP schemes will produce different 
results in different environments in which they operate.  According to Sansom et al. 
(2003), there may well be 'no correct’ answer for water and sanitation institutions and 
that every country will have to go through a process of determining which process of 
combination of public private participation approaches best suits their political, socio-
economic and water resources environment. But evidently, one challenge that exists in 
developing countries has been the lack of certainty regarding the most suitable 
approach to be adapted following a series of highly publicised contract terminations 
and other controversies in the water sector in developing countries (Marin, 2009).  
Generally, different arrangements exist in different forms, sizes and boundaries 
between public and private sectors and are sometimes blurred, making public-private 
partnerships difficult to classify and to define clearly (Ouyahia, 2006). The role that the 
private sector can play in the delivery of services exists in varying degrees (Earle, 
2001). As can be seen in figure 2-1, a wide spectrum of forms and sizes of private 
sector participation exist beginning from service contract (as the simplest form) to a 
concession contract, depending on varying conditions. What differentiate various 
options of partnership and participation are the degree of private capital being 
introduced and the length of the contract required to obtain the necessary pay back 
and the necessary return on capital (Sansom et al., 2003).  
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Figure 2-2Different modes of Public Private Partnerships 
Source: (Blokland, Braadbaart & Schwartz, 1999) as cited by Franceys, (2007) in a 
lecture note 
Nonetheless, the World Bank, (1995), as cited by (Alcazar et al., 2002), says that a 
reform becomes politically desirable when the political benefits outweigh the political 
costs, and feasible when reformers have the power to overcome opposition and 
implement changes. In Argentina for instance, economic crisis during the period of a 
reform in the water sector somewhat shaped the political competition and environment 
which favoured the reform. 
2.4 Different modes of management models for water utilities 
2.4.1 Service contract 
The simplest form of partnership among all other forms of private sector participation 
arrangements is the service contract. With a service contract, overall responsibility for 
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the system is retained by the public authority and only some specific components of the 
overall service are contracted out to the private operator to bring about economic and 
financial efficiency. In such an arrangement, the private operator or contractor is limited 
to handling its own staff and the service component contracted out to it to provide 
efficient service. Usually, the contract period lasts between one to three years 
(Sansom, et al., 2003). And given the limited period and narrowly defined nature of 
service contracts, competitive bidding procedures can easily be used to award service 
contracts (Asian Development Bank, 2008).  
In the water sector, services such as meter reading, billing, repairs of pipelines and 
other plumbing works are within the domain of service contracts spanning between one 
to three years as in the case of Mexico City; Santiago, Chile; and Madras, India. Often, 
service contracts are portrayed as a stepping stone to management contracts, leases 
or concessions, and do not necessarily create circumstances that make further reform 
likely (Haggarty et al., 2002). 
In Mexico, there were two features worthy of note regarding the service contract 
employed. First, four contractors were engaged and second, each contract was 
designed to be executed in three stages over a ten-year contract period. This 
arrangement reveals something about the use of multiple private partners and 
progressive step processes to increase the benefits and sustainability of private sector 
reforms in water sector over time.  Here, the possible benefits to be derived from such 
a model or approach were that, competition could be enhanced among individual 
operators to generate efficiency. Furthermore, it was presumed to allow governments 
to gradually introduce the private operators to the public to fend off the usual public 
opposition and encumbrances that are often associated with public-private partnership 
projects (Haggarty et al., 2002). Politicians appear to appreciate this type of model 
where difficult decisions in the implementation of such plans are often left to the later 
years so as to push potentially unpopular actions onto future administrations while 
allowing the current government to claim credit for instituting reforms (Brook, (1997) as 
cited by (Shirley, 2002)). 
2.4.1 Management contracts 
Marin, (2009) defines a management contract as an arrangement in which services are 
provided by a publicly owned utility that is managed by a private operator. In a broader 
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term, it is an arrangement under which operational control of an enterprise is vested by 
contract in a separate enterprise which performs the necessary managerial functions 
for a fee in return (The Water and Sanitation Monitoring Platform (WSMP) - Ghana, 
(2009). Unlike service contracts, the private operator is granted more responsibility to 
manage several components of the services under management contracts including 
operation and maintenance of the distribution system. Typically, the contract periods 
span between 3 and 5 years as in the case of Cartagena, Mozambique, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Uganda, Gaza, Colombia; Gdansk, Poland; Mali; and Johannesburg, South 
Africa among others (Marin, 2009). Distinctively, the private operator offers services 
only while the public authority provides the working and investment capital and shapes 
issues regarding cost recovery to ensure the financial viability and sustainability of the 
utility. Nonetheless, separating the service and management functions from financing 
and expansion decisions makes the overall governance more complicated and 
therefore sometimes introduces the risk of the private operator not enjoying the needed 
autonomy or the authority to overhaul under-performing capital investments. 
A management contract might be chosen as a means of improving operational 
efficiency in a mature water and sanitation utility where there is no need for substantial 
new investment, or where there is limited political support for moving towards lease 
arrangements in which a private operator takes on the commercial risk (Marin, 2009). 
Normally, governments employ management contracts first to test the waters (- i.e. 
adopt a stepwise approach towards a long-term leasing or concession contracts) as in 
the case of Trinidad and Tobago, and Gaza. Evidently, in practice, none of these 
management contracts led to a more complex public-private partnership. The point 
must be made that this model or arrangement may not be suitable for governments that 
expect to access credit or private finance for new investments since the private 
operator will not make any capital investments.   
Nonetheless, one major advantage of a management contract is that several 
operational gains could be made through the private sector management without 
having to transfer the assets of the public utility to the private operator or investor. 
Management contracts are relatively less difficult to develop than others and can be 
less controversial as well as being lower cost (Asian Development Bank, 2008).  
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2.4.2 Example: Management Contract in Gaza 
According the World Bank, (2006), by 1995, the water supply services in the Gaza 
Strip were in a crisis. The water utility was confronted by; 
i. intermittent water supply services 
ii.  over extraction of its primary water resource 
iii.  poor water quality due to the intrusion of deeper saline water 
iii. high levels of unaccounted for water of about 50 percent 
iv.  leakages in distribution networks 
v. low tariffs - well below cost recovery (i.e. US$0.30 - US$0.40). 
vi. illegal connections, and  
vii. inaccurate or no metering. 
Consequently, the Palestinian Authority entered into a four-year management contract 
with Lyonnaise des Eaux/Khatib and Alami (LEKA) so as to improve water supply 
services in the West Bank. Technically, there were no clear legal and regulatory 
frameworks. Not only that but also, there was scanty information on the water utility 
and its network system. Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority was faced with political 
and security challenges in the Gaza (Saghir et al, 1999). However, one essential 
feature of the arrangement that is worthy of note was the use of a reputable 
international audit firm to provide an independent assessment of the performance of 
the operator and overcome any potential tension(s) that might arise between the 
private operator and the Palestinian Authorities in view of the fact that there were no 
clear regulatory framework. Again, the arrangement offered several opportunities in 
view of the fact that the contract was flexible to the extent that the private operator was 
allowed to determine immediate investment needs and also procure goods and 
services whenever necessary (World Bank, 2006). Furthermore, it allowed the 
contracting authority and customers to make informed choices and judgements based 
on the performance of the private operator.  
According to the World Bank, (2006), the operator successfully met the requirements 
of the contract terms under its direct authority but the local authorities displayed 
inconsistencies in implementing their responsibilities. For instance, the Palestinian 
Authority failed to deal with nearly 11,000 illegal connections identified and reported 
and were also reluctant to deal with staff in the dosing units who failed to follow 
36 
technical and operational instructions (Saghir et al., 1999). They added that leaving 
the “implementation of management decisions in the hands of the local authorities” 
was a major defect of the arrangement and thus greatly exposed some of the major 
limitations of management contract that negatively impacted on the benefits of 
improved management. Meanwhile, the project improved the per capita water 
consumption from 70 to 100 litres per day by 2001. In addition it improved the 
water quality, and the unaccounted-for water reduced from 50% to 30%. Finally 
the revenue also improved.  
2.4.3 Example: Management Contract in Trinidad and Tobago 
Evidently, the public water utility, the Water and Sewerage Authority -WASA was poorly 
operated and managed and this led to the engagement of the private operator in the 
water sector in Trinidad and Tobago, (Weatherdon, G. as cited in Sansom, K. 2003 ). 
The utility had a malfunctioning water supply and distribution system and went 
bankrupt. The Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA) of Trinidad and Tobago suffered 
similar challenges that many publicly-owned utilities in low income countries face 
including;  
i. high unaccounted-for water,  
ii. low service coverage,  
iii. low productivity,  
iv. corruption,  
v. financial bankruptcy,  
vi. political patronage and interference,  
vii. non-metering,  
viii. very low water tariffs, 
ix.  lack of capital for infrastructural development and capacity building and  
x. low collection efficiency (Mycoo, 2007; Nankani, 1997). 
 In addition to the above challenges, there was no well-defined or planned programme 
for rehabilitating old distribution pipelines and pipe repair techniques were inadequate. 
This led to high levels of unaccounted-for water and frequent interruptions in water 
supply. Due to the level of bankruptcy, the water utility could hardly float bonds or raise 
commercial loans (Mycoo, 2007). Apparently, water tariff levels remained unchanged 
over four decades (i.e. from 1937 to 1985) for political expediency. Strangely, more 
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than half of the funds granted to WASA for capital development were used in taking 
care of daily cash requirements. This further led to the erosion of the asset base of the 
utility, deterioration of physical plants and rampant water rationing. Even though, it 
required a policy reform to address the operational, maintenance and investment 
challenges confronting the bankrupt public water utility, the government opted for 
privatisation in 1996 using an interim management contract with Severn Trent Water 
International of the United Kingdom” (Mycoo, 2007). A two-phase strategy was adopted 
with the primary objective of giving the government of Trinidad and Tobago ample time 
to: 
i.  gather information for better risk allocation in the future, 
ii.  develop a long-term tariff regime, and 
iii. establish a relationship of trust with a private operator and at the same time 
improving service employing private sector management (Nankani, 1997). 
Fundamentally, the loan contracted from the World Bank was to help undertake major 
maintenance activities on the water network system, increase access, improve billing 
and collection and install more meters based on performance targets set in the 
arrangement. Meanwhile, with the private sector involvement in a water sector with 
limited regulatory capacity, the approach adopted by Government could best be 
described as the safest. Apparently, it was politically unwise and disadvantageous for 
the incumbent government of Trinidad and Tobago to undertake a long-term, 30-year 
concession without first testing the ‘political pulse’ of the general population with a 
short- term agreement and partly because, “it would require the time-consuming task of 
amending the company’s authorisation act in the months preceding a general election 
in November 1995”, hence the management contract was chosen (Nankani, 1997).  
One major challenge of this arrangement that resulted in poor outcomes was the failure 
of the Government to set up a strong and comprehensive regulatory framework to 
regulate the activities of the private operator (Manson, 1994 as cited by (Mycoo, 2007). 
Additionally, the autonomy of Water and Sewerage Authority, (WASA) was severely 
compromised through government’s interference and political manoeuvring. Critical 
measures that needed to be adopted to improve the efficiency of the utility such as 
strict financial accounting, cost recovery and programming of investment fell victim to 
government actions (Mycoo, 2007). In the end, the performance of the private operator 
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was judged unsatisfactory to the Trinidad government and therefore the contract was 
not renewed upon expiry. 
2.4.4 Example: Management contract in Mozambique 
In 1999, the Government of Mozambique created an asset management agency 
(FIPAG) to develop and improve the urban water supply services in the large cities 
after the protracted war in 1992. Two separate but bundled arrangements of a 15-year 
lease and management contracts were signed with Agua de Mozambique (AdeM) – 
(formed through a consortium of foreign water supply operators led by SAUR, and 
some local investors). A comprehensive institutional reform was undertaken by 
developing an institutional framework, referred to as the Delegated Management 
Framework (DMF). The framework created two autonomous public bodies including an 
independent regulatory body (CRA) and an asset management agency (FIPAG) to 
facilitate the smooth implementation of the entire reform in the water sector (Triche et 
al., 2009). According to Triche et al., (2009), several factors influenced government’s 
decision to adopt this form of contracting by awarding two separate but bundled 
contracts which included “the existing decentralized market structure, the government’s 
policy to promote the development of financially viable decentralized services, and the 
expectation that services in the provincial capitals would probably not attract qualified 
bidders unless bundled”.  
Overall, the selection of the successful bidder (AdeM) was based on technical and 
financial proposal. Albeit the financial bid was unrealistically low AdeM won the 
contract and two years into the project in 2001 it began facing major financial difficulties 
worsened by delays in the implementation of new investments and floods in 2000. 
Ultimately, it culminated in the renegotiation of the contracts where higher fees, 
improved service obligations and risk allocations and procedures were introduced.  
2.4.5 Management Contract critique 
The management contract itself is a legal document which explains in performance 
requirements in detail and spells out the terms of relationships among all relevant 
stakeholders or parties including the private operator, the asset-holding authority, the 
regulator if any, and customers in the relevant water sector. It constitutes the 
foundation around which all future activities and conflicts are revolved. The document 
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requires clear definitions of all legal, financial, technical/operational, regulatory, 
institutional and social boundaries to ensure efficient, transparent, effective and 
successful contract implementation. Marin (2009) maintains that details do matter; the 
choice of contractual designs, as well as the willingness of the public and private 
partners to make the contract work during the implementation. And according to him, 
these factors have proved to be major determinants in the final outcome.  
In the case of Gaza and Trinidad & Tobago, the designs were such that the contract 
fee was composed of a fixed payment/fee component (i.e. fixed management fee) and 
a performance fee component that was contingent upon specific performance targets 
set in the agreement for the private operator. In Gaza, a fixed-fee component of US$6 
million formed the basis for international competitive bidding for the management 
contract with an incentive payment of US$3 million which had an annual ceiling of a 
quarter of the total incentive payments (US$750,000). Here, the contract arrangement 
demanded that the private operator provide full-time expatriate managers, full-time 
local technicians, administrative support, and short-term expatriate specialists to 
undertake certain specific tasks. Technically, all performance targets were grouped 
under four contract objectives and rated to reflect the priority of all targets with the 
reduction of unaccounted-for water being the most prioritised. Incentive payments were 
therefore made employing composite performance scores. Meanwhile, one significant 
feature of the agreement is worthy of note. Because there existed no regulatory body 
prior to the contract, the contracting authority engaged a private auditing firm (Deloitte 
and Touche, Norway) which was mandated to audit annual technical/operational and 
financial performance targets and determine incentive fees, if any, and finally to 
undertake comfort letters for any payments to be effected. What is unclear is whether 
or not the auditing firm could effectively monitor and assess the performance of the 
private operator knowing that, irrespective of who owned the water utility, “there is 
always a strong asymmetry of information between the regulator and operator” and 
sometimes the “private operators can abuse their monopoly position to extract undue 
and excessive profits”(Marin, 2009). Obviously, this form of the contract arrangement 
raises a major question about whether it could not have been more appropriate to 
establish a local but independent regulatory body that was legally mandated to oversee 
all sector activities including tariff-setting instead of simply engaging an auditing firm 
that was only reviewing the operator’s annual performance reports.  
Furthermore, other lessons that could be drawn from this arrangement are: 
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 the high level of financial support provided to the project by the World Bank for 
infrastructural development and  
 the network rehabilitations and system expansion helped in reducing 
unaccounted-for water, increased water coverage and per capita consumption. 
 clear benchmarks and performance ratings were set  
 the contract permitted the operator to focus on benchmarks that could promote 
higher performance 
Consequently, staff training and public relations were given less attention because 
these benchmarks were perceived as harder to achieve or worth too little in terms of 
their weighted worth” (Saghir et al., 1999). However he stated that, one way of 
overcoming such challenges is to design the contract in such a way that some 
objectives form part of the contractual requirements either within the base or the 
incentive fees, and to be monitored effectively (Saghir et al., 1999). To reform the water 
and sanitation sector in Trinidad and Tobago, certain initiatives were taken by the 
government to improve the economic viability of the public water utility. According to 
(Mycoo, 2007), a tariff increase was swiftly granted prior to the engagement of the 
private contractor thereby prividing the opportunity to be insulated from the usual 
unwarranted agitation, accusation and wrath of the general public and other civil 
society groups against the private operator for the tariff increases upon resumption. In 
addition, the water utility was granted the right to increase water tariff of customers 
enjoying more than a 12-hour water supply service by 35%. Meanwhile, political 
interference and inordinate delays in processing tariff increases applications resulted in 
infrequent price changes (Mycoo, 2007). Similarly in Guyana, the management 
contract began in January, 2003 and a tariff increase of 37% was granted by the 
Government in March, 2003. In spite of this, the private operator was associated with 
the tariff increase and wrongly accused by its customers for the increase in tariff even 
though it was implemented before the inception of the contract. Technically, albeit the 
link might be justified at first glance, “in reality, the water utility was bankrupt”, where 
“tariff revenues did not cover operating and maintenance costs, or even the electricity 
bill from the state electricity utility” (Marin, 2009). Also, to the private operator, it serves 
as an incentive for the generation of more revenue that will eventually lead to financial 
viability of the water utility, coverage expansion and finally provide reliable water supply 
services to its customers. In the case of Guyana, all bidders were asked to submit 
technical, financial and supplementary proposals separately to ensure that “it obtained 
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not only good financial bids, but also technically competent management teams” and to 
test the appetite of the private sector for risk in the water sector (Nankani, 1997). 
2.5 Complex Public Private Partnerships 
2.5.1 Lease contract or Affermage 
Returning to the investigation of different types of PPP arrangements under lease 
contracts, facilities are rented to the private operators by public authorities between 8 
to 15 years duration. The private operator completely assumes responsibility for the 
operation and management of the entire water system including the collection of water 
tariffs. International examples of leases, particularly common in France from where 
most of the initial private operators originated took place in Cote d'Ivoire; Guinea; and 
Czech Republic. Unlike the service and management contracts the lease models 
commit and empower the private operator to provide the working capital while the 
grantor provides the investment capital. The lessor or private operator effectively buys 
the rights to the income stream from the utility’s operations and thus assumes a 
significant share of the commercial risk associated with those operations (Sansom, et 
al., 2003). The main advantage of lease contact is that, it is more attractive to private 
operators, who might otherwise be reluctant to get involved in risky environments.  
2.5.2 Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) contracts 
A Build Operate Transfer (BOT) contract involves a concession firm or a consortium of 
firms providing the financial investment, designing, constructing, operating and 
maintaining the infrastructure for an agreed but specific period before transferring the 
facility to the government as in Mendoza, Argentina; Izmit, Turkey. Generally, build-
operate and transfer projects in the water sector have mostly been limited to the Latin 
America, East Asia and the Caribbean.  It is capital intensive and therefore mostly 
identified with new water projects that require heavy investments. BOT contract period 
lasts longer than lease period (usually more than 20 years) to ensure that the project is 
bankable before transferring the facility to the public authority or government.  
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2.5.3 Concession contracts 
Baxter et al. (2010) describe a concession as a private business operated on another's 
property by contract or permit and governed by state, federal, and local laws, which 
vary by jurisdiction. Under a concession arrangement, aside from the responsibility of 
the private contractor to operate and manage the assets of the water utility, the 
contractor also provides the investment. In this arrangement, the asset is under the 
contractor's ownership but all assets revert to the government after the contract period 
(usually for 25 and 30years), including asserts created by the private operator as in the 
case of Buenos Aires, Argentina; Manilla, Philippines; and Cancun, Mexico . 
Concessions are awarded through competitive bidding. The bidder that proposes to 
operate the utility and meets the investment targets usually for the lowest average tariff 
wins the concession and is governed by a contract that sets out such conditions as the 
main performance targets. 
2.5.4 Examples: concession contracts 
In order to understand the particular qualities and role of the management contract, it is 
useful to consider in more detail aspects of the more sophisticated and complex 
concession contracts. Examples from Buenos Aires, Argentina and Senegal are 
described. 
Despite the enormous volume of water resources available in Buenos Aires, as a result 
of poor management and policies of governments in Argentina, water was made very 
scarce. In its suburban areas where the poor were predominant, only 55% of 
inhabitants had water. Also, only about 1% of consumption was metered, billing was 
poor, collection efficiency was about 80% and water coverage was 70% in the 
metropolitan. Consequently, the water sector became well ripe for private participation 
leading to one of the largest concessions that the world saw in a developing country 
since December, 1992 (Alcazar et al., 2002). According to Ducci, (2007) as cited by 
(Marin, 2009), the concession in Greater Buenos Aires served a third of the urban 
population of the country and saw a substantial investment during the first five years. 
Even though Delfino et al., (2007) state that after 1997 the concessionaire failed to 
invest in network expansion to reach the neighbourhoods further away in the periphery, 
overall, the concession in 1992 brought about major improvements in the sector that 
were considered “striking” in spite of all the criticisms it attracted at the time.  
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However, the concessionaire’s failure to investment in the early years of the project in 
network expansion sharply brings into question the role of the private sector in funding 
water projects. Meanwhile, in some other jurisdictions, PPP projects performed well in 
expanding access to piped water as in the cases of Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, East Manila 
(Philippines), Guayaquil (Ecuador) Cartagena (Colombia) and Corrientes (Argentina).  
Similarly, Senegal’s urban water supply sector underwent a major reform after the 
public utility became bankrupt. The utility was also plagued with a lot of problems such 
as; lack of autonomy from government, chronic water shortages in the capital city and 
piecemeal development of the asset and unpaid bills with clients in the public sector 
(government departments, municipalities and parastatals),. Consequently, the 
government engaged a French water company on a 10-year contractual basis to run 
the production and distribution systems of the urban water utility with a major objective 
establishing long-term financial viability through increased efficiency and effectiveness 
so as to rescue the bankrupt urban water supply sector. According to Brockhurst and 
Janssens, (2004), the in Senegal saw a lot of improvement by the seventh year and is 
perceived to be an example of a well-planned and well-executed reform. One major 
factor that contributed to the success of this arrangement was the effective and efficient 
contract design processes that were employed. Here, a great emphasis was placed on 
learning from experiences of other transactions and reform processes within other 
jurisdictions. Comparisons were made using the case of Guinea, The Gambia and Cote 
d’Ivoire. Finally, the institutional framework for the water sector was: 
  transparent 
  driven by three basic concepts: accountability, autonomy, and incentives. 
  attract a professional private operator 
 co-ordinated centrally by an experienced and asset owner (State Asset Holding 
Company) 
 not overly regulated with too many conditions placed on the actors 
 and ensure that the partners cooperated and maximised joint benefits (asset-
holding authority and private operator) (Brockhurst and Janssens, 2004). 
Furthermore, it was emphasised that a sound balance should exist between the 
operator and the asset-holding company stating that: “if the arrangement creates a 
giant and a dwarf, the outcome will be that the giant will dictate to the dwarf”. As they 
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put it in the report, even a solid contract will not prevent overruling if there is not 
balance of power (Brockhurst and Janssens, 2004).  
More significant of this arrangement was the bidding process. Here, request for 
proposals were widely publicised in order to attract a good number of companies from 
different countries and the government officials visited several countries to stimulate 
interest in the bidding process including England, Germany, Belgium and the United 
States of America as a follow up. According to Brockhurst and Janssens (2004), nine 
years after the initiation of the reform, the Senegalese urban water sector saw major 
improvements in service levels. It is significant state that these successes were 
chalked due to the good working relationship that existed among all sector players. 
Finally, the utility showed its capability of borrowing funds from the capital markets and 
repaying them in a timely manner.  According to  Brockhurst and Janssens, (2004), the 
reform process made the urban water sector reform in Senegal successful because of;  
 the use of a particularly appropriate form of contract  
 strong political will of government and good leadership within government 
 a well-designed process and 
 the flexibility and innovation on the part all sector actors whenever necessary 
Overall, the experience of water reform in Senegal reveals that:  
 there can be no sustainable and successful reform if there are no political 
commitments, strong internal leadership and stakeholder ownership 
 Governments must show commitments towards its investment obligations and 
ensure timely implementation   
 Sector investment must be planned in parallel or in synergy with utility reform 
 Trust and cooperation among all key sector players are crucial 
 The asset-holding company needs to be institutionally autonomous, 
professionally competent and with a clear financial and operational targets 
 Issues regarding staffing must be addressed upfront and if necessary staff 
cutbacks are effected  
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2.6.1 Impact of public-private partnerships on tariff levels 
One major reason why private operators have never been welcomed into the water 
sector by consumers has been the fear of increase in tariffs. The private operator is 
perceived to be profit-oriented or motivated albeit the assertion may not be wholly true 
for the private operator. Marin, (2009) identified three major factors that affect tariff 
levels whenever a private operator is engaged including: 
 the tariff policy adopted by the government under the PPP project, which 
determines how much of the cost will be financed through tariff revenues 
 the difference between the tariffs and cost recovery levels before the start of the 
project and  
 the level of cost reduction the private operator can achieve through efficiency 
savings  
According to him, universally, the task of evaluating tariff records of PPP schemes 
could sometimes be herculean and controversial taking into account the last two 
factors above and how they combine within the context of the developing world. Even 
though the impact of PPP projects on tariffs could be evaluated by comparing water 
tariff levels under public and private utilities, it must be done with caution since it is 
usually uncommon to have both schemes operating under the same framework (Marin, 
2009). It is therefore significant to compare parameters that are comparable under the 
same or similar conditions. From the extensive study undertaken by Gassner et al., 
(2009) using very large samples of utilities and comparing corporatized utilities with 
public-private partnership schemes, no significant impact of PPPs on tariff levels during 
either the transition or the post-PSP period, for any type of PSP contract investigated 
was found. Also, (Estache and Rossi, 2002) and (Andres et al., 2006) could hardly 
establish any effect of privatisation on prices. (Gassner et al., 2009) assigns two 
reasons for such results along the lines of theoretical predictions. They are; 
 a reduction in price due to an improvement in efficiency and  
 an increase in price due to the elimination of explicit and implicit subsidies and 
cross-subsidies often present in the sectors analyzed.  
Between the effects, the one that will dominate depends on the initial situation and the 
regulatory environment they added. 
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The sensitivity of tariffs and the need to understand the actual costs incurred by private 
operators leads to a consideration of PPP's corollary, economic regulation. 
 
2.5.2 Economic regulation in the water sector 
Fundamentally, “market failure” provokes the introduction and application of economic 
regulation to mitigate distortions associated with monopoly prices in cases where there 
are barriers to entry and should provide the right investment incentives to market 
participants and protect consumers from monopoly abuse (van Ginneken and 
Kingdom, 2008; van Basten, 2007; and (Guasch J.L. and Spiller, 1999). Usually, 
utilities with natural monopolies operate in market failure conditions, where producers 
could abuse market power and consumers would be unable to make alternative 
choices due to lack of information and competition (Aryeetey and Ahene, 2005). In 
such a situation, the tendency of service providers to overcharge and consumers to 
underpay will generate mistrust. In this regard, the role of an independent regulator as 
a “referee” can therefore not be overemphasised. Often, economic regulation is 
associated with private sector participation in the provision of water supply and 
sanitation services (Locussol et al., 2009). According to Trémolet and Hunt, (2006), 
regulation is a set of functions that consists of:  
 ensuring that service providers comply with existing rules (mainly on tariffs and 
quality standards) and  
 adapting those rules to cope with unforeseen events  
Regulation exists in various forms that may sometimes be overlapping but comes 
under three common classifications such as; economic regulation, social regulation and 
process regulation. Nevertheless, this research is particularly concerned with economic 
regulation. Conceptually, different authors and institutions have given different 
descriptions and definitions to the term “economic regulation”. According to (Guasch 
J.L. and Spiller, 1999), economic regulation is the “restrictions on prices, quantity, and 
entrance and exit conditions for specific industries” with the fundamental economic 
rationale of improving production efficiency and entails monitoring, enforcing and 
changing allowed tariffs and service standards so as to avoid monopoly abuse of 
service providers that may provide poor services and charge tariffs that are above 
47 
costs in order to increase their profits. In a more simpler and elaborate form, Gerlach 
and Franceys (2008) refer to economic regulation as “the process of acting as an 
‘impartial referee’, balancing, judging, adjudicating and refereeing the various 
stakeholders interests, not the writing of ‘regulations”. Knowing the critical role of a 
referee explains vividly the role and the relevance of economic regulation in PPPs. In 
its broadest sense, regulation is the imposition of rules by government, backed by the 
use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify the economic behaviour of 
individuals and firms in the private sector (OECD, 2007). Clearly, the few definitions 
stated above have provided various economic and social reasons for the regulatory 
functions of a regulator but the commonest among these reasons are based on 
“correcting for market failure, economies of scale or equity considerations” (Guasch 
J.L. and Spiller, 1999and OFWAT, 1999).  
 Till date, it is unclear to many what specifically the benefits of regulation are and 
sometimes raise the argument about what form it should take. While one school of 
thought says that every regulation requires a regulator and that regulation by contract 
is not possible and thus simply define regulation as “whatever the regulator does”, the 
other considers regulation to mean “almost any form of government control of the water 
sector and assume it to be the answer to any water sector problem” (Groom et al., 
2006). Groom et al., (2006), strongly disagree with the assertion that regulation is just 
“what regulators do” and argue that regulation means more than that. Regulation could 
be done by either contract or by a regulator. Meanwhile, it is generally useless to 
impose a regulator on a management contract since incentives to improve performance 
are embedded in the contract (Locussol et al., (2009). “Regulation can only 
complement ownership, not replace it” (Groom et al., 2006).  
Globally, public-private partnership in water supply sector is at risk in environments 
where there is weak regulatory capacity (Fuest and Haffher, 2007). It is fair and 
appropriate to indicate that regulation is fundamental to governing complex, open and 
diverse societies and economics (Rodrigo, 2005). In agreement, Ugaz and Price, 
(2003), argue that some regulation is necessary to prevent exploitation of monopoly 
profit by industries that retain a degree of monopoly power. Also, regulation is 
appropriate because welfare objectives of governments and private operators are not 
the same, with operators having information advantage over governments (information 
asymmetry), and also having market power and without it, private providers might 
make unreasonable profits by overcharging and under-delivering (Jamison and Berg, 
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2008; Ehrhardt et al., 2007). Regulatory institutions are therefore required to oversee 
and ensure competition, efficiency, affordable pricing and quality service (Aryeetey and 
Ahene, 2005; Berg, 2000; Mandri-Perrott, 2009)().  
Meanwhile, Groom et al., (2006) as cited by van Ginneken and Kingdom, (2008) claim 
that independent regulation of public utilities has often failed to deliver the expected 
outcomes because it lacks the ability to apply sanctions and therefore effective 
regulation will require the ability to reward good performance and punish poor 
performance. They emphasised the point that “a refusal of a regulator to grant a tariff 
increase to a privately owned utility due to an assessment of inefficiency can move the 
private owners of the utility into action by threatening their profits. If the regulator 
punishes a publicly owned utility for inefficient performance by refusing it a tariff 
increase the government owner will likely cover this deficit through taxes or a cut back 
on expenditure. In either case the public suffers”. In this regard, the researcher argues 
that the goal of an effective regulation hitches on financial viability, operational 
efficiency, distributive justice and dynamic efficiency. Here, financial viability relates to 
the creation of incentives towards cost recovery and at the same time offering quality 
services, operational efficiency ensures appropriate pricing to “optimise consumption 
and supply” while dynamic efficiency rivets on ensuring competition and expand 
services and finally, redistributive justice deals with the social objectives of universal 
services such as subsidies to take care of the poor (Mandri-Perrott, 2009). Considering 
regulation as an art therefore implies that knowing the objectives of regulation is one 
thing and having the ability to effectively and efficiently regulate in order to achieve the 
set goals and objectives is another. Berg, (2000), buttresses this position by stating 
that, part of the art of regulation revolves around understanding the linkages between 
choice of market structure, design of regulatory rules, and institutional requirements. 
Now, the ability to balance the interests of the three major sector actors; customers, 
investors and government constitutes the major task of regulation (van Basten, 2007 
and Mandri-Perrott, 2009). It must however be pointed out that, the success or failure 
of any regulation is contingent upon how it is designed and implemented, and the 
specific problem it is attempting to solve (Guasch and Spiller, 1999). It is therefore 
significant to design the systems of governance and develop the regulatory rules to 
support the objectives of improving the sector performance (Berg, 2000). Bad design of 
agreements has often accounted for the failure of agreements and a good agreement 
is “simple and short” and specifies (van Ginneken and Kingdom, 2008): 
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Guasch J.L. and Spiller, (1999) consider the underlisted regulatory elements as vital for 
effective and successful regulation  
 Regulatory credibility 
 Clear rules for and limits to government and regulator discretion  
 Minimum opportunities for renegotiation 
 Maximum use of competition  wherever feasible 
 An incentive-based regulatory framework 
 Appropriate antitrust legislation, well-trained and well-compensated 
professionals, and effective enforcement. 
Often, regulatory institutions in developing countries are weak with limited regulatory 
capacity. In certain situations, it is extremely difficult for regulatory institutions to attract 
qualified staff or professionals to undertake efficient and effective regulatory tasks due 
to poor remunerations and over-politicisation of the institutions. Consequently, many 
regulatory institutions in developing countries could hardly be described as sufficiently 
independent of governments’ control and cannot effectively enforce the regulatory 
frameworks and thus poses a major challenge to the success of most reforms 
undertaken in developing countries within the public sector (Guasch J.L. and Spiller, 
1999).  
2.5.3 Challenges of Economic Regulation  
In Ghana, regulation of water and electricity utilities has repeatedly suffered from 
political interference and patronage. These have greatly impeded the general 
performance of both the regulator and the utility companies to the extent that Ghana 
Water and Sewerage Corporation could only increase water tariffs upon ministerial 
approval which in most cases delay for several months and in some cases, more than 
a year (Amis, 1998). The question then is why would the government of Ghana 
interfere in the activities of regulators and yet continue to trumpet the mantra of 
regulation? According to Aryeetey and Ahene, (2005), the initial imposition of measures 
to promote regulation and competition in economic activities in Ghana, including utility 
services, was not necessarily out of a public conviction about the benefits of the 
principles of regulation, as in the attainment of social objectives but out of a sense of 
compulsion. While on the one hand some governments accept the general principles of 
private sector as a panacea for the inefficiencies of public utilities including lack of 
50 
quality service, poor management, lack of investment in public utilities and under-
pricing, on the other hand, they exhibit their failure to play by the rules of the game 
most of the time. Regulatory independence is very much compromised in most 
developing countries through political interference. In Zambia for instance, a regulator 
was dismissed for approving a price increase that was considered politically unpopular 
although the increase was required by law (Jamison and Berg, 2008). In the United 
States, regulators sometimes lose their jobs if they are seen by politicians to be 
outspoken or too politically active. In effect, politicians may use regulators as 
scapegoats for ineffective or unpopular policies or for policies that are difficult to 
explain to the public he added. Regulatory independence requires that the regulator 
and the regulatory body enjoy arm’s-length relationships with the consumers, private 
interests and political authorities (Smith, 1997). 
Regulation and competition in developing countries are often hampered by several 
factors making reforms difficult to attain the needed levels of effectiveness and 
efficiency. The factors listed below underscore some of the regulatory challenges in the 
water sector (Laffont, 2004): 
 Lack of up-to-date technology such as computerised systems.  
 Lack of proper training programmes; to the political and social difficulties that 
hamper the payment of incentive salaries to auditors to reward effort and 
discourage corruption. 
 Widespread corruption  
  Inability to impose high penalties in cases of documented wrongdoing 
 Weak accounting and auditing systems 
 Lack of constitutional control of government and some degree of inability to 
enter into long-term contracts. 
 Lack of checks and balances typical of well-functioning democracies (supreme 
courts, government auditing bodies, separation of powers, independent media) 
make the governments an easier prey to interest groups and patronage. 
 Weakness of rule of law 
 Poor enforcement of laws and contracts biases contracting toward self-
enforcing contracts or leads to renegotiations. 
 The failure of liberalisation and deregulation of public infrastructure to attract the 
necessary level of foreign capital and 
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 Lack of political democracy and well-functioning political institution increase the 
uncertainty of future regulations and make it difficult for government and 
regulatory institutions to make credible commitments to long-term policies. 
According to van Basten, (2007), “in the African context true independence remains the 
long-goal, but in practice government and utility regulators are closer than what might 
ideally be required”. Economic regulation is clearly a sophisticated approach to 
governance which cannot necessarily be assumed to function effectively in limited 
governance capacity environment. Coherence, predictability, credibility, legitimacy and 
accountability are key attributes of a good regulatory system (Ehrhardt et al., 2007). 
 
2.5.3 The role of the regulator in urban water supply sector in Ghana 
One major step taken by the government of Ghana to exhibit its commitment and 
support for the water sector, to ensure fairness among all stakeholders in the sector, 
was to establish an economic regulator. This was also believed to facilitate increased 
private sector participation in the water and electricity sectors. The Public Utilities 
Regulatory Commission (PURC) was set up in October 1997, under Act 538, to 
regulate the provision of utility services in the water and electricity sectors with the 
mandate to: 
 promote guidelines for rates to be charged by utility service providers; 
 protect the interest of both the service providers and consumers; 
 promote fair competition among public utilities; 
 examine and approve rates to be charged by service providers; and  
 monitor and enforce standards of performance for provision of utility services. 
Regulatory supervision of a monopoly is not necessarily political. What it requires is a 
combination of social, technical, economic, financial, accounting and commercial know-
how (Halcrow, 1995). Technically, its functions complement the role of the State 
Enterprise Commission (SEC) which regulates all State-Owned Enterprises, with the 
Water Resources Commission (WRC) regulating and managing all water resources in 
the country (PURC, 1998). But until the establishment of the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Commission in 1997, Government was both the regulator and the operator. Its mission 
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statement states that “PURC is committed to the development and delivery of the 
highest quality of utility services to all customers and potential customers, while 
building a credible regulatory regime that will respond adequately to stakeholders’ 
concerns and also ensure fairness, transparency, reliability and equity in the provision 
of utility services in the Country” (PURC, 2005). However, despite section 4 of Act 538 
which set-up the PURC making it independent and autonomous, its activities are 
criticised for not being autonomous as will be investigated further. Undue political 
interference and patronage had greatly impeded the general performance of the water 
service provider, to the extent that GWSC could only increase water tariffs upon 
ministerial approval which in most cases delayed rises for several months and in some 
cases, several years(Amis, 1998). Consistently, since the inception of multi-party 
democracy in Ghana in 1992, governments hardly ever allowed tariff increases in 
election years since the incumbent party would not like to loose votes due to tariff 
increases. In view of the foregoing challenges, there could well be weaknesses in the 
regulatory system that are likely to work against the arrangement with the management 
contractor to the extent that the regulator (PURC) remains dependent on government. 
According to the World Bank, (1994), “given the limited regulatory capacity of most 
African countries, divestiture of public utility management poses special challenges.  As 
the ultimate owner, the state will have to continue to set service goals, cost 
minimisation targets, and investment incentives. Designing good contracts and 
monitoring the implementation require sophisticated institutional capacity. This will be 
difficult in the African context, but is unlikely to be any tougher than regulating a 
government-owned utility”. 
 
2.6 Water as an “Economic” or “Social” good 
People living in low-income countries have continued to suffer from diseases and 
sicknesses associated with poor water supply and sanitation. In 2003, the estimated 
1.6 million deaths per year were attributable to unsafe water supply and sanitation, 
including lack of hygiene (Hutton and Haller, 2004). Access to clean water is key to 
survival and critical for reducing the prevalence of many water-related diseases (Gleick 
et. al., 2002). Access to water is fundamental to development and therefore any 
attempt by governments of developing countries to reduce poverty and promote 
economic growth should first address issues regarding access to improved water 
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supply and other related services which are critical and crucial. Meanwhile, misuse and 
scarcity of fresh water are frequently reported around the globe pointing to a very 
gloomy picture of how unsustainable the world’s water resources are becoming in 
future. Unless the water resources are effectively and efficiently managed, human 
health, food security, industrial development and the ecosystem will be at risk since 
they all depend on water. In 1992, the global water challenge attracted the attention of 
experts, practitioners, governments, and organisations around the world giving birth to 
the International Conference on Water and Environment (ICWE) in Dublin in 1992. 
Consequently, the provision of water services around the world has generated a 
controversial debate as to how water should be considered following the four Dublin 
principles declaration in 1992 stating that: 
 Water is a finite, vulnerable and essential resource which should be managed in 
an integrated manner. 
 Water resources development and management should be based on a    
participatory approach, involving all relevant stakeholders. 
 Women play a central role in the provision, management and safe guarding of 
water. 
 Water has an economic value and should be recognized as an economic good, 
taking into account affordability and equity criteria. 
(Source: ICWE, (1992) as cited in Savenije and Van der Zaag, (2002)) 
For many centuries before 1992, water was recognised as an economic good (Rogers 
et al., (2002). Meanwhile, between the concept of water pricing and the idea of water 
provision being a basic right to all individuals, a conflict may exist if water prices rise to 
a level that low-income households cannot afford (Rosegrant and Cline, 2002). Among 
the four principles above, the fourth has generated a controversy since it recognises 
water as “an economic good”. Meanwhile, the growing debate over globalisation and 
privatisation of water reveals the evidence of how unclear the fourth Dublin principle is 
to many (Gleick, et al., 2002). Subsequent to the Dublin meeting in January 1992, the 
United Nations (UN) Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 unequivocally gave recognition to the role of economics in the efficient 
management of water by stating that “Integrated water resources management is 
based on the perception of water as an integral part of the ecosystem, a natural 
resource, and a social and economic good” as cited in (Gleick, et al., 2002).  
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There is considerable misunderstanding about what the concept of treating water as an 
economic good (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2002). The true meaning of the 
terminology, “an economic good” has always been unclear to many and  “what has 
been far less clear is how, practically to achieve the right balance between managing 
water as an economic and a social good” (Gleick, et al., 2002). In agreement, Van der 
Zaag and Savenije, (2000) as cited by Savenije and Van der Zaag, (2002) say that “the 
problem is not with the terminology; it is the interpretation that causes confusion”.  
While the first school of thought believes that water must be considered as an 
“economic good”, the second nevertheless believes that, taking into account the 
importance of water to life, water must be considered as a “social good” and not as “an 
economic good”. Two positions have been espoused on this terminology of “water as 
an economic good”. The first position maintains that water should be priced at its 
economic value in which case the market will ensure that water is allocated to its best 
uses while the second interprets “water as an economic good” to mean that the 
“process of integrated decision making on the allocation of scarce resources, which 
does not necessarily involve financial transactions” (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2002) 
 
2.6.1 The value and cost of water  
Different theories, ideas and concepts have evolved towards improving water 
management practices over the years and attempt to determine the true economic 
value of water and its provision following the ever increasing challenges bedevilling the 
water sector including water scarcity, inefficiencies, financial non-viability and lack of 
investment among others. “The old paradigm of planning and designing water supply 
systems, with little attention to demand determinants, pricing structures and financial 
policies, is not sustainable” (UNEP 1995; Varis &Somlyody 1997; Gleick 2000; Brandes 
& Maas, 2004 as cited by Sharma and Vairavamoorthy, 2009). Water pricing and PPP 
have attracted the attention of managers, experts governments, and customers 
because they are interlinked. According to Rogers et al., (2002), conceptually, there 
are many ways to promote equity, efficiency and sustainability in the water sector 
and water pricing could be the simplest way but possibly the most difficult to implement 
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politically and that “when the price of water reflects its true cost, the resource will be put 
to its most valuable uses”. Issues of water and economy are inseparable considering 
the strong link that exists between the two (Commission on Sustainable Development-
(CSD), 2004-2005). Albeit, market-based techniques of pricing water enable the 
demand and supply relationship to play a very important role in determining the price of 
water, in most situations they are employed in irrigation and industrial water pricing 
(Johansson 2000).  Nevertheless, the market-based approach to water pricing “has not 
been widely considered for household water pricing because social equity is at least as 
important as efficiency in determining domestic water prices” (Wang et al., 2008). 
Water pricing reforms in most developing countries have been always faced 
challenges. Sometimes, the long-standing practice and cultural and religious beliefs 
that have treated water as a free good, and entrenched interests benefit from the 
existing system of subsidies and administered allocations of water add to the difficulties 
(Rosegrant and Cline, 2002).  
2.6.2 Cost reflective pricing and cost recovery of water services 
The concept of price, cost and value according to Rogers et al., (2002), are often 
bewildered when dealing with water pricing. He defined price as an “amount set by the 
political and social system to ensure cost recovery, equity and sustainability” and 
emphasise the point that cost is not the sole determinant of price for water and 
sometimes subsidies may or may not be included in the price. Cost relates to all 
expenditures incurred at every stage of water production and supply including 
production, transmission and distribution etc. Spencer, (1983) defines cost as cited by 
Van Ryneveld, (1995) as “a sacrifice that must be made in order to do or acquire 
something” and that the nature of the sacrifice could take many forms that may be 
tangible, objective or subjective including money, goods, income, security, leisure time, 
prestige, pleasure or power. In estimating the true economic value of water and costs 
related to its provision, various general principles are considered. Cost of providing 
water consists of both direct and indirect costs. Apart from values derived from water 
provision, one can also derive a value which can be affected by the reliability of water 
supply and water quality (Rogers et al., 1997). Rogers et al., (2002) argue that, many 
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who say that raising water prices is regressive and therefore reduces equity is highly 
incorrect and explained that  “higher water rates allow utilities to extend services to 
those currently not served and those currently forced to purchase water from vendors 
at very high prices”. Further, they assert that if water resources are managed in an 
integrated fashion where the economics, legal and environmental aspects complement 
each other, increased prices do improve equity, efficiency and sustainability of the 
resources. A clear signal is sent to users of water that, it should be used wisely if water 
is reasonably priced albeit cost recovery remains the prime target of water pricing 
(Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2002). According to Johansson (2000), whether by 
administrative mandate or by market forces, water pricing is an important way to 
improve water allocations and to encourage conservation. In any case, equity must be 
considered as one crucial factor when pricing water. .  
 
One major factor that has accounted for the poor performance of most urban water 
utilities in developing countries is the low water prices, providing little incentive for 
increased water use efficiency and reducing the ability to finance capital improvement 
and expansion (Rosegrant and Cline, 2002). Several objectives are attained through 
water pricing and water tariff setting is considered as a crucial function for water utilities 
(Kayaga and Motoma, 2009). Two different factors account for the wide variations 
exhibited in tariffs charged by water utilities around the world. It is explained that:  
 First “given the natural monopoly feature of water supply technology, water 
utilities which price water at marginal cost would tend to produce financial 
deficits. This feature is at odds with the objective of cost recovery needed for 
the long-term financial sustainability of the utility. Therefore, tariffs have to be 
devised so that this feature can be corrected, taking into account constraints 
such as low access to consumption metering” 
 
 Second, “in practice, water tariffs and subsidies are often not the direct product 
of market forces. In large parts of the world, the concept of water as a social 
good prevails over that of water as an economic good. As a result, it is 
commonly admitted that full cost recovery is not an appropriate objective in the 
case of water services” (UN, 2007), 
Meanwhile, Savenije and Van der Zaag, (2002), suggest that, if one employs the 
definition that economics is “about applying reason to choice” then the definitions of full 
cost and full value of Rogers et al., (1997 and 2002), should be used to make 
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allocation decisions and assert that obviously, “a certain allocation is attractive when 
the full value is higher than full cost”. Fundamentally, the aim of price setting is to 
recover the costs incurred in producing a product and services and also to provide 
appropriate returns on the capital invested in the business and unless all costs incurred 
are recovered, the financial viability of the business will be compromised leading to its 
collapse eventually. It is only water utilities that are able to generate adequate cash to 
operate and maintain their systems attract investments for system expansion and 
ultimately improving services (Winpenny, 2003). It therefore stands to reason that, 
“cost recovery is a prerequisite for sustainable water service provision” (Mugabi et al., 
2010). Best practices suggest that price of water supply service should be set to meet 
economic, efficiency, financial, equity and simplicity objectives (Locussol, et al., 2009) 
 
Real cost recovery of water and its efficient use is a recipe for financial and technical 
sustainability including social equity of water supply (Marobhe, 2008). Theories have it 
that, keeping water tariffs below cost-recovery levels imposes financial burden on 
governments. The implication is that governments would have to offset the deficit or 
difference through transfers periodically which seldom occur in the context of the 
developing world resulting in lack of resources for investments and network expansion 
that ultimately affect poor families living in the peri-urban areas (Marin, 2009). The 
challenge therefore is how to perform the “balancing act” of water pricing such that 
equity, efficiency and sustainability of water will be ensured. Equity, efficiency and 
sustainability can be promoted through water pricing policies (Rosegrant and Cline, 
2002 and Rogers et al., 2002). According to Rosegrant and Cline, (2002), the main 
objectives of water pricing include: 
 the creation of incentives for efficient water use, 
 cost recovery in the water sector, and 
 financial sustainability for urban water supply systems, including the ability to 
raise capital for expansion of services to meet future demand.  
They argue that effective water-pricing policies can contribute to the objectives listed 
above, but several problems are associated with the implementation of such policies in 
developing countries. Implementing innovative water pricing will introduce incentives 
for efficient water use and recovery of at least operational and maintenance costs and 
experience from several countries has revealed that incentive pricing leads to water 
conservation by households, they added.  
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Often, it is presumed by multilateral donors, international financial and engineering 
consultants, and water sector professionals working in developing countries that 
increasing block tariff (IBT) structures are the most popular and appropriate way to 
determine water users’ monthly bills and therefore have become the suitable choice in 
developing countries today (Boland and Whittington, 2003 and Liu, et al., 2003). 
Nevertheless, Boland and Whittington, (2003), contend that this assertion is wrong. In 
agreement, some researchers including (Inocencio, 2001; Weitz and Franceys, 2002) 
maintain that, IBTs “penalise shared connections, which are commonly found among 
connected low-income households”. 
Theoretically, the IBT structure model seems perfect but is practically difficult to apply 
in many developing countries. One major challenge or limitation that is associated with 
the IBT system of pricing is the difficulty of practically applying the formulae to different 
categories of customers that are usually captured or catered for within the first block of 
the structure that is purposely introduced to take care of low-income households. 
Fundamentally, increasing block tariff structures are introduced in developing countries 
in order to insulate the low-income households against high water tariffs while providing 
a strong incentive at high levels of consumption for conservation by charging industrial 
and commercial water users significantly more (Vairavamoorthy and Mansoor, 2006). 
Conversely, often the poor live in “compound houses” where only one meter usually 
serves about five or more households thereby making it practically impossible for the 
total consumption of water to be within the “lifeline’’ regime. Thus, “paying for bulk 
water would mean large total consumption charged with higher rate due to the stepwise 
rate structure, and the poor therefore pay higher prices per cubic meter of water” 
(Inocencio, 2001). “Too often, low water tariffs have worked against the interests of the 
unconnected poor” (Marin, 2009). Komives et al., (2005) posit that even though it 
seems desirable to make piped water affordable for the poor. Research has shown that 
in developing countries, low tariffs have rather benefited the connected middle class. 
To avoid this challenge of water pricing, David (2000) suggests as cited by (Inocencio, 
2001) that as a means of establishing a correct level of incentives for adequate water, 
sewerage and sanitation service, pricing policy must be evaluated more broadly to 
ensure that minimum cost and price are  given to all so that consumers will be willing to 
pay. Gerlach, (2008), considers the design of appropriate tariff systems as a critical 
regulatory task, which must go hand in hand with subsidy allocation. Nonetheless, 
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Marin, (2009) contends that “low water tariffs are not necessarily a good thing, since 
good service ultimately cost money. Social objectives are often sought through cross-
subsidies in the tariff structure such as lifeline (Groom, et al., 2006).  
. 
2.8 The research gap 
This literature review has necessarily been 'scene-setting' in the complex world of 
public private partnerships in addition to the task of determining what, if anything, the 
academic literature has to say about the success or otherwise of this form of reform in 
urban water supply. 
However, the academic literature in respect of Management Contract in the water 
sector in low-income countries is remarkably limited. There is a multiplicity of 'grey 
literature' reviews of public private partnerships and economic regulation in low-income 
countries but very little systematic analysis of the results, particularly with regard to the 
specific case of Management Contracts. This literature review has confirmed that there 
is a research gap with regard to the comparative performance of management 
contracts in low-income countries. The next Chapter describes how the author planned 
to investigate the performance of the AVRL management contract in Ghana. 
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3 Research Methodology 
This study is considered unique in the sense that it affords the researcher the 
opportunity to investigate and evaluate the financial and operational performances of 
three different regimes of operators in a single urban water supply system at different 
periods from 1984 to 2011. In summary, two field visits were undertaken to Ghana to 
investigate and also evaluate the performances of the water utility under three different 
management models during three different periods. This chapter explains how the 
research was undertaken, beginning with the research design, data collection strategies 
employed, through to technique for data analysis. In addition, various reasons for 
employing a particular research strategy or tool at any given stage of the research are 
provided and justified in this chapter.  
3.1 Research design 
Research designs vary very much; the investigator chooses what plan to employ 
depending on the research questions being addressed and the methods of data 
collection. Every empirical research has an implicit, and if not, explicit research design 
and the logical sequence that links the empirical data to the study’s initial research 
questions and ultimately to its conclusion defines it (Yin, 2003). Others described it as a 
plan that 
guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting 
observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw 
inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation 
(Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992, pp 77-78 as cited by (Yin, 2003).  
Prior to the determination of the research method(s) employed in this research, finding 
the focus of the research so as to identify what exactly the research was seeking to do 
became very critical and most significant (Yin, 2009). This hurdle of the research was 
overcome by initially and tentatively writing down the research focus which was later 
refined making it more clearly focused and researchable. Approaching the research this 
way helped the researcher to clearly and carefully determine all relevant areas that 
needed to be tackled during the research and always having in mind, the central role that 
every researcher plays in research (Robson, 1995). Careful planning was undertaken to 
ensure that all research strategies and tactics employed during this research provided a 
strong basis for data validation based on studies done on the principles and concepts of 
water utility regulation and management through literature search and discussions with 
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my supervisors. Treating the research design as a “blueprint” of the research, the author 
first tried to address the elemental problems of the research by identifying what the 
relevant data were, what data or information to collect, what questions to study and how 
to analyse the results of the study (Philliber, Schwab, & Samsloss, 1980 as cited by (Yin, 
2003). For instance, factors such as seasonal variations in water demand (i.e both 
raining and dry seasons) informed the periods when the interviews and questionnaires 
were administered. This made it possible to understand the reasons for the shortfalls in 
supply during the period that the private operator was in charge of the system. 
Being a social research, more than one approach is available for collecting relevant data 
that will adequately deal with specific questions, propositions or problems. It must 
however, be pointed out that each approach (experiment, surveys, archival analysis, 
histories and case study) comes with its peculiar advantages and disadvantages (Yin, 
2009). Meanwhile, according to Whyte, (1981) as cited by Robson, (1993), a case study 
is suited when studying organisations or institutions, policy implementation and 
evaluation, institutional culture, management and organisational issues, processes and 
adaptation. In this vein therefore, a case study is considered appropriate for this study as 
it shows why certain decisions were taken and implemented and their outcomes 
(Schramm, (1971) as cited by Yin, (2009)). Both qualitative and quantitative methods 
were employed to yield different types of intelligence about the study subject thereby 
providing a powerful resource for informing and illuminating practice or policy (Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2006).  While the quantitative data was collected through reports, qualitative 
data was collected through key informant interviews, public hearings and observation. In 
brief, the research was carried out through three major stages or phases by initially 
gathering background information through literature review followed by data collection by 
undertaking two periods of fieldwork in Ghana in 2008 and 2010 focusing on Accra, 
Tamale and Kumasi. The final stage has consisted of analysing and interpreting 
observations, drawing up conclusions and developing recommendations. The entire 
research design process could best be described as flexible and exploratory since at 
every stage of the research changes were effected whenever necessary so as to 
effectively address the research objectives. There will always be some element of the 
unknown in management research unless it is simply duplicating what is already 
established (Pole & Lampard, (2002), as cited by Lewis, 2006)). Figure 3-1 below vividly 
explains how various activities of the research interacted during the research process at 
different stages or phases of the research. 
63 
 
Figure 3-1 Doing case study research: A linear but iterative process 
Source: (Yin, 2009) 
3.1.1 Research objectives and evolution of method 
Prior to the involvement of the private operator in the urban water supply sector in June, 
2006, daily water shortages were being reported in most of the urban cities in Ghana. 
Meanwhile, customers could hardly and exactly tell what remedies or options were 
available to the Government of Ghana at the time. As a matter of fact, until Aqua Vitens 
Rand Limited was engaged, the author could hardly imagine or appreciate the gravity of 
the challenges that the public water utility was confronted with. This phenomenon in the 
urban water sector of Ghana sparked off several questions that could not easily and 
immediately be answered. Consequently, it provoked or generated the interest of the 
author to investigate the performance and challenges of the urban water utility over the 
years and establish concrete facts about the Ghana urban water sector. In the attempt to 
link the activities and mandates of all stakeholders in the urban water sector and to be 
able to answer the numerous unanswered questions surrounding the urban water sector 
and the management of the utility, the initial project was refined at a later stage of the 
research.  
In the beginning, the aim was to investigate or assess the factors that led to the 
privatisation of the Ghana Water Company taking into consideration, the context within 
Prepare 
Share Analyse 
Collect Design 
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which the public utility has been operated. However, at a later stage of the research after 
undertaking an intensive literature search and several discussions with my supervisors 
and subject advisor, it became evident that assessing the performances of the public 
water utility as a state owned corporation and a state owned limited liability company and 
the private Management Contract was more appropriate so as to establish the problems 
of the sector more concretely and compare the performances of the three regimes that 
have operated the utility over the year since 1981. The reformulation of the initial proposal 
to accommodate new ideas gave birth to the final research topic whose aim is to assess 
the effectiveness of the present form or model of private sector participation in the 
regulated urban water supply sector in Ghana. The study also assesses the net 
improvement that the partnership brought to the urban population in the five years. This 
was done through careful assessment of the regulatory frameworks, political, social and 
economic environment against the set targets of the management contract with the private 
operator. The repeated revisiting of various aspects of the research ensured high 
compatibility among purposes, theory, research questions, sampling techniques and 
methods reflecting the flexible nature of the design process (Robson, 2002) 
3.1.2 The case study approach 
A case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003). Clearly, a strategy for doing 
research involving an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence defines a case study 
(Robson, 1995). It permits the investigator to concentrate on specific instances in an 
attempt to identify detailed interactive processes which may be crucial, but which are 
transparent to the large-scale survey and emphasised that it provides a multi-dimensional 
picture of the situation and illustrates relationships, corporate political issues and patterns 
of influence within a particular context (Remenyi and Williams, 1998)).  
However, a common misconception about research strategies or techniques employed in 
investigating research problems has been the idea of arraying various research strategies 
hierarchically. This misconception has given birth to a situation where researchers are 
made to believe that ‘case studies are appropriate for the exploratory phase, surveys and 
histories are appropriate for the descriptive phase of an investigation and that experiments 
are the only way of doing explanatory or causal inquiries ’(Yin, 1994).This he describes as 
“incorrect” and cited White’s ‘Street Corner Society, 1943/1955’ and Allison’s ‘Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises, 1971’ as some of the best and famous 
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case studies that have been both descriptive and explanatory. Case studies are 
considered superior to other research methods when “how” and “why” questions are being 
raised and the investigator has little control over events and the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. One unique strength of a case 
study approach, such as the use of documents, interviews, observation and artefacts as a 
research method is “its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – beyond what might 
be available in the conventional historical study” (Yin, 1994).  
Increasingly, case studies are being used in business and management studies as an 
evidence-collection approach for several reasons including the fact that the scope of case 
study is intensive, ranging from individuals, to business groups, to fiscal policy (Remenyi 
and Williams, 1998). However, in spite of the above attributes of a case study, some 
researchers have disdain for it and contend that the case study approach lacks the 
necessary scientific rigour and reliability and incapable of dealing with issues of 
generalisability despite the distinctive nature of this empirical inquiry method 
(Johnson,1994). Yin, (1994) explains that, this assertion is being held because too many 
times, researchers who employed this strategy have been sloppy and permit biased views 
or ambiguous evidence to influence the direction of their findings and conclusions and 
sometimes others confuse case study research with case study teaching. He further 
explained that case studies are only not generalisable to populations or universes but to 
theoretical propositions in which case the researcher’s goal is to expand and generalise 
theories and not to enumerate frequencies. Three authorities in the social sciences; 
Lipset, Trow & Coleman (1956), cited by (Yin, 1994) described in their single case study 
that the goal is to do a “generalising” and “not particularising” analysis. One of the 
challenges of all social science endeavours is the employment of case studies for 
research (Yin, 2009). The exploratory and descriptive characteristics of this management 
science oriented research required a research strategy such as the case study to provide 
the needed flexibility that would allow multiple sources of evidence such as documentary 
evidence, observations, interviews and focus groups during data collection (Robson, 
1993). A case study approach is considered as the preferred research tactic to answer the 
‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of the research and establishes valid and reliable evidence since it 
enables the investigator to comprehend the complex real-life context from which multiple 
sources of evidence was drawn (Yin, 2003).  
Case studies are particularly valuable when the aim of the research is to capture 
differences or unique variations (Patton, 1987). In attempting to have an in-depth 
understanding of the challenges confronting the urban water supply sector in Ghana over 
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the years and in the present, case study was considered as the most suitable tool capable 
of gathering a rich information or data for the analysis of the situation (Patton, 1987). A 
case study research can be exploratory, explanatory and descriptive (Yin, 1984). 
However, the author subscribed to the exploratory and descriptive case studies and thus 
helped in formulating research questions and hypothesis testing, and finally describing the 
challenges in the urban water sector respectively. The entire process of undertaking this 
research is elaborated in table 3-2 below. Data collection was undertaken based on a 
systematic identification of a set of performance indicators for a successful benchmarking 
as shown in table 3-2 below, relative to the research questions elaborated earlier: 
a) Investigate the context within which Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation 
(GWSC), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), Aqua Vitens Rand Limited 
(AVRL) and Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) operated in Ghana; 
b) Evaluate the performance of the urban water utility under the three different 
management models since its inception and 
c) Investigate the role and effectiveness of the economic regulator in the urban water 
supply sector 
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Table 3-1 Research objectives and performance indicators under investigation 
Objective
s 
Indicators Elements of performance indicators 
under investigation 
Source(s) of 
information 
a, b and c Quality of 
service 
Average hour of service per day of water 
supply, water pressure, method used for water 
sampling (frequency, number and relevance of 
collection point), number of tests conducted on 
samples taken from the distribution system, 
standard number of tests required, potability 
(turbidity, chlorine, bacteriology) number of 
complaints from customers about services in a 
year, number of customers with discontinuous 
supply during normal operation, prompt service 
provision, customer relations, consistency in 
interactions, care, attention and trust 
Annual reports from 
GWSC, GWCL, AVRL, 
PURC, household surveys 
and public hearings 
 
 
a, b and c Billing and 
collection 
Accounts receivable, total annual operating 
revenues, annual amount of water sold, 
number of connections, cash income, billed 
revenue, billing accuracy, customer records and 
piracy (illegal connections) & timeliness  
Annual reports of GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL and PURC  
a, b and c Access 
 
Population of service area, average household 
size, number of household connections etc 
Annual reports of GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL, PURC, and 
household surveys  
a, b and c Costs and 
staffing 
Total annual operational expenses, total annual 
volume of water sold, total number of staff, 
total number of connections, annual electrical 
energy cost, chemical cost, total annual labor 
costs including benefits, total cost of service 
contracted-out(outsourcing) 
Annual reports of GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL, and PURC 
and audit reports of 
auditors  
 
a, b and c Financial 
performance 
Sources of funding, total annual operational 
revenues, total annual operating cost, cash 
income and debt service, total debt, equity, 
current assets, and current liability, operating 
costs, operating revenues, depreciation and 
interest costs, operating income and fixed asset 
Annual reports of GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL and audit 
reports of auditors 
a, b and e Process (i) Budgeting, target identification, resources for 
improvements and    change, skill and training 
strategies, annual appraisals and target setting 
system for managers, remunerations, layoffs, 
rewards and recognition programs for staff, 
recruitment and dismissal of staff. 
Annual reports and 
corporate plans of GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL, PURC, , 
audit reports of auditors 
and contract document 
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Objective
s 
Indicators Elements of performance indicators 
under investigation 
Source(s) of 
information 
c, d and e Process (ii) Independence of board of stakeholders, 
organisational structure, control of 
investments, monitoring of services and prices, 
reporting procedures, complaint collection 
procedure, supervision of compliance, service 
target, dispute resolution mechanisms, 
handling of complaints against GWCL, AVRL or 
Customers, penalty for reneging 
Annual reports and 
corporate plans of GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL, PURC, 
management  contract 
document, acts and laws 
governing the urban 
water sector and audit 
reports of auditors 
a, b, c 
and e 
Metering 
practices 
Total number of connections, total number of 
connection with operating meter, volume of 
metered water sold, and total volume of water 
sold 
Annual reports of GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL and PURC  
a and b Pipe network 
performance 
Total number of pipe breaks in a year per 
kilometre of the distribution network 
Annual reports of GWSC, 
GWCL & AVRL  
 
d Tariffs 
 
Tariff levels, proportion of tariff increase, 
timing and intervals between tariff increases, 
validation of formula, tariff implementation, 
connection & disconnection charges, 
residential fixed & variable component of tariffs 
& subsidies 
Annual reports of GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL, and PURC  
e Political and 
organisational 
behaviour 
Political stability, political interference, wage 
legislation (minimum wage and overtime), 
sector law or legal, rule of law, institutional 
structure, framework for contract enforcement, 
governance, service to the poor, regulation, 
tariff policy, and pricing regulation. 
National water policy and 
management contract 
documents, GWSC, 
GWCL, AVRL and PURC 
reports, public hearings 
and interviews(semi-
structured) 
c Management 
contract 
design and 
process 
Level of empowerment, incentive, penalty, 
commitment and access to resources, baseline 
data,   
 
 
Management contract 
document, list of SNAG 
items, Memorandum of 
understanding,  
a, b, c 
and d 
General 
customer 
perception 
Average hour of service per day of water 
supply, water pressure, prompt service 
provision, customer relations, consistency in 
interactions, care, attention and trust and 
demonstrations against the private operator 
News papers, public 
hearings, Interviews 
(semi-structured), 
household survey, and 
annual reports of PURC, 
GWCL, & AVRL 
Source: Author 
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3.1.3 Conducting the fieldwork 
It is rarely possible to test the empirical generalisation against all the members of the 
target population and therefore the researcher selected a sample of the overall 
population on which to conduct the test (Remenyi and Williams, 1998). Purposive 
sampling was employed as the sampling technique in this research. The public water 
utility operates in all ten regional capitals of Ghana but three regional capitals including 
Accra, Kumasi and Tamale were selected and used for the study. The sample population 
used was carefully picked out taking into account the political, economic, geographical, 
social and cultural significance that each of them represents and commands. For 
instance, geographically, Tamale represents the Northern zone, Kumasi represents the 
Middle zone and Accra represents the Southern zone. More significantly, the presence 
of Aqua Vitens Rand Limited in these cities informed and largely influenced the selection 
of the sample population comprising customers or consumers in three capital cities. 
Largely, the fieldwork involved household survey in Accra, Kumasi and Tamale using 
questionnaires, interviews using semi-structured questions, documentary evidence 
collection, participant observation in public hearing and general observation. 
Rural-urban migration is rapidly giving birth to slums in the urban cities of Ghana. Accra, 
the capital city and the largest city in Ghana for several years has suffered from 
perennial irregular and inadequate water supply due to mismanagement and 
uncontrolled rapid urbanisation. Similarly, Kumasi being the second largest city in Ghana 
is also faced with water supply services challenges. Finally, the fastest developing city in 
Ghana, Tamale also has a long history of perennial shortage of water in the metropolis 
and thus compels women and children to spend long productive hours searching for 
water. Since it is important to address the perennial water shortage problems in the 
urban areas of Ghana to promote national development, the above reasons have made 
the three locations very significant, appropriate and relevant for the study. Again, eligible 
institutions, bodies, groups and individuals which constituted the population from which 
samples were drawn included the Ghana Water Company Limited (The Asset Holding 
Authority), Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (The Private operator), Public Utility Regulatory 
Commission (i.e. the Regulator), Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing 
(MWRW&H) and Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Customers ( i.e. domestic, 
industrial/commercial) and people living in the slums were selected for the study. 
According to Richardson et al., (1992), “the researcher chooses a particular group or 
place to study because it is the type wanted for the research” and “the researcher 
selects the sample based upon his or her judgment about some appropriate 
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characteristics, required of the sample members.  In this way, he builds up a sample that 
is satisfactory to the specific needs.  The researcher selects a sample to serve a specific 
purpose even if this makes a sample less than fully representative” (Zikmund, 1994). 
 
3.1.4 Questionnaire-based survey 
According to Kerlinger as cited in Taylor, (1994), questionnaires are widely used in the 
collection of data in research because of their effectiveness in securing factual 
information about practices and conditions, and for inquiring into the opinions and 
attitudes of the subject. Richardson et al., (1992) asserts that the most important survey 
methods, from the point of view of the lone researcher are questionnaires. Osuala (1993) 
further explains that questionnaires are particularly advantageous whenever the sample 
size is large enough to make it uneconomical for reasons of time or funds to observe, or 
interview every subject. In this study, two main types of questionnaire were employed 
including household questionnaires and key informant semi-structured questionnaires. 
Household surveys were conducted using questionnaires that principally were targeted 
at answering questions regarding how customers felt about services they were receiving, 
the challenges confronting them, how much they were paying for the services and for 
how long water was flowing through their taps, customers’ experience with water service 
providers and why certain things happen; what in their candid opinion could be 
responsible for the sector challenges and what remedies were available to avert the 
sector challenges, whether or not they saw some improvements in the services delivered 
by the private operator.  
This technique was used to compensate for any limitations that other techniques might 
be associated with. Customers from three regional capitals constituted the population 
from which data was collected including Accra, Kumasi and Tamale. In identifying or 
selecting the sampling frame, firstly, the researcher had consultations with some water 
customers (i.e. piloting questionnaires), technical staff/field officers and revenue 
collectors of the service provider in order to ensure that whatever information was 
collected from each sample population would adequately represent the views of the 
larger community from which respondents were selected. Following the identification of 
the sampling frame which included various categories of customers from four different 
communities in each of the three urban cities (described in detail below), the author 
visited the selected cities to look for skilled data collectors and subsequently arranged 
for the household survey to be conducted. Prior to the survey conduction, training was 
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provided to data collectors or interviewers to avoid the possibility of influencing 
responses of respondents or interviewees by attempting to indicate correct answers 
(Robson, 2002). During the training, data collectors were given the opportunity to ask 
questions and sufficient explanations were provided to ensure data collectors truly 
understood their tasks before the commencement of the survey. The data collectors 
were selected from their respective cities based on their ability to speak both the English 
and local dialects and academic qualifications so as to ensure that every class or 
category of customers in the communities during data collection was effectively 
engaged. Two Teaching Assistants (TAs) from the Marketing Department of Kumasi 
Polytechnic who were indigenes of the region were engaged to collect data in Kumasi. 
Similarly, two Teaching Assistants (TAs) from the Agricultural Engineering Department of 
Tamale Polytechnic were used in Tamale. Finally, two undergraduate students from the 
Institute of Professional Studies (IPS) - Accra and Ghana Institute of Management and 
Public Administration (GIMPA) and one graduate from the University of Ghana were 
engaged in Accra. In order to ensure reliability and quality of data collected by the data 
collectors, biases that could be introduced through familiarity were eliminated by 
preventing interviewers from carrying out the household surveys in their own 
communities. It is also worth mentioning that all the interviewers had undertaken 
household surveys prior to this survey. With their experiences and skills in data 
collection already, they understood and knew the dos and the don’ts of face-to-face 
interviews.  
The draft questionnaire was pre-tested using colleagues in the office to read and make 
comments in order to improve the quality of the questionnaire. In addition, questions 
were made simple and clear to respondents during the survey (Robson, 2002). Both 
customers and non-customers of the water utility were targeted in order to collect the 
necessary and relevant information on water services provided to the urban population. 
Four categories of the communities were identified and selected for the survey and 
ensured that the sample population reflected different household income levels of 
customers and characteristics including: 
 One community that was receiving regular water supply  
 One community  that was receiving irregular water supply (water rationing)  
 One community that was receiving water from other service providers other than 
AVRL/GWCL  
 One slum community in each of the cities 
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The categorisation was done purposely to identify various challenges facing different 
classes of water customers in different communities in the same city. In each of the four 
communities used, fifty questionnaires were administered to each of the four categories 
of communities identified above in each of the three cit. In all, two hundred 
questionnaires were administered in each of the three cities resulting in a total of six 
hundred questionnaires administered in Accra, Kumasi and Tamale in 2010. Majority of 
questionnaires administered to interviewees were done on face-to-face basis thereby 
making the exercise very expensive and time consuming but gave birth to the desired 
high response rates. Sampled communities in Accra included; Adenta, East Legon, 
Teshie and Nungua, in Tamale; Kukuo, Gumbihini, Moshie-Zongo, and Jisonayilli and 
finally in Kumasi; Bremang, Amakom/Asafo,  Asawase/Moshie Zongo and Tafo. 
Again in 2013, thirty questionnaires each were administered in Accra and Tamale. Out of 
this numbers, only 27 respondents voluntarily offered to fill in the answers on their own 
since they were engaged at the time the interviewers wanted to engage them. More 
significantly, the interviewees were assured of the confidentiality of the information they 
were providing. A substantial amount of  effort was invested in making sure that  
the data collected was of good quality in terms of accuracy and adequacy and truly 
reflects the performance of GWSC, GWCL, AVRL and PURC under investigation. 
 
3.1.5 Documentary sources 
With the exception of societies predating the use of writing, documentary information is 
likely to be relevant to every case study topic (Yin, 2009). Documentary evidence or 
analysis serves as a source of cross-validating, corroborating and augmenting evidence 
gathered through other sources such as household survey, public hearings, interviews 
and observation since what people say maybe different from what they do sometimes as 
in the case of this study (Yin, 2009; Noor, 2008). Secondary data was collected from 
different organisations including the Ghana Water Company Limited (Asset Holding 
Authority), Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (private operator), Public Utility Regulatory 
Commission (the regulator), Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing 
(MWRW&H), Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and the internet. Documents gathered 
included audited operational/technical, and commercial reports, audit reports, audited 
financial statements, performance review reports, corporate plans of GWSC/GWCL, 
technical audit report by the World Bank, memorandums of understanding, notes on 
snag items, letters, PURC Act, 1997 Act 538, contract documents, monthly and annual 
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reports of AVRL, annual reports of PURC, annual reports from the Customer services 
and Finance and Administration Directorates of the PURC), Regional reports on treated 
Water, and the Ghana Living Standard Survey reports etc.  
A particular effort was made to determine quantitative data regarding the financial 
position of the service provider over as long a period as might be possible. With some 
success in this area (though noting the sometime incompatibility of financial data 
recorded during different periods) it was planned to include an element of longitudinal 
comparison in the analysis to make up for the lack of any present day comparator. An 
overview of the financial data compiled, data collected to represent a significant time 
period, is demonstrated at the conclusion of Chapter 5. This data is used extensively in 
the analyses reported in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
3.1.6 Interviews 
In combination with other methods, semi-structured interview questionnaires were 
conducted using interview guides. The strategy provided the author the opportunity to 
seek personal perspectives and perceptions of workers of the water utility and other 
stakeholders in the sector on the performance in detail which enhanced the appreciation 
of the deep rooted challenges of the sector (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006). Not only that but 
the approach also offered sufficient flexibility to approach different respondents or 
interviewees differently while still staying focused on the same and relevant areas of 
data needed for the research (Robson, 2002; Noor, 2008).  
Fundamentally, the aim was to investigate some of the political, financial, social and 
managerial challenges that these institutions face which might not be published in the 
company’s reports. Here, the researcher asked respondents or interviewees to propose 
their own opinions about the urban water supply sector in relation to the management 
contract and also suggest possible ways of surmounting the challenges in the sector. In 
June, 2008 just exactly two years into the participation of private operator in the urban 
water sector, the first phase of these interviews was conducted and the second phase 
undertaken in 2010, the final year of the contract. Responses to the interviews 
undertaken in the year 2008 served as an eye-opener to the researcher. The experience 
gathered during the first visit influenced substantially the way the second fieldwork was 
approached by way of planning, timing, and how dates were scheduled for interviews. 
Many officers (respondents) who were contacted during the first fieldwork could be 
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accessed more easily during the second fieldwork because of the good rapport that the 
author maintained with them after the first interaction. For instance, before meeting these 
key informant respondents for the first time, the author had to be introduced to them by 
contacts they knew well since there was a marked reluctance to meet with any 
researcher. Hence after the initial introduction, the researcher ensured that he 
established cordial and personal relationships with respondents and kept communicating 
with them using e-mails and telephone calls after the first fieldwork knowing very well 
that a second fieldwork would be undertaken. As a matter of fact, this attitude of the 
researcher towards these interviewees made it easier for the author to undertake the 
second fieldwork even though it could not entirely be described as “challenge-free”. 
During the interviews, a digital voice recorder was used to record every conversation in 
order to ensure that an accurate account of what truly transpired during these interviews 
was sufficiently captured and also to avoid losing vital submissions that could not have 
been written down during the conversations.  Later, all files were carefully and properly 
labelled with names of respondents or interviewees and dates in order to avoid 
complications. Key informants involved some junior and managers/senior officers of 
Ghana Water Company Limited, Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (private operator), Directors 
of Public Utilities Regulatory Commission and water vendors. At the head office of the 
Ghana Water Company Limited, (Asset Holding Authority) staff such as the procurement 
officer, head of planning, water quality analysis, account officers and head of the 
production unit were interviewed while at the PURC and Ministry of Water Resources 
Works and Housing, Directors were engaged. It is significant to state that it became very 
difficult to interview staff of Aqua Vitens Rand Limited at the head office even though the 
researcher managed to speak to a few of them, likely due to the sensitivity regarding the 
private management contract.  
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Table 3-2  Data source for research questions  
Source: Author’s Fieldwork 
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Population and population growth  √   
Poverty levels  √   
Fragility level  √   
Policy framework √ √ √  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protection of consumers and service 
providers 
√ √ √ √ 
Provision of tariff setting guidelines  √ √ √ √ 
Tariffs approval √ √ √ √ 
Performance monitoring  √ √  
Promotion of competition among sector 
players 
√ √ √ √ 
Assets evaluation √ √   
Advise for government and the general 
public on water sector issues 
√ √   
Studies on economy and performance of 
GWSC, GWCL, AVRL 
 √   
Capacity building in the water sector  √ √ √ 
Awareness creation on regulation and 
service provision 
 √  √ 
Incentives for the provision of water  to 
the urban poor 
√ √ √ √ 
Achievement of commercial viability by 
the public utility 
√ √   
Accountability in the urban water supply 
sector 
√ √   
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Transparency in the urban water supply 
sector 
√ √ 
 
 
 
 
Autonomy of PURC √    
Multi-sectoral regulatory function of 
PURC 
√ √   
PURC’s reporting mechanisms  √ √ √ √ 
PURC’s funding mechanisms  √ √ √ √ 
Appointment of Commissioners to the 
Commission 
√ √ √ √ 
Appointment procedure for the staff √ √ √ √ 
Consumers involvement in regulation 
processes 
 √ √ √ 
 
3.1.7 Public Hearings 
Another strategy employed in collecting information was through attending a number of 
public hearings. Originally, this method was never considered and planned for. It came 
about when in March and April of 2010, the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission 
organised forums throughout the country to solicit views and comments of customers on 
water and electricity tariff proposals submitted to it by the Ghana Water Company 
Limited (GWCL) and the Electricity Companies. This national forum offered all categories 
of customers of the urban water utility and all electricity companies the opportunity to 
meet with both the service providers and the regulator at a common forum to express 
their challenges and frustrations in respect of the services provided to them by these 
utility companies. Not only that, the forum afforded the regulator the greatest opportunity 
to receive at first-hand vital information regarding the quality of services rendered to 
customers by the utilities before a final decision is taken to either maintain or increase 
the existing water and electricity tariffs.  
The researcher considered these public hearings as a usefully complementary source of 
collecting data on the perceptions of customers. It acted as a technique that was 
employed to cross-validate information or data collected from household survey, 
observation and interviews. Overall, the author participated in four of the eight regional 
public hearings that took place in Accra (Greater Accra Region), Hohoe (Volta Religion), 
Kumasi (Ashanti Region), and Tamale (Northern Region). In Tamale, customers from 
three regions were put together to participate in the public hearing. It comprised of 
different categories of stakeholders from Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions 
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where various interest groups were organised and transported from Bolgatanga (Upper 
East Region) and Wa (Upper West Region) to participate in the forum held in Tamale. 
This arrangement was undertaken because the regulator expressed its inability to 
organise separate meetings for the Upper East and West regions. This offered the 
author the opportunity to listen to challenges, views and comments of customers from six 
regions out of the ten in all which otherwise would have been very difficult, impossible or 
too expensive to be organised the researcher. It is significant to mention that different 
interest groups that participated in these public hearings gave the author more insight 
into the challenges facing customers and service providers. It included representatives 
from Traditional Rulers, Ghana Tailors’ Associations, Agricultural Workers’ Union, Ghana 
Chamber of Commerce, Student Groups, Hair Dressers’ Association and the rest of the 
general public.  
The discussion at all the forums were recorded using a digital voice recorder to ensure 
accurate account of what transpired among stakeholders at the meetings and to avoid 
losing vital submissions that could not have been written down during these meetings. 
All files were carefully and properly labelled with names of city and dates in order to 
avoid complications. The author also had the opportunity to interview some principal 
officers from amongst the stakeholders after each forum so as to clarify comments that 
were not clear to the author during the meeting. 
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Figure 3-1 Public hearing for the determination of utility tariffs in water and 
electricity in Teachers’ Hall, Tamale, Source: Author. Tamale, 2010 
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Flow Chart of Methodology 
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4 The Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC), 
Ghana 
 
4.1 Introduction 
For two out of the three service entities being considered in this study there has been an 
economic regulator in the sector, potentially a ‘confounding issue’ in analysis of service 
performance and, equally importantly, perhaps being a key determinant of service 
performance, irrespective of institutional model. It is therefore necessary to undertake a 
detailed analysis, based on fieldwork, of the performance of PURC before considering 
the effectiveness of the different management models of service delivery. 
Statutorily, the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) serves as a multi-sector 
utility regulator that is established and mandated by an act of Parliament, Act 538 on 16th 
October, 1997, eventually becoming operational in 1999. Primarily, the aim of 
establishing the Commission is to regulate and oversee the provision of services by 
public utilities to consumers. Institutions regulated by the PURC include; the Ghana 
Water Company Limited (GWCL), the Volta River Authority (VRA), Northern Electricity 
Development (VRA) and the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG).Even though, 
members of the Commission are appointed by the President in consultation with the 
Council of State, the independence and autonomy of the commission is guaranteed in 
section 4 of the Act establishing it. Conspicuously, it demands that “subject to the 
provisions of this Act, the Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of 
any person or authority in the performance of its functions”. 
Meanwhile, government interferes in the functions of the economic regulator greatly. 
This sometimes lead to unnecessary delays in tariff increases to the extent that even 
when tariffs are reluctantly approved finally, customers complain about the quantum 
leap. They argue that it is more acceptable if these increases are staggered over a 
reasonable period of time. Government sometime prevents the PURC from adjusting 
tariffs with the promise that the difference would be paid to the water utility which 
government always find difficult to fulfil. For instance, because of the national elections in 
2000, water tariff had to be increased by 96 percent in 2001 as there were no tariff 
adjustments from 1999 in spite of the high inflation rates of 40.54 percent that occurred 
in 2000.  
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Setting the pace for financial sustainability and good performance in 2001 by the tariff  
adjustment leading to a situation where operational cost per cubic metre of water 
produced was less than the approved tariff. In spite of the leap in tariffs, GWCL failed to 
generate enough revenue to meet its operational costs during the year due to low billing 
and collection efficiencies and high non-revenue water. It is in this regard that one of the 
core mandates of the PURC is to ensure that cost reflective tariffs are approved for 
commercial viability of the utility. Meanwhile major reviews of tariffs are done in every 
five years taking into account some exogenous factors that may affect its operations 
such as inflation and fluctuating exchange rates that lead to exchange losses. Through a 
consultative process, a water policy framework was developed and adopted for 
implementation in 2007. In this policy document, water was considered as an economic 
good.  
As part of its mandate, Section 3 of the Act demands that the commission:  
i. provides guidelines on rates chargeable for provision of utility services;   
ii. examines and approve rates chargeable for provision of utility services;   
iii. protects the interest of consumers and providers of utility services; 
iv. monitors standards of performance for provision of services;  
v. initiates and conduct investigations into standards of quality of service given 
to consumers;  
vi. promotes fair competition among public utilities;  
vii. conducts studies relating to economy and efficiency of public utilities; 
viii. makes such valuation of property of public utilities as it considers necessary for 
the purposes of the Commission;  
ix. collects and compile such data on public utilities as it considers necessary for the 
performance of its functions;  
x. advises any person or authority in respect of any public utility;  
xi. maintain a register of public utilities; and  
xii. performs such other functions as are incidental to the foregoing 
. Overall, its role covers the following areas: 
i. setting and approval of cost reflective tariffs for GWCL 
ii. protection of all stakeholders in the urban water sector including consumers 
iii. development, monitoring and enforcement of service standards 
iv. Education of the general public on urban water supply services and 
v. Promotion of water provision to the poor in the urban areas of Ghana. 
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Meanwhile, according to section 16 of the Act, no public utility is allowed to fix any rate to 
be charged for any service provided by it unless the rate is in accordance with guidelines 
provided by the Commission. In preparing guidelines on level of rates it is stated that the 
Commission should take into account:; 
i. Customer interest 
ii. Investor interest 
iii. The cost of production of the service 
iv. Assurance of financial integrity of the public utility 
Policy framework for urban water services 
In June 2007, through a consultative process, a policy framework was developed and 
adopted to govern the activities of all stakeholders in the water sector of Ghana 
(Government of Ghana, 2007). The policy framework defines the institutional framework 
for water supply services and its regulation in the urban areas of Ghana. Nonetheless, in 
the policy framework, water is considered as an economic good and thus makes the 
policy framework unclear and incoherent leading to some of the challenges in the urban 
water sector. 
4.1.1 Data sources 
Evidence gathered came from various sources including documents, key informant 
interviews, focus group discussions, and questionnaires. Discussions were held with 
some key sector stakeholders. Two people each from GWCL, PURC, AVRL and Non-
Governmental Organisations and one person from Water Resource Commission served 
as key informants during the interviews. Questionnaires were also administered to 25 
respondents in the urban water sector. This was done in order to ascertain the views or 
positions held by some key sector players regarding the specific roles of the economic 
regulator taking into account the level of monopoly power that the urban water utility 
enjoys. In this case, three (3) respondents were selected from the PURC, two (2) from 
government, ten (10) from the Grantor (GWCL) and ten (10) from the private operator 
(AVRL). Strategically, the respondents were selected from these units taking into 
account the institution or organisation in which they work, the individual’s knowledge, 
expertise and experience in the urban water supply sector, position the individual had 
held and was holding at the time of the research and the number of years one has been 
in the sector. In all, the 25 respondents comprised of 21 senior officers and 4 
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technicians. The questionnaire administered to the twenty five respondents covered the 
following; 
i. the functions/roles of the Public Utility Regulatory Commission as a regulator  
ii. the activities and functions that are seen to be performed by the regulator  
iii. other activities considered relevant that the regulator should be seen to be 
undertaking 
iv. benefits that could be drawn from effective and efficient regulation 
 
4.1.2 Results from questionnaire showing perception of 
respondents on roles of Public Utility Regulatory 
Commission (PURC) 
Results emanating from questions administered to the 25 respondents in respect of 
specific roles of PURC as an economic regulator for the urban water supply sector in 
Ghana are shown in table 4-1. The author attempts to investigate specific roles of the 
economic regulator taking into account the level of monopoly power that the urban water 
utility enjoys. As depicted in table 4-1, respondents generally agreed that in establishing 
a regulatory framework for the urban water sector will inject efficiency and effectiveness 
into the services of the urban water utility. Albeit respondents agreed that aside 
economic regulation, there are other forms in which the utility could be regulated 
including water quality, environmental, social, technical standards regulations. It is 
however worthy of note that this study is limited to economic regulation. As indicated 
earlier, a total of 25 respondents were employed during the investigation. Table 4-1 
shows the results depicting various levels of respondents’ agreement or disagreement.   
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Table 4-1 Roles of the economic regulator from questionnaire responses  
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The responsibilities of PURC are; 
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1 
To set performance service standards for 
the service provider 75 25 0 0 0 24 
2 
To protect all stakeholders including 
customers/consumers 96 4 0 0 0 25 
3 
To advise government  on issues of urban 
water supply services 91.7 8.3 0 0 0 24 
4 
To develop clear guidelines for setting 
water tariffs 64 36 0 0 0 25 
5 
To ensure that the urban water supply 
sector  is sustainable 80 15 5 0 0 25 
6 
To prevent market failure in the urban 
water sector  40 56 4 0 0 25 
7 
To promote competition among all 
service providers  in the urban water  
supply sector 64 20 16 0 0 25 
8 
To negotiate contracts involving private 
operators 50 29.2 20.8 0 0 24 
9 
To provide service guidelines on 
governance structure in the sector 24 52 8 16 0 25 
10 To evaluate assets of service providers  25 20.8 25 29.2 0 24 
11 To issue licence to service providers 72 20 4 4 0 25 
12 
To develop policy guidelines on subsidies 
for the urban poor 37.5 29.2 20.8 12.5 0 24 
13 
To develop performance guidelines for 
service providers to ensure that there is 
effectiveness and efficiency 28 50 0 24 0 25 
14 
To evaluate the performances of service 
providers 65 25 10 0 0 25 
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15 
To develop a regulatory framework to 
ensure effective and efficient regulation 
of activities of all stakeholders in the 
urban water sector 66.7 29.2 0 4.1 0 24 
16 
The urban water supply sector necessarily 
requires an independent economic 
regulator for efficient and effective 
service delivery 88 12 0 0 0 25 
17 
To control tendencies of service providers 
exhibiting monopoly power   66 28 6 0 0 23 
 
The following types of regulation are necessary in the urban water supply sector of Ghana 
18 Social regulation 76 12 4 8 0 25 
19 Economic regulation  92 8 0 0 0 25 
20 Operational/Technical regulation 56 24 12 8 0 25 
21 Water quality regulation  42 58 0 0 0 22 
22 
A regulatory framework is necessary due 
to lack of transparency, accountability 
and poor governance 64 29 4 3 0 
 
23 
23 
Efficient and effective economic regulation 
of a water utility would promote efficiency, 
accountability, commercial viability and 
transparency in the urban water supply 
sector 
40 44 16 0 0 
 
    25 
24 
Both financial and managerial autonomy 
could be achieved through effective and 
efficient regulation 73 15 12 0 0 
24 
25 
Efficient economic regulation of the 
water utility would promote commercial 
viability of the utility.  40 57 3 0 0 
 
24 
26 
Effective and efficient economic 
regulation leads to improvements in 
performance generally. 92 8 0 0 0 
25 
 
27 
Economic regulator should be seen to be 
promoting policies that ensure that the 
urban poor are served 35 65 0 0 0 
23 
28 
Small-scale water service providers also 
need to be  regulated 
35 19 44 4 0 
 
24 
29 
All contracts with private operators must 
involve the regulator 
56 7 11 26 0 
25 
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Would you agree that, for water supply services to improve, it 
requires that the economic regulator:  
YES 
(%) 
NO 
(%) 
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30 
Institutes punitive measures against  utilities that do not comply 
with the guidelines set by the regulator 
96 4 25 
31 Takes legal actions against utilities  if necessary 80 20 25 
32 Develops more incentive packages to service providers 100 0 24 
   How would you like the small-scale water service providers to be regulated?  
33 
A different regulatory framework should be developed for 
regulating small-scale water service providers 40 60 
25 
34 
Small scale service providers should be encouraged to form 
associations for easy regulation 91.3 8.7 
23 
35 Small scale service providers should be regulated through GWCL 80 20 25 
 
What should be done to ensure that the urban poor are fairly treated in the provision of water? 
36 
Special incentive packages be introduced into the tariff structure 
in order to attract service providers to serve the urban poor 92 8 
25 
37 
Water policy should be developed which makes it obligatory for 
the public utility to serve the urban poor  80 20 
25 
 
The regulation of business plans and strategies of GWCL (i.e. employment and deployment 
policies, contracting, procurement policies, tariff structures etc) would; 
38 
Promote transparency and discipline in staff recruitment 
processes 40 60 
25 
39 Encourage prudent financial management 88 12 24 
40 Ensure effective and efficient application of utility’s resources 92 8 25 
41 Prevent overstaffing and understaffing situations 60 40 25 
Source: Author’s analysis of data 
Perceptions held by the 25 respondents drawn came from the PURC, government, and 
the Grantor (GWCL) and the private operator (AVRL) in respect of PURC’s role as an 
economic regulator in the urban water supply sector of Ghana is presented in table 4-1 
above. Generally, majority of the respondents agreed to the suggestions or assertions 
made in the questionnaire. However, in few cases respondents disagreed with the 
assertions. For instance, it was suggested to respondents that if business plans and 
strategies of GWCL are regulated, transparency and discipline in staff recruitment 
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processes will be promoted but majority of respondents disagreed with this assertion 
with the reason that nepotism and political patronage is still prevalent in the public sector 
of Ghana. Not only that but also, there was no clear cut position on whether the 
evaluation of assets of the service provider should be the responsibility of the economic 
regulator, PURC. Finally, 60 percent of respondents disagreed with the suggestion that 
small-scale water service providers will be better regulated if a different regulatory 
framework is developed for them. 
Detailed explanation of the results is given below in relation to the different perceptions. 
Approval of tariffs leading to commercial viability 
It took the economic regulator well over five years after its establishment before a water 
tariff policy was developed in 2005. This was aimed at ensuring that commercial 
harmony is created between the GWCL as the service provider on the one hand and 
customers or consumers on the other hand taking into account the performance of the 
service provider (.i.e. efficiency, effectiveness, quality of service) and other exogenous 
factor in tariff setting for commercial viability of GWCL. other, through ensuring the best 
possible value, price and improved quality of service. In this case, cost reflective tariffs 
are expected to be approved for implementation. The policy however accepts a uniform 
rising block tariff structure with a lifeline tariff of 6m3. Even though the incentive was 
deliberately directed towards the urban poor it failed to make the intended impact. 
Instead, it largely favours consumers with smaller family sizes and who have their 
individual household connections and meters. This is because the urban poor in Ghana 
usually live in compound houses where one meter serves all families in the compound. 
Majority of customers contacted during the investigation agreed that GWCL needs to be 
commercially but complained about quality of service as would be seen in subsequent 
chapters. One of interviewees said that, “it is difficult for the economic regulator to 
perform its functions and therefore one cannot believe that GWCL will ever become 
viable commercially.” But one may ask whether cost reflective tariffs could necessary 
lead to cost recovery and therefore could provide all the solutions to the financial woes of 
GWCL? As shown in figure 4-1 below, more factors account to the woes of GWCL. 
Generally, respondents stated that commercial viability of GWCL could be achieved 
through effective and efficient regulation and approval of appropriate tariffs. However, 
figure 4-1 refutes the perceptions and assertion held by many that low tariff levels 
continues to account for accounts for the financial woes of the public utility. It is evident 
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that, albeit the economic regulator somewhat helped the service provider to achieve cost 
recovery from 2003 to 2010, the average tariff of a cubic meter of water was more than 
the unit cost of production (i.e. cost of operation and maintenance but excluding 
depreciation or any cost of capital). 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Ghana case - Average tariff per cubic volume of water versus average 
unit cost of water produced. Source:  Author’s analysis 
The author therefore believes that low billing and collection efficiency and high non-
revenue water somewhat are major challenges to GWCL’s achievement of full cost 
recovery.  From the analysis of responses from the respondents, the following factors 
are necessary for the commercial or financial viability of GWCL; 
i. Development of clear guidelines for setting water tariffs  
ii. Development of performance guidelines for service providers that ensures efficiency 
and effectiveness 
Consumer protection 
The economic regulator protects customers by ensuring that tariffs reflect actual cost of 
water services provided and services provided meet agreed standards. In order to 
ensure that tariffs relate consumers’ levels of affordability, PURC assesses all 
complaints of customers whiles the Bureau of Consumer Services (BCS) at the PURC 
Secretariat ensures that quality services are provided by the water utility. 
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A consumer proposed that the PURC must ensure that services are efficiently and 
effectively delivered during the focus group discussions while another customer from 
ISODEC - a Non-Governmental Organisation that vehemently opposed the involvement 
of the private operator argued that PURC should prevent GWCL from exhibiting 
monopoly power by making sure that water tariffs the cost of services that it provides 
otherwise customers may only be paying for the inefficiencies of the service provider and 
added that some level of competition is necessary within the urban water sector. There 
is also the need to enhance transparency within the sector by regularly publishing 
reports on the water utility’s performance by the PURC they added. Evidently, the tariff 
structure employed are never understood by customers and therefore demanded that 
customers are adequately educated on it.  
This assertion was however confirmed during the interviews when an interviewee said 
that the posture of GWCL exhibits complacency in its operations since customers or 
consumers have little or no choice to make. He therefore suggested that PURC institutes 
punitive measures against the GWCL so as to ensure efficient and effective service 
delivery. Also, all respondents of the questionnaire agreed that it is the responsibility of 
the economic regulator to protect customers.  
Generally, it was agreed that protection of customers could be done if;  
i. effective consumer complaints and resolution mechanisms are employed 
ii. water tariffs cover operational costs but reflects affordability levels of customers 
especially the urban poor 
iii. the public is well informed about the roles of the PURC and the service providers 
iv. performance reports of service providers are published regularly, 
v. obligations and rights of sector stakeholders are publicly displayed.  
Monitoring the performance of the GWCL 
Monitoring the performance of GWCL has become more critical and crucial considering 
the abysmal performance of the public utility for over three decades now. PURC has the 
mandate to monitor the performance of GWCL. According to the PURC, GWCL failed to 
achieve most of the targets set for GWCL as stated in the regulators 5-year review report 
(PURC, 2005). It is however not deterrent enough for the regulator to only expose the 
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the service provider without applying the appropriate 
incentives, penalties or sanctions against it even though PURC says  penalties are 
applying during tariff setting and approval processes – a position many people disagreed 
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with. Since the performance of GWCL is a major component of this study, the author has 
done a more comprehensive work on the performance of GWCL in subsequent chapters 
Through the focus group discussions, PURC identified three main approaches by which 
it monitors the performance of GWCL. They include: 
i. Auditing.  
ii. Routine inspections of operators’ physical facilities, equipment, premises, plants 
and its service areas. 
iii. Surveys through public forum in order to receive feedback from customers as 
described in chapter 3. 
Nonetheless, some of the interviewees registered their frustrations about lack of clear 
performance guidelines having specific service targets that would ensure efficient 
regulation of the water utility’s operations. During the interview, one interviewee blatantly 
stated that “the software component of urban water supply services must be left for 
people who understand the water business and not the engineers as we have now”. 
Generally, it was agreed during the focus group discussions, interviews and responses 
of respondents that the performance of GWCL should be monitored by the regulator and 
further requested that performance review reports must be regularly done and made 
public to ensure transparency. Finally, there was general agreement that competition 
should be promoted among all stakeholders in the urban water supply sector in Ghana. 
 Promotion of competition in the urban water services delivery 
A regulatory framework is necessary to prevent the service provider from enjoying a 
monopoly power that would affect customers respondents stated generally. Where 
regulation is weak, a water utility exploits its monopoly power.  
From the focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and questionnaires 
administered, it was found that for PURC to effectively and efficiently perform its 
monitoring functions it should; 
i. develop performance guidelines for the public utility with specific performance 
targets  
ii. apply all service rules and standards to the operations of GWCL  
iii. apply sanction whenever necessary and 
iv. evaluate GWCL’s performance and make the review reports public 
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Advisory services and knowledge base on urban water services 
PURC being the referee must understand the activities of all urban water supply sector 
players and therefore it was universally agreed that the task of PURC performing the 
advisory role is paramount. However, what was unclear was whether or not PURC is 
given the opportunity to play its roles effectively in this regard. In view of this, it was 
suggested that; 
i. the sector ministry should closely collaborate with PURC considering its rich 
knowledge in the urban water sector of Ghana 
ii. PURC should be well resourced to undertake more studies in the urban water 
sector for effective regulation and appropriate policy formulation.  
 
 
Services to the urban poor 
The Act mandating the PURC to perform as an economic regulator failed to impose any 
specific obligation on the regulator to provide water to the urban poor. Unfortunately, this 
challenge directly relates to issues of role of the customer/consumer and protection and 
affects largely persons who receive water directly from the service provide and therefore 
presents a limitation. Clearly, the regulatory functions of PURC can be said to be skewed 
towards services that are delivered directly by GWCL. Only 15 percent of the urban poor 
were had house connection a (PURC, 2005). Thanks to PURC for developing a social 
policy in 2005 which clearly outlined its role and interventions on water supply services 
to the urban poor. This social policy introduced a lifeline tariff component of 6m3 volume 
of water per household per month that is specifically directed at assisting the urban poor. 
According to PURC, the lifeline tariff reflects affordability but is higher than basic 
operational unit costs but excluding depreciation and return on capital (PURC, 2005).  
Even though PURC gives no concessions to the urban poor in respect of connection 
fees, lack of sufficient network makes it sometime makes it difficult for the urban poor to 
do house connection rather than the cost of connection (PURC, 2005). However, 
through a funding mechanism designed by the PURC, any strategy of the service 
provider that is specifically designed to help the urban poor to access piped water is 
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promoted and supported. For instance, from the US$130 million of the urban water 
project financed by the World Bank, US$10 million was specifically set aside for pro-poor 
activities. The PURC also recognises the existence alternative sources of water supply 
services but believes that the other sources of services rendered by water vendors and 
water takers could hardly be regulated in respect of rates charged except the quality of 
water. Meanwhile, water sold to persons or entities that provide secondary market 
services are subject to price regulation of PURC. The activities of water tanker operators 
are very much visible in Accra, Cape coast, Kumasi, and Sekondi-Takoradi male. The 
associations of various water tanker operators regulate their own activities. While some 
discussants during the group discussion felt that the activities of the alternative water 
service providers such as water taker operators can be regulated, others disagreed with 
the reason that it is not a well-organised group and therefore would be difficult to do. In 
addition the “water mafia” will frustrate whoever attempts to ensure sanity in that the 
water sector.  
 It was generally observed that the existing regulatory framework somewhat has unfairly 
neglected the urban poor. An interviewee from the PURC believes that it is the 
responsibility of the Commission to ensure that the urban poor access good quality 
water. Meanwhile, majority of respondents were of the opinion that PURC as the 
regulator should promote social values of water and ensure that water is provided to the 
urban poor. Albeit it seems impossible to provide these services directly to the urban 
poor, government could collaborate with small scale water service providers to achieve 
this objective.  
As can be seen in the results displayed in table 4-1 above, (.i.e. rows numbered 36 and 
37), 92 percent of the respondents agreed that special incentive packages should be 
introduced into the tariff regimes in order to attract service providers to serve the urban 
poor and 80 percent agreed that water policy should be developed imposing a social 
obligation on the public utility to serve the urban poor.  
Finally, it was suggested that the provision of water services to the urban poor could be 
done by; 
i. developing new regulatory tools for alternative service providers e.g. licensing 
ii.  having a deliberate national policy that ensures that government provides 
subsidies towards the provision of water to the urban poor and 
iii. using effective consultative mechanisms among all players 
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Institutional arrangements of PURC 
Perceptions and information gathered on the institutional arrangements for the PURC 
through documents, the focus group discussions, questionnaires and key informant are 
presented in this section.   
Generally, respondents agree with Government’s decision to set up an autonomous 
body or institution to regulate the services of GWCL, ECG and VRA and further indicated 
that making PURC part of a Government ministry would compromise its autonomy.  
On whether or not;  
i. a separate body should be set up to undertake the regulatory 
functions?   
ii. to create a regulatory body within the relevant ministry as a 
department? 
iii. Contract out some critical elements of the regulation to competent 
private firms? 
Majority of respondents disagree with the position that the regulatory body should be 
created within the relevant ministry as a department. Furthermore, the fear of 
government manipulating and interfering in the operations of the regulator for short term 
political interest if the regulatory functions of PURC were made to reside in the political 
sphere of Government was highly registered. However all 25 respondents agree that a 
separate entity is required to undertake the regulatory functions. Economic regulation 
was considered as a critical function for the urban water market.    
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Table 4-2 Questionnaire responses on Institutional arrangements of PURC  
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1 
If the regulatory body resides within the 
political sphere of government, its 
functions may be compromised or 
manipulated for short-term political gain or 
interests. 88 12 0 0 0 25 
2 
In engaging a private operator, it is 
necessary to involve a regulator to ensure 
that the all regulatory issues are properly 
captured in the agreement. 32 20 4 24 20 25 
3 
The engagement of the private operator in 
the urban water sector should attract a 
different  regulatory mechanism 12 20 
 
40 28 25 
4 
An autonomous statutory body is 
necessary for efficient and effective 
performance of its functions 72 28 0 0 0 25 
5 
The governance system of the regulator 
should be two-tier. The Council or 
commission and the executing body or 
secretariat. 52 44 4 0 0 25 
6 
Government should appoint members of 
the commission 25 50 12.5 12.5 0 24 
7 
All members of the executing body 
including the head should be appointed by 
the commission through a competitive 
process. 72 28 0 0 0 25 
8 
In order to have an effective and efficient 
regulatory council the Executive Secretary 
must be a full member of the council. 50 20.8 4.2 25 0 24 
9 
Consumers should be represented on the 
board of the Commission 80 20 0 0 0 25 
10 
Consumer protection watch groups must 
be established to aid in the process of 
implementing the regulatory guidelines  60 30 10 0 0 
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11 
The independence and autonomy of the 
regulator can be enhanced if it derives its  
funding through regulatory fees 88 12 0 0 0 25 
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For the institutional arrangements to effectively promote operational efficiency,  the 
institutional framework  should demand for the; 
 
12 
Creation of the regulatory body  within its sector ministry as a 
Department  
32 68 
25 
13 
New regulatory body having its own resources (i.e. could ether 
be a single or multi-sector regulator). 60 40 25 
14 
Contract out some critical components of the regulation to 
competent private firms 50 50 25 
 
 
The autonomy of the regulator would be enhanced if the regulator reports to the; 
 
15 The Sector Minister 4 96 25 
16 The President 28 72 25 
17 The Parliament  of Ghana 96 4 25 
Source: Author’s analysis of data 
Structure, composition and reporting mechanism of PURC  
The Commission engages a wide range of professionals including economists, 
engineers, accountants Chemists etc. It is composed of; 
i.  a Chairman 
ii.  one person nominated by the Trades Union Congress 
iii.  one person nominated by the Association of Ghana Industries 
iv.  one representative of domestic consumers 
v.  the Executive Secretary appointed under section 33 of the Act; and  
vi. four other persons with knowledge in matters relevant to the functions of the 
Commission.  
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Apart from the Executive Secretary of the Commission, all other members hold office for 
a period not exceeding five years but are eligible for re-appointment on the expiration of 
that period. Meanwhile, the President in consultation with the nominating body can 
remove any member of the Commission for inability to perform the functions of his or her 
office, for stated misbehaviour or for any other just cause according to Section 5 of the 
Act. Conspicuously, its autonomy is enshrined in the Act which says that “the 
Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority in 
the performance of its functions”. 
Generally, informants were opposed to the existing mechanism employed in appointing 
Commissioners to the PURC since the Commissioners are appointed by the President, 
their independence could greatly be compromised. Instead, they suggested that the 
Commissioners should be appointed through a public call for a Commissioner and going 
through a transparent appointment processes. However, some informants from the 
PURC believe that the appointment of the Commissioners by government does not 
necessary compromise their independence of the functions. Others also disagree with 
the provision that allows the President to appoint four other persons with knowledge in 
matters relevant to the functions of the Commission. The reason is that Politician could 
be appointed to influence major decisions of the commission even though they may have 
technical expertise to perform as members of the Commission.  
While the Chairman of the PURC reports to the office of the President, the PURC is 
mandated to present a performance report to Parliament annually. Also, it is legally 
bound to provide audited accounts to the Auditor General annually within six months of 
the end of a financial year. Staff of the PURC contacted during the investigation support 
the existing reporting mechanisms. What they do not want to be done is to make the 
Commission a department with the sector Ministry since that will negatively compromise 
their autonomy and greatly. PURC enjoys a higher degree of independence and 
autonomy without reporting to its sector Ministry. Meanwhile responses from the 25 
respondent shows that 72 percent of the respondent rejects the existing reporting 
mechanism of reporting to the office of the President and 96 percent of the respondents 
prefer that PURC reports directly to the Parliament of Ghana. With the proposal that 
PURC reports to the sector Ministry, 96 percent disagree.  
The responses are summarised in the table below: 
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Table 4-3  Reporting mechanism for the regulator 
Mechanism Higher likelihood of 
achieving greater 
autonomy [%] 
Less likely [%] 
The regulator reports to the sector Ministry 0 100 
Reporting to the office of the President 10 90 
Reporting to the parliament of Ghana 96 4 
Source: Author’s analysis of data 
Table 4-3 clearly shows a strong acceptance of respondents for the regulator to report to 
the Parliament of Ghana since that would further promote the autonomy of the 
Commission. None agree that PURC reports to the sector Ministry since its autonomy 
and independence would further be compromised.  
 
The multi-sectoral regulatory function of PURC 
The PURC functions as a multi-sector regulatory institution for the urban water utility, 
Electricity Company of Ghana, the Volta River Authority (VRA) and the Northern 
Electricity Department of VRA. During the focus group discussions, participants of PURC 
agreed with the existing institutional arrangements where the PURC functions as a multi-
sectoral institution. According to them, the present arrangement allows more effective 
use of resources of the Commission than splitting these functions among different 
bodies. For instance, there are some services that are common to both sectors such as 
legal and consumer care services. Apparently, most of the participants of GWCL also 
supported the current arrangement but however believed that the Commission gives 
more attention to the energy sector. Furthermore, out of the 25 respondents to the 
questionnaire, 68 percent agree that a multi-sector regulatory framework is appropriate 
because of its cost effectiveness and reduction in the possibility of industry regulatory 
capture. Figure 4-2 shows the perceptions of respondents on the appropriateness or 
otherwise PURC as a multi-sector regulator. 
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Figure 4-2 Perception on multi-utility regulation 
Source: Author’s analysis of data 
Overall, the results drawn from all sources of data sources in this study triangulate 
towards the establishment of a separate entity or body to perform the regulatory 
functions in the water supply sector. 
Funding sources for the PURC 
Funding sources are clearly defined by the Act that established the PURC. Largely, the 
PURC is financed through government annual budgetary allocations. However, PURC 
can also receive funding through the following sources; 
i. grants 
ii. government subvention  
iii. any loans granted to the Commission and 
iv. any monies accruing to the Commission in the course of the performance of its 
functions under the Act 
PURC charges no regulatory fees for regulating the utilities even though funding has 
become a major challenge to PURC.  Consequently, the operations of the Commission 
become difficult.  In 2006, the PURC became indicated that it became “an annual ritual 
of arbitrary imposition of a budgetary ceiling bearing no relation to the Commission's 
requirements for effective operation” (PURC, 2006). Budgets of the Commission 
continue to suffer from arbitrarily cuts. This has greatly prevented the Commission from 
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carrying out some of its critical projects and activities. In the same 2006 annual report of 
the PURC, the Commission hinted that “the Commission would continue to seek to 
secure its own funding through the imposition of a levy or regulatory charge on the 
service providers”. Presently, PURC is constrained by the current arrangement to 
adequately undertake its regulatory activities. A discussant from the Commission 
indicated that “if the current funding arrangement remains unchanged and budgets 
approved by the Parliament of Ghana for the Commission continue to be suffering 
arbitrary cuts in its budgets, then the operations of the PURC will continue to be 
undermined.”  
Nonetheless, the Commission continued to maintain a policy of keeping lean staffing 
levels and ensures that its key staff are well-trained and exposed to relevant and current 
regulatory mechanisms since its inception. Unfortunately, the Commission continues to 
lose some of its best brains as a result of low remunerations for staff compared to 
analogous institutions making it difficult to retain its staff (PURC, 2005). All 
respondents suggested that, the independence and autonomy of the regulator can be 
enhanced if it derives its funding from a regulatory fee or levy instead of being resourced 
through government budgetary allocations that are woefully inadequate. 
 
Analysis of PURC’s level of adherence to the principles of economic regulation 
The level of adherence of the regulator to principles of economic regulation in Ghana 
was subjectively analysed by the author in table 4-4 showing the author’s perception of 
PURC’s adheres to the principles of economic regulation. 
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Table 4-4: Level of achievement of economic regulatory principles of PURC 
The regulatory 
principle of 
PURC 
Definition of the economic 
regulatory principle 
Remarks/Observation 
Proportionality 
The cost of regulation in relation 
to  funding 
Funding is inadequate and done 
through budgetary allocations 
 
Regulator seeking to educate the 
general public and service 
provider by providing relevant 
information and embarking on 
training programmes to build the 
capacity of service provider 
instead of seeking to apply 
sanctions 
PURC undertakes stakeholder 
consultations and also embarks 
on public education through 
radio, television programmes and 
public awareness programmes. 
Training programmes are 
organised for staff of GWCL 
Accountability 
 
The regulated institutions are 
made to understand the workings 
of the regulator 
Tariff guidelines for water 
services are available. 
Feasibility of the service provider 
to appeal against the regulator’s 
decision. 
No specific provision for appeal is 
available even though such 
decision are resolved between 
them 
Availability of an effective and 
efficient complaint unit that 
should take care of consumers’ 
complaints 
This is clearly spelt out in the 
legislation. However, the 
question is how effective the 
system is. 
 
 
The regulator has a well defined 
role towards the Ministry, 
President, Parliament and the 
general public 
The Act is specific on the line of 
responsibility of PURC to the 
Ministry, Parliament and the 
general public. However, PURC 
reporting to the office of the 
President, is not explicitly stated 
in the Act 
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Customers are involved in the 
decision processes and other 
activities of the Commission 
At least 3 persons from the 
Trades Union Congress, 
Association of Ghana Industries 
and the representative of 
consumers represent customers 
on the Commission. In addition  
law allows for the establishment 
of consumer services committees 
 
 
The reporting and accounting 
audit procedures and processes 
are well defined and followed 
The Act clearly defines the 
reporting processes and 
procedures and is  done in  
practice excepts that it 
sometimes delays and difficult to 
be accessed publicly 
Consistency 
Consistence in the performance of 
its functions to the extent that the 
level of predictability of its 
decisions removes uncertainties 
among the stakeholders 
It is evident that the PURC has 
not been consistent over time in 
their regulatory decisions. PURC 
failed several times to implement 
the automatic adjustment tariff 
formula agreed upon 
 
Service providers enjoy equal level 
of attention from the regulator 
The energy utilities receive more 
regulatory focus than water 
utility.  
Transparency 
 
Objectives of the regulator is 
effectively communicated to all 
stakeholders 
 
This is available to all and can be 
found on the regulator’s website 
and annual performance reports 
Stakeholders are consulted before 
major policy change decisions are 
taken 
Consultations are seldom done 
as in the case of AVRL.  
 
The regulated entities clearly 
understand their obligations 
 
Their obligations are spelt out 
clearly except that they are 
sometime not followed 
Decision making processes are 
made clear and all major decisions 
taken are made known to the 
public 
 
The processes cannot be said to 
be clear in the Act. Some major 
decisions are never published 
Documents and other relevant 
information employed during 
decision making processes are 
available for public scrutiny. 
Only the regulatory tools are 
available.  Much cannot be found 
on water services 
 
Performance data on the 
regulated entities are published 
regularly 
PURC prepares annual reports on 
the performances of the 
regulated entities and this is 
available on their website but not 
published regularly 
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Processes and procedures for 
appointing Commissioners to the 
Commission are clearly stated and 
are competitive 
 
It is clearly spelt out in the Act 
except that it is not competitive 
Services to the 
urban poor 
Availability of a national policy 
towards ensuring that water 
services are provided to the urban 
poor 
The PURC has developed a policy 
paper in that regard 
Incentive packages are given for 
serving the poor e.g. free or 
subsidised connections 
There have been incentives 
However, it cannot be said to be 
consistent and deliberate 
 
Special programmes specifically 
designed to benefit the urban 
poor 
Part of the World Bank’s US$130 
funding for the urban water 
project was set to extend services 
to the urban poor 
 
The tariff structure offers a 
special tariff regime that is 
targeted at the urban poor 
 
It is available but only benefits  
those with connections and with 
small family sizes 
 
Evidence of projects done to 
provide water services in poor 
communities and informal 
settlements 
 
Apart from the World Bank urban 
water project  funding, no 
specific project is directed at 
improving services to the urban 
poor 
Autonomy 
Is a separate regulatory body with 
its own legal status 
PURC is a statutory body 
Functions or responsibilities of 
the regulator is clearly defined in 
the Act 
 PURC’s roles are explicitly 
defined in the Act establishing it 
Security of tenure of the 
regulatory commission is 
guaranteed in the law 
Tenure is guaranteed  by law 
Commissioners and Directors are 
protected against arbitrary 
dismissal   
No commissioner can be 
dismissed arbitrarily without 
resorting to the law 
The commission does not seek a 
prior approval on a regulatory 
decision from a government 
department or Ministry for its 
implementation. 
The Commission takes its own 
regulatory decisions without 
reference to government 
Tariff is approved without  the 
interference of government  
Even though PURC says it is 
independent, approval of  tariffs 
are always delayed and 
sometimes not done due to 
interference from  government 
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Source: Author 
The political environment of Ghana has been stable for almost two decades now. 
However, the prevalence of poverty in Ghana has exposed the urban poor to many 
health hazards since access to water by the urban poor continues to pose challenge. 
The poor pay more for water in the urban areas. Even though some attempts have been 
made by government through the PURC to address the challenge, the challenge is still 
enormous. It is however believed that until government deliberately directs its efforts 
towards ensuring that the urban poor accesses clean water no solution could be seen in 
sight. According to Franceys and Gerlach, (2008), “tariff reform is a critical and always 
politically sensitive element of water sector reform that is clouded in many myths and 
perceptions” With the present situation now, the author strongly believes that, the 
solution resides in a radical policy reform that must have all the political support and 
commitment and implemented through the regulator.  
From all the sources of data employed in this research, results have shown that the 
existing regulatory framework is acceptable but the Commission needs to exhibit its 
independence and autonomy from government. Appointment mechanisms used in 
appointing Commissioners to the Commission were also somewhat accepted generally 
but was suggested that staff of the secretariat should be taken through a transparent and 
competitive process to ensure that the competence and expertise of staff are never 
compromised. Not only that but also, the reporting procedures of the Commission were 
found to be appropriate. However, the autonomy and independence of the Commission 
could not be guaranteed as long as it continues to draw its funding from the state. And to 
ensure its autonomy and full independence the regulator could be financed through a 
regulatory fee imposed on the utilities it regulates 
In investigating the regulator’s adherence to regulatory principles, it was found that the 
PURC could not adhere to all the principles. From the analysis in table 4-4, the 
commission showed weakness in the areas of transparency, funding, consistency, 
autonomy and water supply services for the urban poor. 
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5 The Three Management Models 
This chapter discusses performance indicators achieved by each of the three 
management models: water production and sales, non-revenue water, tariffs, bill 
collection efficiency, headline efficiency, accounts receivable, profitability ratio, liquidity 
ratio and creditworthiness ratio of the public urban water provider during the two main 
periods preceding the AVRL Management Contract and including the private contract. 
Objective verifiable performance indicators are considered during the analysis based 
on the available performance data gathered on the water company. Limited 
performance data availability has been one major limitation to this analysis at this 
stage.  
5.1 Introduction 
Ghana Water Sewerage Corporation (GWSC-1966-1998) and Ghana Water Company 
Limited (GWCL as full service provider-1999-2006) have had the fundamental 
responsibility for urban water service provision to be supplied in an efficient, effective 
and sustainable manner. The expectation of the population therefore is to enjoy quality 
service at an affordable price and anything short of these is unacceptable and must be 
investigated and addressed. The performance and activities of Ghana Water Sewerage 
Corporation (GWSC) and Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) over the years are 
analysed in this section to give a baseline of performance that occurred prior to the 
involvement of the private operator, (AVRL) in June, 2006. 
Generally, the task of measuring performances of water utilities could be complex in 
view of the fact that it is multidimensional. The measurement of individual performance 
indicators that help in determining the overall performance of a water utility are also 
accompanied by various kinds and levels of drawbacks most especially in developing 
countries. Amongst them include; lack of sufficient and reliable data and lack of reliable 
data sources (Marin, 2009).This study seeks to assess the performance of 
GWSC/GWCL (before the management contract) and that of the private operator, 
(under private management) and ultimately determine the net improvements, if any, 
that the public private partnership has brought to the urban population. However, in 
making any judgement on the net improvements, the researcher takes into account the 
fact that different contractual schemes yield different benefits in different environments. 
Most importantly, because management contracts are limited in scope and time, the 
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role of the government is crucial in the overall performance of the private operator. 
Hence the raging debate over the benefits of private partnership in the urban water 
supply services in Ghana today which concentrates on: 
 how much will customers be paying for water tariff as a result of different  
management approaches?, 
 what percentage of the urban population will be served?,  
 how effective and effective will the company’s operations be?, and 
 whether Ghanaians are not capable of managing their own water utility without 
necessarily involving foreigners or private operator in the urban water 
sector? 
Each model has to be considered taking into account exogenous factors that exist in 
the environment in which the private operator operates. The pollution of water bodies 
(i.e. both ground and surface water)by mining companies, farmers and ‘galamsey’ 
operators (i.e. local artisanal gold miners) is on the ascendency and continues to 
pose both operational and financial challenges to the urban water utility in Ghana. 
It is seldom reported and very little or no attention is being paid to it by agencies 
that are responsible for ensuring and promoting the safety of water resources in 
the country. Presently, the current trends in climate change, population growth, 
reckless degradation and pollution of water bodies, rural-urban migration and high 
water demands pose great danger to many developing countries including Ghana 
and other countries with limited water resources. More challenging times in the 
urban water sector in the near future is more likely to confront governments, water 
experts and professionals, operators and water consumers. Often, some intrinsic 
factors that are normally associated with the growing deficit in water demand and 
also water tariffs are either ignored or overlooked by water users and the earlier 
these factors are considered, the better it will be for both water  service provider 
and consumers. Reports of the urban water utility indicate that raising water tariffs 
are inevitable because of the high cost of water treatments due to the high level of 
pollution of water sources. 
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5.2 Data analysis techniques 
The analytic strategy or method employed by every investigator is contingent upon his 
or her own style of rigorous thinking in addition to the adequate presentation of 
evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations (Yin, 2003). 
Nevertheless, he emphasises the point that, analysis of case study evidence is least 
developed among other research methods that exist. Bernard, (2006) posits that data 
analysis begins prior to data collection because the researcher has ideas concerning 
what he or she is studying and that data analysis is a continuous process. According to 
Yin, (2009), the process entails the examination, categorisation, tabulation and tests of 
qualitative and qualitative evidence. Taking into account the objectives of the research, 
both the qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analysed using different 
techniques.  
 
Information collected through interviews and public hearings were transcribed and 
carefully coded into a numerical form. SPSS, Microsoft Word, and Excel were used in 
transcribing data collected through interviews by capturing different responses by 
grouping and tallying some of the responses. Further, the data was organised by 
categorising it into financial, social, technical/operational, political, economic, 
governance and commercial issues. This affords the investigator the opportunity to 
identify the relevant information that needed to be focused on. Also, modifications of 
the research process and alternative methods were done whenever necessary during 
the research. For instance, after analysing the first data collected during the first 
fieldwork in Ghana in 2008, it was evident that customer perceptions were not 
adequately captured. Subsequently, the inadequacies were addressed during the 
second fieldwork in Ghana in 2010. Exploratory analysis was subsequently undertaken 
to find out what the data was “saying” and also tried to confirm whether or not the data 
collected was sufficient enough to produce a good story about the urban water supply 
management in Ghana. For instance, from the annual reports (including the Cash flow 
statements, Balance sheets, Income and Expenditure accounts), spreadsheets were 
generated for both the technical/operational and financial data analysis using Microsoft 
Excel. This afforded the researcher the opportunity to have a fair idea of what the data 
was depicting. “Try to get a feeling for what you have got and what it is trying to tell 
you” (Robson, 2002).  
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The computation and interpretation of financial, operational performances and 
performances indicators were undertaken based on the standard set of indicators of 
the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET, 
2009, and 2014). Graphs, ratios, and percentages were employed to depict the 
performances of the three regimes. Additionally, analysis of variance (ANOVA), t-Tests 
and Tukey’s HSD (i.e. honestly significant difference) tests were employed to show 
whether or not statistically, there were any differences between the three sample 
means of the three management models or regimes and their respective periods. Lind 
and Mason, (1997) posit that while t-Test is the appropriate statistical tool for 
comparing the sample means of two different populations if the differences are to be 
determined. Now, ANOVA shows whether or not statistically there are any significant 
differences in the means where there are more than two means to be compared. In 
testing the null hypothesis that the means of the three regimes (i.e. populations) are all 
equal, a single factor or one-way ANOVA was employed. Overall, in deciding on 
whether or not statistically, significant differences exist in the three sample means, a 
null hypothesis H0 (i.e.H0: μ0 = μ1 = μ2 = μ3) and an alternative hypothesis, H1: Not H0 
(i.e. H1: μ0 ≠ μ1 ≠ μ2 μ ≠ μ3, or at least one of the means is different from the others), 
stated at 5% level of significance, where μ represents the mean score of the 
population. In deciding, if the calculated value F is equal to or greater than the critical 
value; F ≥ Fcritical, then the result is significant at that level of probability and the null 
hypothesis H0, is rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 is true. Similarly, if the 
calculated value F is less than the critical value; F < Fcritical, then the result is 
insignificant at that level of probability and the null hypothesis H0, is accepted and the 
alternative hypothesis H1 is untrue (Lind and Mason, 1997). 
Furthermore, Pallant, (2005) posits that, paired-samples t-Test (also known as 
repeated measures) is employed when a researcher has only one group of people or 
companies, or machines etc and collects data from them on two different occasions, or 
under two different conditions. Furthermore, according to (Kothari and Garg, 2014), the 
distribution of test statistic becomes normal distribution in the case of large samples 
while sampling distributions such as t-distribution, F-distribution and chi-square 
distribution are used for small samples as in the case of this research. Therefore, in 
comparing the performances of the three regimes of the same public water utility under 
different management models, and establishing whether or not there were any 
significant differences regarding their mean performances, t-Test was considered the 
most appropriate statistical tool to apply as matched pairs of mean performance 
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indicators of each of the regimes were matched with the same performance indicators 
of other regimes. Here, scores on a continuous measure were compared for each pair 
of indicators. Also, the paired-sample test was chosen as it afforded the researcher the 
opportunity to compare various performance indicators of the public urban water utility 
under different management models and periods (i.e. between GWSC and GWCL, 
GWSC and AVRL and GWCL and AVRL). Results for the paired-samples t-test was 
presented using the name of the test, the purpose of the test, the t-value, the degrees 
of freedom (df), the probability value, and the means and standard deviations for each 
of the regimes.  
 
Tukey's multiple comparison test, also known as Tukey's honestly significant difference 
(HSD) constitutes one of several tests that a researcher can employ to determine 
which means among a given set of means differ from the rest. With only two groups of 
observations one could compare the two group means using a t-Test and with more 
than two groups, it is inappropriate to simply compare each pair using a t-test because 
of the problem of multiple testing. In order to perform this type of analysis correctly a 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is usually used to evaluate whether there is any 
evidence that the means of the populations differ. For instance, if the ANOVA leads to 
a conclusion that there is evidence that the group means differ, it becomes necessary 
to further investigate which of the means are different. Hence the use of Tukey’s 
multiple comparison test. While the ANOVA tells whether groups in the sample differ 
but and cannot tell which groups differ, Tukey's HSD specifically clarifies which groups 
among the sample have significant differences. Therefore, Tukey's HSD tests were 
performed to conduct further data analysis in order to maintain integrity which were 
tests that were never pre-planned. Statistically, like both the t-test and ANOVA, the 
Tukey’s multiple comparison test, assumes that the data from the different groups 
come from populations where the observations have a normal distribution and the 
standard deviation is the same for each group.  
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was employed in computing 
the HSD values representing the minimum distances between two group means which 
must exist before the difference between the two groups can be said to be statistically 
significant. From the Tukey’s HSD table, the Sig value is read across each row and the 
Sig. value determines whether or not the two conditions that are being compared are 
significantly different. Now, where conditions are significantly different, their Mean 
Difference values in the corresponding rows have a star (*). In the case where the Sig 
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value is greater than 0.05 it is concluded that statistically, there is no significant 
difference between the two conditions that are being compared and therefore can 
conclude that the differences between condition Means are likely due to chance. 
Conversely, if the Sig value is less than or equal to 0.05, it is concluded that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the two conditions that are being compared 
and therefore can conclude that the differences between condition Means are not likely 
due to chance. 
Finally and additionally, longitudinal comparator analysis was undertaken for various 
regimes (GWSC at least 10 years, GWCL, 7 years and AVRL, 5 years) in assessing 
the performance of all three management models. The financial and operational 
performance indicators however constitute a major component of the process of the 
data analysis. Inflation rates were obtained from Ghana Statistical Service and used to 
generate the conversion factors employed in converting all nominal financial data into 
2011 real prices and subsequently converted into constant Dollar prices. 
 
5.3 Performance evaluation of Ghana Water and Sewerage 
Corporation (GWSC, 1965-1998) 
The researcher has striven to collect published data from as early a date as is 
possible. The quality and coverage of this information is necessarily mixed – 
however it does now appear to be more complete than anything available from 
GWCL or other sector institutions. The following sections are based upon this 
information, primarily from GWSC Annual Reports, sometimes reported through 
various consultants’ studies. 
5.3.1 Efficiency and effectiveness, GWSC 
One major intriguing operational challenge that has continued to confront the 
national public water utility has always been the large volumetric discrepancies that 
exist between the quantity of water produced and water sold. Evidently, annual 
water productions of Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation from 1987 to 1998 
have fluctuated between 159.3 million cubic metres in 1988 and 191 million cubic 
metres as shown in figure 5-1 below. Between 1989 and June, 1998, the World 
Bank Credit 2309GH was employed for the rehabilitation of 33 systems out of the 
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existing 210 systems and this led to the completion of most of the rehabilitation and 
capacity building projects in Ashanti, Volta, Western, Central, ATMA and Brong 
Ahafo regions (GWCL., 1998)). Funding of rehabilitation projects was undertaken 
by other institutions and governments during the same period, to improve the 
performance of the public water utility in Ghana. For instance, in 1996, GWSC 
undertook a number of rehabilitation works throughout the country to improve service 
delivery. Notable among these projects were the Accra-Tema Metropolitan Area 
(ATMA) rehabilitation project supported by AFDB, Italian Government and the Nordic 
Fund; GWSC Assistance Project for the Northern Regions supported by CIDA, the 
Water Sector Rehabilitation Project for 33 large-scale urban water systems serving 
about 6.18 million throughout the country. 
 
Largely, the completion of most of the rehabilitation and capacity expansion projects 
undertaken in 1996 account for the steady increase in water production after 1994 from 
186 million cubic metres in 1995 to 191 million cubic metres in 1996. 
 
Figure 5-1 Water production (1987-1998) and sales (1984 – 1998), GWSC 
Now, rehabilitation of the transmission pipeline from Tema to Kpong, extension of 
water supply to Pantang junction and Adenta Estate (SSNIT flats), Bamag plant at 
Weija, Techiman and Konongo water supplies, Candy plant at Weija, and 17 No. 
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pumping station in ATMA were all completed and commissioned in 1996 (GWSC, 
1996). 
 
Technically, various factors account for the fluctuating trend in the annual water 
production from 1987 to 1998 including the drying up of raw water sources, 
frequent plant and equipment breakdowns, rehabilitation works, installation of 
production meters for accurate measurements, and frequent power outages. A case in 
point was the corporation’s failure to transfer 105 small water supply systems to 
Community Water and Sanitation Division earmarked to take place in 1998 and the 
Water Sector Rehabilitation Projects in the same year resulted in the increase in the 
operational systems from 182 in 1996 to 190 in 1998 but conversely resulted in a 
decrease in the annual water production in 1998 due to natural factors including the 
drying up of raw water sources, frequent power outages, (Ghana experienced load 
shedding nationwide in 1998) low voltages, and the installation of production meters 
leading to the capturing of actual production figures in lieu of estimates (GWSC, 1998). 
A key indicator therefore is Non-revenue water (NWR), defined as the difference 
between quantity of water supplied and water sold (i.e. volume of water “lost”). It is 
expressed as a percentage of net water supplied and represents the water that has 
been produced and “lost” before it gets to the customer through leaks, theft, and legal 
usage for which no payment is made (IBNET, 2011). For over a decade (from 1987 to 
1998) GWSC recorded significantly high levels of non-revenue water as shown in 
figure 5-2.below.The operational effectiveness and efficiency of GWSC has largely 
been exposed during the period in figure 5-2. Throughout the 12-year period (i.e. from 
1987 to 1998),non-revenue water ranges between 51 and 63 percent. 
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Figure 5-2 NRW, Metering & Bill Collection Efficiencies, GWSC 
This implies that consistently and notoriously, more than 50 percent of water produced 
during the period had been lost. In its commercial sense, more than 50 percent of the 
utility’s water revenue was lost except in 1988. “Technically, a high non-revenue water 
level depicts a poorly-run water utility that lacks governance, autonomy, accountability 
and the technical and managerial skills necessary to provide a reliable service” 
(Liemberger et al, 2009). 
Physical and commercial losses are the two elements that constitute non-revenue 
water (NRW) stemming from leakage due to ageing and obsolete networks, pipe 
burst, illegal connections, lack of effective monitoring, lack of regular updating of 
customer data, corruption on the part of some unscrupulous officials of the utility who 
may aid some consumers to do illegal connections and low metering. It is estimated 
that physical and commercial losses constitute 30 and 20 percent of the non-revenue 
water respectively in the case of GWSC. Partly, low metering in 1996 contributed to 
the high non-revenue water of 57 percent (GWSC, 1996). Meanwhile, a metering 
program embarked upon by the water utility in 1996 by procuring and installing 93,500 
consumer meters and 67 production meters partly accounted for the reduction in non-
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revenue water recorded in 1998 from 53 percent in 1997 to 50 percent in 1998 
(GWSC, 1998) 
 
Finally, the product of water sold (calculated as a percentage of water produced) and 
bill collection efficiency technically defines the overall collection efficiency of the utility. 
This is because, it helps to integrate, encompass and express the totality of all 
operational/technical, managerial, commercial and financial efficiencies and 
effectiveness of the utility. Averagely, the utility’s overall collection efficiency from 1991 
to 1998 was 40.7 percent and thus exposes the general abysmal performance of the 
water utility during the period. 
 
Customer metering 
Metering ratio as a performance indicator, expresses the percentage of metered 
consumers to the total number of consumers served by a water utility. It indicates the 
effectiveness of the metering installation strategy employed by the utility. Both physical 
and commercial components of the losses incurred by GWSC during the period under 
study have been indeterminate due to lack of sufficient meters for water consumers 
and lack of production meters. As shown above, from 1991 to 1998, less than 60 
percent of water customers were metered with metering ratio ranging between 34 
percent and 59 percent in 1996 and 1994 respectively. A sharp decline in metering 
ratio from 98.5 in 1994 to 79.4 in 1995 was as a result of significant increases in 
customer base without a corresponding increase in meter installation. Even though the 
utility’s management in 1995 attempted to improve upon the low metering ratio by 
ordering more meters for installation, the meters could not be delivered and therefore 
worsened the metering situation in 1996 where about 6,751 new customers were 
added to the existing customers and 33,692 defective meters were recorded during 
the same period.  
 
Billing and collection efficiencies 
Billing and bill collection efficiency are crucial and are major determinants of financial 
performance and for that matter the sustainability of any water utilities. Significantly, bill 
collection efficiency affects the financial health of all water utilities to a large extent; 
hence, utilities that perform poorly in billing and collection inevitably suffer major 
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financial drawbacks. Fundamentally, billing requires a good record-keeping on 
customers such that the quantity of water consumed by all consumers and their 
respective locations are known for effective billing, collection and monitoring. However, 
this study has revealed that data management during the period had been very poor 
due to lack of computers and other logistical support needed for generating accurate 
data on customers. This challenge was evident during data collection as it became very 
difficult for the researcher to collect data on this period (especially for the years 2004 
and 2005). Nevertheless, during the fieldwork, some informants (i.e. staff of the water 
utility) intimated that, billings were sometimes done based on mere guesstimates and 
therefore majority of customers were billed using “flat rates” or estimates regardless of 
the volume of water a customer consumed. Also, some technical officers collude with 
customers to conceal household sizes for the estimates.  
The implication is that, while some customers are under-billed far below their actual 
consumption, others are over-billed. In such situations, some unscrupulous unmetered 
customers may be encouraged to engage in the illegal sale of water to neighbours and 
other consumers that would be without water at the expense of the water utility -a 
practice that is very much prevalent in the Ghanaian society today. Unfortunately, it has 
become business as usual and therefore a major source of income to some 
unscrupulous unmetered customers of the water utility– a situation that prevails in all 
three cities used for the study. 
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Figure 5-3 Bill collection efficiencies, GWSC 
According to Marin, (2009), the task of accurately measuring water losses is 
notoriously complex. For over a decade, (i.e. from 1987 to 1998) less than 50% of the 
water produced was sold. Also exacerbating the problems of GWSC is the low bill 
collection efficiencies exhibited by the water utility over the years. Except in 1996 when 
bill collection efficiency hit 98 percent, average bill collection efficiency was 
approximately 89.3 % from 1991 to 1998. It is however worthy of note that 
Government’s non-payment of bills of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), 
the culture of customer’s unwillingness to pay water bills readily and long billing cycles 
significantly account for these low collection efficiencies. Here, customers’ 
unwillingness to pay water bills might partly be influenced by long billing cycles and 
poor quality of service since customer will only be willing and ready to pay their bills 
whenever quality services are provided and guaranteed. Marin, (2009) asserts that it is 
common for poorly performing public utilities to have low bill-collection rates due to lax 
enforcement and the fact that people resent paying for poor services. Usually, issues 
relating to culture of non-payment of bills once developed take time to undo and in this 
case, customer orientation and education could provide a good remedy. 
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Figure 5-4 Days receivables ratio, GWSC 
The enforcement of government’s policy to decentralise payment of utility bills of MDAs 
in 1996 without the necessary budgetary provisions, efforts and support to financially 
empower the MDAs to pay their bills, resulted in the decline in bill collection in 1997 
and consequently increased the average collection period and further worsened in 
subsequent years as shown in Figure 5-3. 
In 1998, a private company, Messrs Delaram was engaged to recover the arrears of 
the corporation in order to improve the corporation’s commercial operations in the 
areas of meter reading, bill distribution, arrears collection and prepayment metering 
and this resulted in the collection of 563 million cedis within six months from June 1998 
(GWSC, 1998). Also, more than 2 billion cedis was collected as part of the arrears of 
MDAs in 1998. A tariff increase of 130 percent granted to GWSC by the newly 
established PURC in 1998 improved both billing and collection figures during the year 
in terms of cash over the previous year. Meanwhile, overall collection efficiency 
declined further in 1998 due to government’s failure to pay about 65 percent of bills of 
MDAs. Albeit government pays its bills, payments are usually unduly delayed thereby 
sometimes showing bill collections of government above 100%. While one may agree 
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with the above reasons, lack of adequate bill collection centres greatly account for the 
low bill collection efficiencies for the private customers.  
 
5.3.2 Financial ratio analysis, GWSC 
Liquidity 
Inevitably, the availability of sufficient liquid resources is crucial to the survival of water 
utilities if they are to meet their current and maturing obligations. However, it is worth-
noting that different businesses require different current ratios for analysing a 
company’s financial performance. Here, the liquidity ratio employed in examining the 
relationship between the liquid resources of GWSC available and the current liabilities 
is the current ratio expressed as the ratio of the current asset to the current liabilities of 
the water utility. For a water utility, a current ratio of 2:1 is considered desirable.  
 
 
Figure 5-5 Liquidity ratio, GWSC 
The graph above depicts the Corporation’s short-term solvency for a period of one and 
a half decade, (i.e.1984-1998) that could best be described as extremely low except in 
1988 when the utility’s current ratio was 2.52 but with high corresponding accounts 
receivable of 9 months The implication is that, even though the figures show that the 
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utility was liquid in 1988, funds were tied up in cash due to high receivables and 
therefore could not be used productively. The Corporation’s liquidity position sharply 
worsened after 1988 to a low of 0.44 in 1990 and only improved to 1.79 in 1993 and 
then declined again from 1994 till 1998.The Corporation’s attempt to increase the 
current liability during this period in order to sustain its operations coupled with high 
inflations and exchange losses, greatly affected the liquidity position of the utility. 
Additionally, the closure of the World Bank Credit GH2039 compelled the corporation to 
resort to short term borrowing in view of sustaining the Water Sector Rehabilitation 
Programme worsened the liquidity position in 1998. High exchange rates due to 
inflation and low collection efficiency leading to high receivables to a large extent 
contributed to the financial stress that the Corporation experienced throughout the 
period. Overall, the liquidity position of GWSC could best be described as quivery 
during the period and thus significantly affected the utility’s operations making it 
extremely difficult for the utility to repay its foreign loans and also pay for its imports. 
Operating ratio 
Operating ratio is expressed as a ratio of the operating expenditure to operating 
income and usually employed to determine how much is left to cater for non-operating 
expenditures. According to Franceys, (2007), an operating ratio of 60 percent or less is 
considered desirable for water utilities. Thus, at least 40 percent of a water utility’s 
revenue is required to take care of non-operating expenditures of a water utility. GWSC 
had unacceptable levels of operating ratios throughout the 15-year period (i.e. from 
1984 to 1998) and had its best operating ratio of 66.3 percent in 1995 and its worst 
ratio of 205 percent in 1985. With the sky-rocketing levels of inflation in the early parts 
of the 1980s which reached a climax of 142 percent in 1983 (IMF, 2011), controlling 
energy cost and chemicals that were imported in US dollars became extremely difficult. 
Except in 1993 and 1995, when the operating ratios were 69 and 66 percent 
respectively, the entire period recorded high ratios above 71 percent. This explains the 
large negative net margins recorded by the Corporation.  
Not only that but also, the Corporation’s production and general administration costs 
components constitute approximately 75 percent of the operating expenditure with 
energy costs having more than 50 percent of the production costs. Comparatively, 
between 1997 and 1998, electricity and chemical costs registered almost 100 percent 
increase and therefore any attempt to control both the chemical and electricity costs 
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would ultimately and automatically reduce the operating and consequently make 
available sufficient cash for non-operating expenditures. 
 
Figure 5-6 Operating ratio, GWSC 
Profitability  
The growth and sustainability of a business are contingent upon the management’s 
ability to control spending judiciously so as to earn a return on resources that have 
been committed towards the business. In this study, the performance indicator 
employed in measuring the level of profitability of GWSC is its return on fixed assets 
(ROFA) which shows how profitable the corporation is relative to its fixed assets. 
Depending on how prudent resources of a utility are employed, an operating surplus or 
deficit could be generated. In this case, a profitability ratio between 6 percent and 8 
percent may be considered desirable for a water utility such as GWSC. 
Successively from 1994 to 1998, GWSC recorded deficits with its return on fixed assets 
(ROFA) ranging between -9.69 percent in 1994 and -1.03 percent in 1998 respectively. 
It is significant to state here that, both endogenous and exogenous factors have 
accounted for this abysmal performance of the corporation. In 1994, revaluation of the 
corporation’s assets which raised the value of its assets by 800 percent which 
automatically increased the depreciation charges thereby making losses before the 
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additional taxes and interest charges were considered hence leading to the abysmal 
losses that it incurred in 1994. Meanwhile, three unprecedented upward adjustments of 
tariffs of 44 percent, 20 percent and 10 percent in March, April and July 1995, 
respectively also gave a remarkable increase of 66.3 percent in water revenue over 
that of the previous year from 19.9 billion cedis to 33.09 billion cedis in 1995. Coupled 
with a reduction in its operating ratio from 79 percent in 1994 to 66 percent in 1995,its 
operating deficit reduced significantly in 1995. 
 
 
Figure 5-7 Profitability ratio, GWSC 
Between 1994 and 1997, it is intriguing to note that while operating expenditure of the 
utility increased by 173.9 percent, its total revenue increased by only 96.2 percent 
(GWSC’s Corporate Plan, 1999-2001). Nonetheless, the establishment of a regulatory 
body (i.e. Public Utility Regulatory Commission) in 1997 somewhat helped improve the 
worsening financial position of GWSC when it approved a 130 percent tariff increase 
which reflects in the Corporation’s profitability in1998.  
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By and large, undue political interference had influenced the performance of GWSC to 
the extent that it could only increase water tariffs upon ministerial approval which in 
most cases delayed for several months and in some cases, more than a year (Amis, 
1998) even though, section 4 of Act 538 establishing the PURC makes it explicitly 
independent and autonomous. Not until March, 1998 when the GWSC was granted130 
percent tariff increase, water tariffs either lagged behind average unit cost of production 
or were at par. The graph below clearly displays the deficit gap between average tariff 
levels and unit costs of water produced between 1989 and 1998. 
Taking into account the difference between the average tariff and the average cost of 
water sold, it clearly exposes a high level of inefficiency in the system during the 
period. With more than 54% non-revenue water at the time, raising tariffs will not 
necessarily or automatically translate into the utility’s ability of achieving cost recovery. 
In such a case, where both commercial and operational/technical inefficiencies are 
significant (i.e. in the area of billing and collection and high non-revenue water losses), 
increasing tariff levels as a means of achieving cost recovery may only make 
customers to pay for the inefficiencies of the corporation. 
To achieve full cost recovery, the tariff must be able to take care of the utility’s 
operating expenditure, capital maintenance expenditure and the capital costs. Here, 
the average unit cost of production may be expressed as the total expenditure divided 
by the total volume of water produced while the average unit cost of water sold is 
expressed as the total expenditure divided by the total volume of water sold. 
Average tariff is however defined as the total billing divided by the total volume of 
water sold. 
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Figure 5-8 Average tariff versus average unit cost of water production and 
sales, GWSC 
The difference between the average unit cost of water produced and that of water sold 
gives the average unit cost of water that is unaccounted for. As depicted in the figure 
5.8, while the gap between the unit cost of water produced and the average tariff has 
been marginal, the gap between the average tariffs and the average unit cost of water 
sold was significantly wide and thus exposes the gross inefficiencies in the operations 
of the corporation.  
Creditworthiness 
The ratio of the corporation’s long-term debt to the shareholder’s equity defines the 
utility’s debt to equity ratio and the higher the ratio, the riskier the business. Here, the 
level or magnitude of long-term loans investment of GWSC is analysed using its 
leverage and from the graph below, the debt to equity ratios exceed 100% in 1997 and 
1998 showing that majority of the utility’s assets were financed through debts having 
the best leverage of 15.45 percent in 1994 since 1991.In the 1990s, the depreciation of 
the cedi against most major currencies coupled with the high rising exchange rates, 
translated into high exchange and interest losses on its debts.  
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Figure 5-9 Leverage, GWSC 
With the increasing levels of investment in 1995 and 1996 through loans and grants 
coupled with low collection and a sky-rocketing annual inflation rate of 70.8 percent in 
1995, debt-to-equity ratio significantly worsened after 1994.  
 
Figure 5-10 Level of Investment, GWSC 
125 
Subsequently, investments greatly declined after 1996 as shown in the figure 5-10 
above. 
5.3.3 Human resource management of GWSC 
Labour productivity and staffing levels 
Labour productivity ratio is defined as the number of staff members per thousand 
customers served. From figure 5-11 below, GWSC recorded high labour productivity 
ratios between 26 in 1991 and 18 in 1998 due to overstaffing without the corresponding 
increases in customer base through coverage expansion. One major challenge that 
has bedevilled most public institutions in Ghana is the institutionalised political 
patronage since independence and GWSC was not spared. Undoubtedly, very little 
gains were made in the corporation’s labour productivity ratios during the 8-year period 
under study. 
 
 
Figure 5-11 Labour productivity ratio, GWSC 
Labour productivity stood at a dismal ratio of 26 employees per 1,000 customers in 
1991 and with very poor work practices. Albeit, a Manpower Improvement Programme 
was instituted in 1991 to redeploy redundant staff, recruit identified professionals and 
also motivate and retain staff somewhat improved the utility’s labour productivity of 
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GWSC, it was unsuccessful. For instance, its staff strength at the close of December, 
1995 stood at 4,284 compared to 4,349 at the inception of the programme. However, in 
1996, the corporation vigorously pursued a three-pronged programme and that led to a 
further reduction in the number of staff through the limitation of fresh recruitment to 
essential categories of staff only. Consequently, staff strength marginally decreased 
from 4,284 to 4,198 while customer strength increased from 205,685 in 1995 to 
216,748 in 1996 respectively thereby further but marginally improving its productivity 
ratio to 19.2 in 1996.  
 
On the contrary, a review of the corporation’s staff establishment/structure to reflect the 
needs of the utility in 1996 by a task force found out that a staff strength of 3,980 was 
most appropriate at the time. In spite of the restriction placed on fresh recruitment 
during the period to special categories of staff, financial constraints made it impossible 
for the scheduled retrenchment of low productive staff to be effected. Hence the 
targeted staff strength of 3,980 could not be achieved. Again in 1998, the staff strength 
of the corporation marginally increased by forty eight new workers from the previous 
year standing at 4,226. It is however worthy of note that system expansion and 
rehabilitation projects undertaken in 1995 through to 1997 helped in improving the 
labour productivity of the corporation since more customers were added as a result of 
the expansion of the system. 
 
Staff training 
GWSC had implemented a Manpower Improvement Programme that sought to ensure 
a continuous improvement of operational efficiency of its human resources as an 
essential software and catalyst for the operational inputs of the corporation. 
Consequently, the programme attracted highly qualified personnel and helped fill 
technical/professional and other strategic positions (GWSC, 1995). In 1996, more than 
20 percent of its labour force was offered various forms of training to equip and 
motivate staff for their tasks. Both locally and overseas, employees undertook various 
courses to top-up their skills. Most of the revenue staff in charge of customer care and 
technical staff in charge of Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) were 
supplied with workshop equipment and trained locally in 1998 (GWSC, 1998). 
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5.4 Performance evaluation Ghana Water Company Limited 
(GWCL, 1999-2006) 
As part of government plans to invite a private operator into water supply operations on 
an enhanced lease basis, a preparatory work to transfer 105 out of 210 systems to the 
District Assemblies/Communities for community management was undertaken and 
completed by the end of 1998. Additionally, a number of studies were undertaken 
including the willingness and ability to pay, tariff structure, water quality and assets 
valuation. More significantly, by way of ensuring a successful implementation of the 
various phases of the programme in future, a Transaction Advisor was appointed 
(GWSC, 1998). Finally, in pursuant to the Statutory Corporation’s Act, 1993 (Act 641) 
as amended, GWSC in 1999 became a limited liability company under a new name, 
Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL).  
Subsequently, due to this conversion, the capita structure of the company completely 
changed and therefore was registered with an authorised capital of GH¢ 200 billion 
shares of no par value and an issued capital of GH¢ 12.5 billion (i.e. GH¢ 12.5 billion 
shares) (GWCL, 1999). Inevitably, major changes were made in the composition of 
company’s board membership including the chairman and with the appointment of a 
Deputy Managing Director for operations, the company had its full complement of top 
management to effect the needed change at the time. 
 
Water production and sales 
At the outset of 1999, GWCL operated 215 systems but transferred 115 smaller 
systems to the some District Assemblies/Communities for community management in 
the course of the year as part of the Water Sector Restructuring Programme (GWCL, 
1999). Nonetheless, it is worthy of note that, a transition period of one year was agreed 
upon for GWCL to continue to be responsible for the operation of these systems until 
the communities were ready to take over the management of these systems. Since the 
inception of the Water Sector Rehabilitation Project in 1990, water production had been 
fluctuating. 
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Not until 2002, water production levels could not exceed the production level of 1999 
which stood at 197 million cubic metres. However, the 6 percent increase in water 
production over the 1998 water production level of 183.6 million cubic metres is 
attributable to the near completion of the water rehabilitation projects. During the 
year, Water Sector Rehabilitation Projects in Tamale and Wa funded by OECF and 
executed by Sogea and the South-East District water Supply Project funded by 
ODA, ECGD and GOG for the treatment of water for supplying water to Ada, 
Sogakope, Keta, Anloga and other surrounding areas were completed and 
commissioned (GWCL, 1999).  
 
 
Figure 5-12 Water production (1999-2005) and sales (1999 – 2005), 
GWCL 
Given that the claim made above by the company for the increase in water 
production in 1999 is true, then one may automatically expect an increase in water 
production after 1999 but the opposite occurred with a 5% reduction in water 
production in 2000 compared to the previous year. The reason being that, out of 
120 smaller systems transferred to the District Assemblies during the year, GWCL 
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continued to operate 35 of the systems. Averagely, GWCL operated 98 systems in 
2000 compared to 215 systems in 1999. In 2002, water production increased by 
9% over the previous year due to the completion of the Adam Clark Plant at Weija 
(ATMA). Here again, it is significant to emphasise the point that after 2000 when 
new and higher capacity plants, were installed as in Weija and Tamale etc and 
transfer of smaller systems to the District Assemblies were completed in 2002, 
merely using the number of systems of GWCL to compare water production levels 
with those prior to 2002 could be highly problematic even if all other conditions 
remain same. For instance in 2001 and 2003, with only 82 systems and 83 
systems in 2002, production levels were far above that of 215 systems in 1999 due 
to these reasons.  
 
In 2003, breakdown of borehole systems at Jasikan, Anfoega and Worawora, loss 
in efficiency of raw water pumps at Vea, poor state of filters in Central Region 
resulting in reduction in raw water abstraction, frequent power outages across the 
nation greatly affected both production. Not only that but also, rationing 
programmes in ATMA, Volta, Upper East and Upper West Regions, deliberate 
reduction of water production in Brong Ahafo, and Upper West Regions due to low 
water demand during the rainy season, low yields of boreholes in Bawku during the 
dry season, occasional damaging of distribution pipelines in Accra west due to 
road construction works, inadequate distribution network in the western part of 
Accra compelled ATMA to produce at 153,000m3per day as against a capacity of 
189,000m3 per day. All these factors resulted in the marginal improvement in water 
production in 2003. (GWCL, 2003) 
 
Now, Accra Tema Metropolitan Area (ATMA) water supply system being the 
largest system significantly influences the overall water production levels. And 
therefore whenever ATMA system suffers a technical and operational hitch, the 
overall water production suffers significantly. Evidently, in both 1999 and 2000, 
ATMA recorded 73 percent of the total city water production and consecutively in 
2001 and 2002,ATMA, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Cape Coast contributed 82 
percent of water production while other urban systems contributed the remaining 
18 percent but with ATMA alone contributing 60% and 63% respectively. According 
to GWCL, (2000),the breakdown of an electrical transformer at Kpong Headworks, 
(part of ATMA system) frequent power outages, low voltages and rehabilitation 
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work at Weija (part of ATMA system) in 2000 accounts for the significant decline in 
water production in that year.  
 
Throughout the 7 years (i.e. 1999 – 2005), water sales had lagged far behind water 
production to the extent that less than 50% of water produced could be sold due to 
high non-revenue water recorded during the period. 
 
5.4.1 Efficiency and effectiveness, GWCL 
Non-revenue water 
One noticeable feature that is worth mentioning following the conversion of Ghana 
Water and Sewerage Corporation into a Limited liability company in 1999 is the 
consistent improvement in water production after 2000, though marginal. Conversely, 
from 1999 to 2005, GWCL recorded notorious levels of non-revenue water (NRW) 
ranging between 48.3% in 2005 and 58.4% in 2002. The implications are that, less 
than 50% of the water produced by GWCL from 1999 to 2004 could be accounted for 
except in 2005 when 51.7% of the water produced was accounted for. 
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Figure 5-13 NRW, Metering & Bill Collection Efficiencies, GWCL 
The study revealed that the high levels of water losses stemmed from leakages on 
transmission and distribution mains, bad service connections due to ageing networks, 
unauthorised consumption (i.e. illegal connections and by-passing of meters), 
metering inaccuracies (i.e. wrong reading of meters faulty meters, non-reading and 
wrong recording of bills), insufficient consumer and production meters, lack of effective 
monitoring, and corruption on the part of some officials of the company. This situation 
reveals a high level of operational inefficiencies, ineffectiveness and poor managerial 
practices within the public water utility.  
 
Nevertheless, the author holds the view that one critical technical aspect of 
rehabilitation projects that both GWSC and GWCL failed to address was the 
replacement of all weak and ageing networks alongside the installation of new and 
more powerful pumps whose high pressures could only worsen the already precarious 
non-revenue water situation by causing more weak pipes to burst and therefore 
leading to more water losses. According to PURC (2005), operators in Santiago, Chile 
(a private operator), Germany (a mixed public-private operator), UK (a private operator) 
recorded overall collection efficiencies of 73%, 83%, 73% respectively in 2002, and 
Gdansk, Poland (public operator) 78%, in 2001 Senegal (a private operator) 80% and 
Central Region, Malawi(a public operator) 78%, in 2000.  
 
Relatively, the performance of GWCL could best be described as abysmal and 
appalling as its overall collection efficiencies fluctuated between 29.3% in 2004 and 
42.7% in 2000, during the same period. Finally, low and declining bill collection 
efficiencies of the utility resulted in a perennial build-up of revenue arrears which at a 
point was tackled through the commissioning of a prepaid metering project in 2000 in 
some selected communities in the Accra-Tema Metropolitan Area (ATMA). This 
resulted in improvement of revenue generation in Tema in the Accra-Tema 
Metropolitan Area in 2000 (GWCL, Annual Report, 2000). Overall, the utility’s level of 
overall water collection efficiency very much exposes the poor performance of the 
public water utility during the period. Structurally, it is very difficult to reduce NRW. 
Kingdom, Liemberger, and Marin (2006) as cited in IBNET, (2014), posit that reducing 
NRW is not just a technical issue, but is also linked to weak management. When looking 
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at a set of managerial indicators, the link between NRW performance and managerial 
performance is less than clear. 
 
Customer metering 
Technically, it is impossible for a water utility to accurately determine its metering ratio 
without having a sufficient and a reliable data on its customers. The ability and 
capacity of most utilities to generate adequate and reliable data poses a major 
challenge to most water utilities for decades partly due to housing systems of which 
Ghana is no exception. Until a thorough nationwide survey is undertaken on 
customers to ascertain the validity of strength of its customers, the operator has no 
other option than to continue with the “old order” in which customers’ strength and 
water consumptions could only be determined employing estimates and guesstimates 
during billing.  
 
During the period under review, metering activity posed a major challenge to the water 
utility considering its direct correlation with level of water losses. The utility achieved its 
highest metering ratio of 53.1 percent in 2000 after the company had pursued a more 
aggressive programme in 1999 towards customers’ metering by procuring 40,000 new 
meters in 1999 for installation. However, upon installing 70 percent of these meters in 
the year, the metering ratio could marginally improve from 46.9 percent in 1998 to 
51.1percent in 1999 and woefully failed to attain its target of 85 percent, since most of 
the meters procured were used to replace defective meters instead of installing them 
for the existing unmetered customers (GWCL, 1999). After 15,000 meters were 
installed in the following year and procuring additional 20,000 meters, metering ratio 
could only marginally increase to 53 percent in the year 2000. Unfortunately, severe 
financial constraints in 2001 hindered GWCL from procuring more meters as planned 
and therefore could only procure 10,000 more meters that were later installed in 
2002but saw a decline in its metering ratio as customer strength significantly 
increased without a corresponding increase in the number of installed meters until 
2005 
 
Billing and collection 
Billing (water sales) and bill collection constitute two major activities of every water 
utility unless the utility is being run on charity otherwise, they are vital for the financial 
health and sustainability of water utilities. More often than not, poorly performing public 
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utilities suffer from low bill-collection ratios due to lax enforcement and the fact that 
most customers feel reluctant paying for poor services (Marin, 2009). The effects of 
cost reflective tariffs on a utility’s financial health can only be realised if billing and 
collection are effectively and efficiently combined while at the same time addressing 
the challenges of water losses. The inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of water utilities 
in the area of billing and collection are sometimes deliberately buried, crowded and 
overshadowed by issues of cost reflective tariffs as it has been in the case of GWCL. 
Thus, any public water utility that lacks these attributes has very little chance of survival 
without subsidies from central government as long as both financial and operational 
inefficiencies persist. 
 
 
Figure 5-14 Bill collection efficiencies, GWCL 
In terms of absolute figures, GWCL had successively recorded various levels of 
improvement in billing. It recorded 28.4% in 1999, 18.2% in 2000, 73% in 2001, 74.8% 
in 2002, and 33.1% 2003, 18.2% in 2004 and 13.7% in 2005 over their previous years. 
However, it is significant to emphasise here that these improvements in water sales 
were somewhat due to tariff increases and not necessarily due to efficient and effective 
billing. A specific case in point is that of 1999 where a 130% tariff increase was granted 
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to GWCL in 1998 and thereby automatically and inevitably resulting in an upward 
performance in billing in the first quarter of 1999 with an additional tariff increase of 
30% in June, 1999. Other factors that contributed to the improvement in billing and 
collection over the years include the: 
 improvement in arrears collection,  
 installation of more consumer meters,  
 institution of illegal connection detection task force,  
 opening of more payment centres, - mobilisation of private sector 
support for meter reading and bill distribution, updating, and  
 reclassification of different categories of customers (GWCL, 1999; 2000; 
2001; 2002 and 2003).  
Also, worthy of mention is the abysmal and consecutive decline in the collection ratios 
of MDAs from 96.3% in 1996 to 37% in 1999 caused by decentralisation of payment of 
water bills of all agencies of government. This however, dramatically improved in the 
year 2000 following discussions between the company and the Ministry of Finance and 
the utility’s subsequent aggressive metering and review of averages and estimates for 
unmetered water customers. Overall, the result was an upturn in performance in 
Government’s collection from 37% in 1999 to 61.3% in the year 2000. Partly, low 
collection points also contribute to the low collection efficiencies recorded by the water 
utility and this conspicuously reflects in the days receivable ratios below. In 2000 the 
perennial build-up of revenue arrears caused by low collection efficiency was 
strategically tackled by commissioning a prepaid metering project in some selected 
communities in the Accra-Tema Metropolitan Area (ATMA) in Tema resulting in a 
significant improvement in revenue generation in ATMA (GWCL, 2000).  
Overall, lack of sufficient meters and accurate data on customers posed a major 
challenge to the utility’s ability of billing and collection since majority of its customers 
were unmetered and therefore could only bill using guesstimates which introduces or 
raises a new debate or dimension in the area of commercial and technical corruption.  
During a customer survey undertaken by the author in 2008 and 2010, a majority of 
unmetered customers showed their preferences towards non-metering stating that 
“people with meters pay too much”. Again, this preference of unmetered customers 
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confirms the earlier assertion of the author that customers who enjoy “flat rates” are 
generally under-billed leading to significant losses of revenue to the water utility.  
 
5.4.2 Financial ratio analysis, GWCL 
Days receivables ratio 
Despite all steps and strategies embarked upon by the management of GWCL in order 
to improve its collection efficiency, average bill collection period it could only make a 
marginal improvement from 221 days in 1998 to 208 in 1999 with further deterioration 
to almost 10 months in 2002. Partly, it is due to delays in the payments of bills of the 
MDAs. Days receivables ratio being a customer management indicator only reveal how 
ineffective and unenthusiastic the programmes pursued during this period were. 
However, average collection period steadily improved after 2002 (i.e. 108 days, 
approximately, 3.5 months). The high accounts receivables significantly further 
worsened the financial stress the utility suffered during the period. To a large extent, 
strategies employed by GWCL from 2003 onwards including the revision of illegal 
connection detection strategy with 100 percent increase in the incentive package to 
200,000 cedis for tip offs upon certification and the shortening of new service 
connection time to two weeks after payment of connection fees and monitoring teams 
in the regions to enhance supervision at the district levels yielded some positive results 
(GWCL, 2003). 
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Figure 5-15 Days receivables ratio, GWCL 
Ultimately, with large amounts of the utility’s funds tied up in receivables for over 10 
months (sometimes due to long billing periods of three months), its liquidity position 
was greatly affected during the period under review. The figure 5.16 depicts clearly the 
critical liquidity position of GWCL since its inception in 1999 except in 2005 when its 
current ratio improved to a more favourable and acceptable level of 2.02. Its short-term 
solvency however worsened from 0.49 in 1999 to 0.23 in 2000 mostly due to exchange 
losses during the year following a very high annual inflation rate of 40.54% compared 
to 13.79% in the previous year. In that year of 2000, one US Dollar was exchanging for 
GH¢ 3,560 at the outset of the year and further worsened to GH¢ 6,887 at the end of 
the year (GWCL, 2000 and IMF, 2011). 
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Figure 5-16 Liquidity ratio, GWCL 
In 2001, the company’s liquidity position improved temporarily but quickly declined in 
2002 again due to some exogenous factors including late approval of 40% tariff 
increase which took effect in the eighth month, the drying up of some rivers (Tano & 
Moku) and poor river inflow into the Kakum dam in the Central Region also resulted in 
a complete shutdown of the plant at Brimsu in C/R for nearly two months. This 
compelled the company to provide tanker services to customers thereby incurring a 
cost of GH¢ 1.1billion (GWCL, 2002). 
Profitability 
Apparently, Ghana Water Company Limited failed to control its operating expenditure 
on personnel, chemical and electricity which have for decades eluded GWSC and 
posed major managerial and financial challenges to the public utility’s profitability. As 
stated earlier, high inflation and exchange rates significantly affected costs of 
chemicals and electricity leading to high cost of production especially in 2000. 
Furthermore, the revaluation of the company’s assets in 2000 greatly contributed to the 
quantum leap in the total cost in 2000 due to a depreciation cost of US$26.2 million 
compared to US$6.85 million in the previous year. Generally, GWCL recorded high 
operating ratios ranging from 99% in 1999 to 77% in 2004.  
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Figure 5-17 Profitability ratio, GWCL 
Operating ratio 
 Averagely, the company’s production and general administrative cost components of 
the operating cost constitute more than 75% of the operating expenditure with energy 
costs alone representing more than 50 percent of the production costs except in 1999. 
Imperatively, any attempt to improve the operating ratio would require efficient 
management and control of both the chemical and electricity costs in order to ensure 
that sufficient cash is available for non-operating expenditures. In 2001, the company’s 
account showed an overall negative balance which almost led to the qualification of the 
company accounts casting it in a very bad light. In view of the above, two options were 
considered in order to redeem the company through: 
i.  securing a letter of comfort from Ministry of Finance and 
ii. obtaining a debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative 
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Figure 5-18 Operating ratio, GWCL 
Following the poor financial performance of GWCL in 2001, and also by way of partially 
redeeming the company, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning had to 
approve a facility under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. Eventually, 
this action gave birth to the signing of the water company’s audited accounts in 2001 
and 2002.  
To further lay emphasis on the gravity of the situation, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning’s inability to issue a letter of comfort to enable the External Auditors 
sign the 2001 Accounts delayed the signing of the 2002 financial statement which 
showed a negative working capital. But with Government taking up all loans of the 
company in addition to the HIPC relief facility granted to the company in 2002, its 
financial position improved and finally enabled auditors to sign the company’s accounts 
(GWCL, 2002).Albeit, it is difficult to state exactly factors that might have contributed to 
the worsening operating ratios of the company after 2003 as very little or no 
comprehensive technical/operational reports exist on the performance of the company 
in 2004 and 2005,the author dares to suggest that largely, operational inefficiencies 
accounted for this since the company’s inception in 1999. 
 
140 
Average costs of water produced and sold 
Here, the graph shows that the average cost of water produced and that of tariff were 
the same in 1999 and 2002 while the average cost of water sold was always higher 
than the average cost of water produced and that of tariff except in 2003 when it 
equalled the average tariff. Somewhat, if high non-revenue water had been managed 
to a low of 25% considering the difference between the average costs of water 
produced and the tariffs, the utility would have made profits during the period under 
review. 
 
Figure 5-19 Average tariffs, cost of water produced and sold, GWCL 
 
Creditworthiness 
From 1999 to 2003, the company’s debt to equity ratios exceeded 100% and would be 
interpreted that, majority of GWCL’s assets were financed through debts during the 
period with 2001 being the company’s worst leverage of 312.87%.Thevolatile economic 
environment in Ghana at the time coupled with the company’s inefficiencies greatly 
exposed the company to very serious financial risks where high inflation rates were 
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culminating into high rising exchange rates and both ultimately and directly translated 
into high exchange and interest losses and therefore adding on to the company debts. 
 
Figure 5-20 Creditworthiness ratio, GWCL 
For instance, a sharp increase in exchange rate (i.e. local currency per USD) from 
GHC 2,669 in 1999 to GHC 5,455 in 2000 translated into an exchange loss of 
US$164.1 million compared to the exchange loss of US$34.7 million in the previous 
year. Thanks to government of Ghana for strategically and timeously employing a HIPC 
relief facility in 2002 to absorb all debts/loans of the company. This resulted in the 
sharp reduction of the company’s debt to equity ratio from 172%in 2002 to 49.9% in 
2005.  
Project financing 
Over the years, several development projects have been undertaken within the urban 
water supply sector by the public water utility including:  
i. the rehabilitation of some existing water supply systems,  
ii. construction of new water schemes, 
iii. expansions to existing systems and 
iv. provision of operational support equipment and improvement studies towards 
capacity expansion of existing water schemes. 
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Prior to government’s engagement of the private operator in June, 2006, majority of 
the water utility’s projects that were undertaken and completed were largely financed 
through external support agencies or were foreign assisted. Nonetheless, some of the 
above-mentioned projects faced some financial challenges and setbacks. In fact, 
94.2% of funds utilised in 2002 for development projects came from external support 
agencies and between 1995 and 2003, external support agencies financed more than 
50% of all development projects undertaken. Largely, this assertion reveals the high 
level of the public water utility’s dependence on foreign support by way of long term 
loans and grants stemming from poor management practices culminating into 
perennial financial stress which the then Kufuor government used as a major reason 
or justification for engaging the private operator, AVRL in June, 2006 in the urban 
water supply sector. 
For decades, various governments of Ghana have continued to finance the urban 
water utility and this has for several years continued to pose heavy financial burdens 
on government to the extent that it failed to honour its actual expenditure to GWCL for 
three consecutive years (i.e. 2000, 2001 and 2002). 
 
Figure 5-21 Project financing, GWCL 
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As shown in Table 5-21, the actual government expenditure for the urban water sector 
in 2000, 2001 and 2002 were 25.62, 3.44 and 1.09 billion cedis respectively 
constituting 71.6%, 52% and 37% of the budgetary allocations while government 
releases stood at GH¢16.6, 1.06 and 0.322 billion respectively. However, it must be 
explained that government’s releases in 2000 stood at GH¢16.6 billion with an 
outstanding debt of GH¢9.02 billion for the year 2000 (GWCL, 2000). Surprisingly, in 
2003 when the utility had no funding from external support agencies, GWCL managed 
to finance 86.1% of its own development projects with an amount of GH¢18.73 billion 
which exceeded twice the amount budgeted for the year. However, the repayment of 
Social Security Bank loans contracted for Messrs Horseley Bridge Tanks of the UK in 
2003 partly accounted for the high figure of GH¢18.72 billion that was recorded 
(GWCL, 2003). 
 
 
 
Table 5-1 GWSC/GWCL funding of development projects (1997 – 2003) 
 YEAR 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Budgeted 
amount 
(GHC 
Billion) 
ESA 173.5 157.0 96.5 35.6 50.6 68.0 87.73 
Govt. 22.6 20.6 17.2 23.19 6.64 2.947 2.379 
GWCL 17.8 14.3 16 19.9 19.8 3.4 8.0 
 
 TOTAL 
 
213.9 
 
191.9 
 
129.7 
 
78.69 
 
77.04 
 
74.347 
 
98.109 
Actual 
amount 
(GHC 
Billion)  
ESA 44.8 80.6 43.14 39.29 23.96 60.208 - 
Govt. 33.0 18.1 18.05 25.62 3.44 1.09 3.01 
GWCL 2.4 8.8 8.02 10.04 18.72 2.622 18.70 
TOTAL 80.2 107.5 69.21 74.95 74.95 63.92 21.71 
Source: GWSC/GWCL, 1997; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002 and 2003 annual reports 
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Funds released by government in 2003 for the Bawjiase water project were mainly 
HIPC funds (GWCL, 2003). 
Generally, investment in water infrastructure is highly capital intensive and remains a 
major challenge to most governments and public water utilities in the developing world. 
Capital investment constitutes a critical component of every water utility’s commitment 
towards ensuring that water supply services are effectively, efficiently, sustainably and 
adequately provided to the ever increasing water consumers and customers for steady 
economic growth and improvements in human development. As is usual for most water 
utilities in developing countries such as Ghana Water Company Limited, financing of 
urban water supply projects is predominantly done through external/foreign loans and 
grants, government sources and sometimes employing revenues generated through 
the sale of water. 
The study revealed that investments undertaken by the public urban water utility fell 
below the needed levels and therefore failed to match up with the ever-increasing 
levels of urban water demands in cities of Ghana prior to its conversion to a limited 
liability company (GWCL) in 1999. The inability of the public water utility to run 
efficiently and effectively at the time gave birth to insufficient revenue generation. 
Investments therefore suffered greatly during the period leading to a significant decline 
in investment levels after 1996 and gradually picked up after 2002. By estimation, 
GWCL required at least US$100 million in 2004 if it was to achieve its target of 
supplying water to all of its customers. Meanwhile, GWCL’s annual investments during 
the period fell far below the required level. For several years, the company had 
struggled to ensure sufficient investments in machinery and technology by way of 
retooling so as to steadily and progressively increase its water production as a result of 
huge perennial shortfalls in revenue.  
Funding of the utility’s development projects were supported by external Agencies, 
Government of Ghana and Ghana Water Company Limited itself. But then, repeatedly, 
the officials of the public water utility have complained and explained that governments 
have not allowed the water utility to charge realistic tariffs that will ensure adequate 
generation of revenue and hence its inability to replace aging pipes, purchase new 
equipment and undertake major system expansion activities. Even though one may 
describe the urban water supply situation in Ghana as more of a crisis than a normal 
challenge which most public water utilities face, some credit and recognition need to be 
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given to the efforts of the utility’s engineers and technicians for doing their best to keep 
the urban water supply systems running up till now, an official stated.. 
5.4.3 Customer perceptions of service 
From 1991 to 2006, customer strength of the water utility had overwhelmingly grown 
from 167,512 to 378,300 (approximately by 126%) resulting from high demands and a 
customer mapping programme that was undertaken during the period. Generally, 
domestic customers of the water utility constitute majority of customers and therefore 
were used for the survey. Here, based upon the household survey conducted in 
Tamale (i.e. Kukuo, Vittin, Jisonayili, Gurugu, Gunbihini and Moshi Zongo),  Kumasi 
(i.e. Asewase & Moshie Zongo, Amakom, Bremang, Asafo and Tafo) and Accra (i.e. 
Adeta Trotro station, Commando, SNNIT Flats & Housing, East Legon, Nungua 
Zongo, GREDA Estate, Teshie and Anyah) in 2010, where customers were asked to 
reflect on the services of the public water utility (GWSC/GWCL) before AVRL took 
over in June, 2006 similar assertions were made including; “The attitude of GWCL 
workers has changed since AVRL took over, and now they know the difference 
between a customer and consumer” which means that consumers were formerly 
perceived as mere ‘users’ instead of customers of the services the water utility. 
Naturally, positive customer relations won’t just happen unless attitudes and skills of 
staff are polished through effective training, institutional and self discipline.  
According to the respondents, customer call-centres that help customers to readily 
discuss or register their complaints including; irregular flow of water, no-flow, wrongful 
billing, pipe-bursts and leakages, stolen and faulty meters, wrongful categorisation of 
customers, late or no bill delivery, wrongful disconnection, non-reflection of payment 
and poor water quality for prompt actions to be taken were non-existent. Consequently, 
customer response time was usually delayed unnecessarily. In Tamale for instance, 
respondents indicated that customer service was poor in respect of water rationing, 
customer response time, billing and customer relations.  
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5.5 Performance evaluation of Aqua Vitens Rand Limited 
Management Contract (AVRL, 2006-2011) 
After several failed attempts by Governments of Ghana to inject some level of financial 
and operational efficiency and effectiveness into its urban water supply sector, the 
Government was advised that one solution could be to introduce a private operator into 
the sector to operate and manage the poor performing public water utility. Government 
however was faced with the challenge of choosing a management model that needed 
to be politically convenient and wise in order not to suffer any unnecessary agitation 
and political pressure from civil society groups, organized labour and opposition 
political parties, particularly recognising the 2008 presidential and parliamentary 
elections.  
Finally, a management contract was entered into in 2006 between the Ghana Water 
Company Limited, a limited liability company, wholly owned by the Republic of Ghana 
(the Grantor) and Vitens Rand Water Services BV, established under the laws of The 
Netherlands(the Successful Bidder) and Aqua VitRa Limited, a limited liability company 
established under the laws of the Republic of Ghana (the Operator)with the intention to: 
 ensure and expand reliable supply of safe water in the urban areas 
 ensure that low income consumers have access to potable water at affordable 
prices 
 ensure sustainability of the sector through cost recovery 
 ensure an adequate and steady flow of investment funds, with an emphasis on 
low cost and concession financing; and  
 support the introduction of the private sector into management and operation of 
the sector under a management contract with the private operator.  
An initial loan facility of $123 million was contracted and subsequently increased to 173 
million by the World Bank and other donor agencies to undertake: 
 Public-private partnership 
 System expansion and rehabilitation 
 Capacity building  
 Project management and 
 Severance programme 
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The private operator assumed operations in June 2006, and by December, it submitted 
its initial review report listing several snag items that were identified during the six-
month period. A snag item was defined as: 
" a defect or condition of the facilities identified by the operator before the 
commencement date or during the initial review that in the view of the operator, as 
confirmed by the Technical Auditor, prevents the system from meeting the service 
standards" (AVRL, 2007) 
Subsequent to this, a memorandum of understanding was signed on the 5th July, 2007 
between the grantor (GWCL) and the operator (AVRL) and facilitated by the Technical 
Auditor (Fichtner). All parties agreed that the operator resubmits a comprehensive list 
of snag items (MoU, 2006). 
According to the management contract, as part of the private operator’s principal 
obligations, AVRL; 
 shall have the right and obligation to provide the services in the service area on 
an exclusive basis during the management contract period. Should the grantor 
desire to expand the service area, the grantor and the operator shall meet and 
negotiate in good faith with a view to agreeing on the provision of services by 
the operator to such expanded service area and the payment to the operator 
thereof.  
 the operator is entitled to:  
 conclude contracts with customers for the supply of potable water in the name 
and on behalf of the grantor;  
  issue bills on delivery of potable water and discharge of sewage;  
 receive payments from the customers; and  
 disconnect customers, except priority customers, for nonpayment and/or for 
other grounds in accordance with applicable law.  
 the operator shall perform the services in accordance with applicable law 
(including environmental legislation and PURC regulations), prudent industry 
practice, the consumer charter, the service standards, the low income 
household policies and the PURC regulatory social policy. The operator shall 
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have care and custody of facilities during the term of this management contract 
and 
 subject to this (section 3.1.3 of the management contract), the operator shall 
have discretion in determining the means and methods to be used to perform 
the services. 
Meanwhile, taking into account the number of snag items identified in the initial review 
report, it became evident that the baseline used in the contract had not been correctly 
determined and even in areas where no snag items were reported, suggestions made 
to the grantor could hardly be effected after six months.  
Apparently, the private operator (AVRL) faced some serious challenges right at the 
outset of its operations. First, the expatiate mangers required deep appreciation and 
understanding of the local and institutional politics that engulfed the urban water sector 
reform before the takeover if they truly wanted to make any meaningful impact by way 
of meeting the performance targets and other obligations. Also, the challenge of 
thousands of unregistered and illegal connections had to be confronted head-on by 
introducing new billing systems, grapple with long bureaucratic procurement 
processes, reducing the high non-revenue water of 53% in 2006 by at least 5% yearly 
and improve the company’s days receivable ratio from 159 days in 2006 to that which 
did not exceed 90 days of non-public sector sales within twelve months.  
All these performance targets required a strong but a committed management team 
that could ensure that all unproductive institutional cultures developed over the years 
are addressed on the part of both the staff and customers through regular training and 
education respectively. However, the initial review report revealed that the staff of 
GWCL that were seconded to AVRL had received very little training for many years and 
therefore lacked sufficient skills, knowledge and attitude to effectively and efficiently 
perform.  
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Figure 5-22 Water production and sales, AVRL 
Progressively, but marginally, both production and sales improved from 2006 to 2011. 
An eight-month (i.e. from January to August) power rationing in 2007according to the 
operator accounts for the marginal increase of 1% in production during the year. It is 
however significant to indicate that although some of the figures were estimates as 
there were no working meters at some of the production sites, any inherent error(s) that 
might be associated with the estimates are the same for both 2006 and 2007 figures 
and therefore provides common grounds for comparison (AVRL, 2007 annual report). 
In 2008, the utility recorded an increase of about 1% in production over that of 2007 but 
recorded a shortfall of 2.4% over the target set for that year. Water production became 
more stable as a result of the effective use of its RRR funds for repair, replacement, 
and rehabilitation of essential equipment including pumping and chemical dosing 
equipment, filters, and spares, and water quality monitoring equipment. Perhaps 
because of that rehabilitation process, a third of the production systems produced less 
than what was produced during the previous year. However, two thirds of the 
production system produced more mainly due to improved borehole operations which 
improved supply from the smaller systems to the respective communities (AVRL, 2008 
annual report). 
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For 2009, the completion and commissioning of the Accra West-East interconnection, 
Tamale and Cape Coast (Sekyere Hemang) water expansion projects towards the end 
of 2008 helped increase the water production. Similarly the commissioning of a new 
system in Koforidua and that of Aburi water affected the production greatly in the 
subsequent years. 
5.5.1 Efficiency and effectiveness, AVRL 
Non-revenue water 
By schedule 4 of the management contract, the operator was required to submit to the 
grantor for discussion and approval a plan for a systematic measurement and 
reduction of non-revenue water in its service area within twelve months from the day 
it commenced operations. Additionally, the operator was to specify how non-
revenue water would be calculated in the absence of complete metering and 
determine yearly targets for reduction in non-revenue water in the service area by at 
least 5%per year per service area. In view of this, a number of steps were taken to 
reduce both the commercial and physical losses. For instance, a customer survey 
(mapping) was embarked upon in 2008 to generate a new geo- referenced customer 
database. According to the operator AVRL, (2008 annual report), the mapping 
significantly exposed different sources through which the utility was losing and continue 
to lose revenues both physically and commercially through leakages, pipe bursts, water 
theft, illegal connections, estimated consumption, inaccurate meter readings, etc. For 
instance, customers who were receiving water yet were considered as 
disconnected/suspended customers, customers that were receiving water regularly but 
were not being billed, customers that were commercial customers and yet billed using 
domestic rates, customers with faulty meters, wrong meter readings on the part of 
meter readers including leakages that were unattended to within the planned repair 
period. 
Most intriguing is the revelation during the first survey exercise undertaken in 2008 
which revealed that about 23,382 customers could not be traced in the Accra Tema 
Metropolitan Area (ATMA) (AVRL, 2008 annual report).In 2008 and 2009 for instance, 
Loss and Leakage Control Teams were adequately empowered and deployed in all 10 
regions to deal with cases of water theft and any other abuses that might occur in the 
field. Strategically, ATMA supply area being the biggest contributor to the non-revenue 
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water, steps were taken to reduce the physical losses in 2009 by setting up 10 pilot 
teams in 10 districts in the ATMA supply area. This team was adequately equipped 
with motor bikes, GPS devices, repair tools and materials to deal with all leakage and 
repair issues. In line with what was started in 2008, zonal metering was further 
explored the following year leading to the creation of District Metered Areas (DMAs) 
that were controlled discreet hydraulic areas and provided with meters to improve 
water auditing and reduce non-revenue water. According to the operator, the DMA 
employed as a tool was more reliable and effective for managing non-revenue water.  
 
Figure 5-23 NRW, Metering & Bill Collection Efficiencies, AVRL 
Nevertheless, no significant gains could be recorded during the period. For instance in 
2008 and 2009, AVRL achieved a non-revenue water of 51.7% as against a target of 
43.4% and a baseline of 51.5%, and 51.6% as against a target of 46.4% and a 
baseline of 51.5% respectively. Most significantly, throughout the five years, the 
private operator failed to reduce the 48.3% non-revenue water that it was contracted 
to address in 2005. It exited in 2011 with non-revenue water of 49.2%. From the 
graph, it is evident that operational effectiveness and efficiency of the operator has not 
achieved the desired targets.  
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On average, the utility’s overall collection efficiency during the period under study was 
about 47.4%. 
Metering 
According to Fichtner, (2009), a status report submitted by the operator on metering to 
the Technical Auditor in July, 2009 proposing a revised metering plan showed that, out 
of a total number of 227 metering areas listed, only 112 had working meters as of May, 
2009. Largely, both physical and commercial losses incurred during the period under 
review were determined using guesstimates due to unavailability of meters. However, 
with the help of the operator in 2008, the Grantor initiated an action towards the 
procurement and installation of bulk meters on all systems. In the same year, meter 
workshops in Accra and Kumasi were renovated and adequately equipped and some 
technical staff were also trained towards the refurbishment and calibration of flow 
meters. In the following year, the meter workshops received 3,994 faulty meters from 
the regions and1,294 were repaired and the remaining unserviceable meters were 
discarded. Additional14,694 SPX used-meters were imported in 2009 from the 
Netherlandsand5,565 were refurbished for the replacement of faulty meters in the 
regions. In Dansoman and Bortianor districts for instance, 1,000 and 3,239 domestic 
meters were installed respectively. The62highest water consuming metering areas 
were also metered to reduce commercial losses. Zonal metering was embarked upon 
in 2008 and intensified because of the positive results it produced. The metering ratio 
declined from 48.7% in 2008 to 43% in 2009 as a result of new connections made 
during the period without a corresponding increase in meter installation. However, as a 
result of a massive meter installation programme subsequently undertaken the ratio 
significantly increased to 59.2% in 2011. In general, metering improved during the five-
year period and out of a total of 140 complaints that were filed against the AVRL 
through the Consumer Services Directorate of the PURC, metering constituted about 
9% in 2009.  
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Figure 5-24 Metering ratio, AVRL 
In 2009, the grantor demanded of the operator to provide it with the formula it 
employed in arriving at a domestic consumption of 50.4 litres per day per person in its 
report in December, 2009. Surprisingly, in response, the operator defined the customer 
consumption as the amount of potable water produced divided by the customer 
strength. This formula employed by the operator in determining the customer 
consumption could best be described as highly deceptive since the metering ratio was 
43% and non-revenue water was above 50% at the time. Some might wonder if this 
could be a deliberate attempt to cover up for its operational inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness. Metering remained stagnant in the early years of AVRL but improved 
in the last year of its operations.  
Billing, and bill collection efficiencies 
The viability of a water utility is ensured through effective and effective billing and 
collection. Also, improvement in revenue levels automatically promotes service 
extension and improvement in service levels. Nonetheless, bill collection became a 
major challenge facing the public utility prior to the engagement of the private operator 
in the urban water sector of Ghana. Somewhat, bill payment behaviour of customers is 
usually informed by customers’ perception about services being rendered and how 
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strategic and aggressive the service provider is towards its bills collection. For 
instance, short billing cycles ensure bill collection positively.  
 
 
Figure 5-25 Bill collection efficiency, AVRL 
Private operators are known for higher bill collection efficiency and from the graph, bill 
collection efficiency of private customers during the period under review was more than 
88% except in 2007 while that of Government fluctuated between 10.5and 100 percent. 
Generally, payment of bills of MDAs became the responsibility of Government but 
fraught with the challenge of long delays in payment of bills for several months which 
sometimes run into a year. Clearly the situation improved during the period of the 
private operator. For instance, only 10.5% of the bills could be collected from 
Government in 2007.The rest of the bill was however paid in the following year leading 
to over 100 percent collection efficiency that was recorded in 2008.Overall, bill 
collection efficiency improved perhaps due to various strategies employed by the 
operator. 
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5.5.2 Financial ratio analysis, AVRL 
Days receivables ratios 
Average bill collection period saw no improvement during the 5-year period. The 
shortest period registered during the period was 159 days in 2006 and the longest 
being 281 days in 2010 which improved to 213 days in 2011. It is however important to 
indicate here that the long delays associated with the payment of bills of MDAs partly 
accounted for the long bill collection periods during the period. In addition, the 
customer survey revealed that some customers failed to pay their bills voluntarily until 
they were compelled through disconnections. Furthermore, long billing cycles and poor 
quality of service in some regions also contributed to the long bill collection periods 
recorded.  
 
 
Figure 5-26 Days receivables ratio, AVRL 
Liquidity 
The relationship between the water utility’s liquid resources available and the current 
liabilities is described employing current ratio expressed as the ratio of the current 
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asset to the current liabilities of the water utility. With the high receivables, it is evident 
that funds were tied up in cash hence the short-term solvency of the water utility 
became very low throughout the five-year period with the worst ratio of 0.75 recorded in 
2011.Also, since 2007 till the year of exit of the private operator, the liquidity position of 
the utility never improved. 
 
 
Figure 5-27 Liquidity ratio, AVRL 
Operating ratio 
During the 5-year period, the water utility’s ratios of operating expenditure to operating 
income were very high ranging between 83 and 98 percent. The implication is that, 
very little income or virtually nothing was left to cater for its non-operating expenditures 
during the period.  Further investigations revealed that electricity costs alone 
constituted about 50% or more of the production costs of the water utility while the 
production and general administrative costs components constituted more than 70 
percent of the operating expenditure during the period under review. 
157 
 
Figure 5-28 Operating ratio, AVRL 
Through a Repair, Replacement and Rehabilitation Fund, some of the faulty and 
collapsed dosing equipment were replaced. In addition, a ‘chemical loss control’ plan 
was employed to enhance the procurement, storage, transport and handling 
processes. Nevertheless, in spite of these attempts in 2008 and 2009 to reduce 
chemical costs, reduction in chemical usage was marginal. According to a Chemist at 
the Grantor, dosing could be done more efficiently if it was automatically applied 
instead of applying it manually. 
Not only that but also, an energy team was formed in 2008 to perform scans on the 
biggest power consuming plants of the utility in order to strategise and address the 
perennial challenge of high electric power consumption. As a result of the team’s 
findings, the Electricity Company of Ghana in 2009 credited the account of the water 
utility with an amount of GHC 4,741,006.43 following series of discussions held 
between management of the water utility and the Electricity Company of Ghana (AVRL, 
2009 report).In addition, various motors, pumps and panels were replaced to ensure 
service reliability and also cut down on high electric power consumption and ultimately 
reduce the overall production cost of the utility. For instance, the operating expenditure 
dropped from US$ 92,442,250 in 2008 to US$73,307,520 in 2009 (i.e. 20.7%) when 
electricity cost recorded a dramatic drop in 2008 from 29,732,770 to US$12,970,580 in 
2009 (i.e. 56%). All these efforts resulted in the lowering of operating ratios registered 
in 2009 and 2010. 
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Profitability  
AVRL recorded deficits with regards to its return on fixed assets (ROFA) in 2007 and 
2008 and also failed to operate within the desirable range of 6 to 8 percent throughout.   
 
 
Figure 5-29 Profitability ratio, AVRL 
The graph below shows a wide gap existing between the average tariff levels and unit 
costs of water produced from 2006 and may somewhat explain why the regulator 
sometimes refuses to increase tariff considering the difference between the average 
tariff and the average cost of water sold. It is therefore the candid opinion of the 
researcher that if the utility works on its high non-revenue water levels of more than 
50%, the utility could break even. And therefore increasing tariffs will only help 
managers of the water utility to select the lazy options while making customers to 
continue paying for their inefficiencies. 
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Figure 5-30 Average tariff, cost of water produced and sold, AVRL 
Creditworthiness  
As shown in the figure below, the utility’s long-term debt to the shareholder’s equity 
ratio improved over the period under review. Employing leverage to assess the utility’s 
creditworthiness, the debt to equity ratios dropped from 34.2% in 2006 to 12.5% in 
2011 which show a sharp departure from the other two regimes. 
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Figure 5-31 Leverage AVRL 
Investments 
The year of engagement of the private operator (i.e. 2006) saw the highest investment 
but sharply declined in subsequent years as depicted in the figure below. Further 
investigations also revealed that, investment plans were never followed even though 
the project was time-bound. Under the arrangement, a fund (i.e. Repair, Replacement 
and Rehabilitation (RRR) fund)was established to undertake minor repair works that 
were identified with an initial amount of USD$5 million. In addition, through a project 
fund from the Netherlands Embassy, the Grantor delivered a further USD$6.5 million. 
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Figure 5-32 AVRL’s levels of Investment. All in 2011 prices 
Human resource development  
Staffing levels 
Labour productivity during the period of AVRL marginally but progressively improved 
after 2007. Its staff strength grew from 2,848 in 2006 to 3,377 in 2011 while customer 
strength grew from 364,000 to 481,502. During this same period, various system 
expansion and rehabilitation works were undertaken thereby marginally improving the 
number of staff per thousand customers served from 7.8 in 2006 to 7 in 2011 as 
depicted in the graph below. 
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Figure 5-33 Labour productivity ratio, AVRL 
Since the inception of the Management Contract, the operators aggressively pursued 
programmes to upgrade the skills of all categories of staff in order to achieve its 
corporate objectives and obligations. As staff numbers grew, 30 percent of the 
workforce in 2009 attained the age of more than 50 years, made up of a good number 
of experienced hands with long length of service. Consequently, young graduates and 
waterworks trainees including professional or management trainees were recruited. 
Capacity building programmes were vigorously pursued by providing training for all 
categories of staff in various forms including technical operations, customer care, 
management development, health and safety, finance, planning, and ICT through 
conferences and workshops, seminars, lectures, on-the-job learning and training, 
knowledge sharing, and coaching and mentoring.  On the average, 1.8 training days 
per employee were realised in 2009 with many employees receiving their first training 
since they were employed into the company. According to Management, the training 
greatly improved and motivated employees. In 2008, the Operator introduced a new 
organisational structure that sought to better serve the needs of all stakeholders, inject 
a stronger customer and commercial focus into the system and also help meet its 
corporate objectives and obligations. The structure at the AVRL Head Office is as 
below: 
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AVRL Head Office
Managing Director
Director
HR & OD
Director
Operations
Director
Customer Care
Director
Finance & 
Business Support
GM, Internal Audit
Private Secretary
GM
Legal & Corporate 
Affairs
GM, Communication
Director
Technical 
Services
Figure 5-34 Organisational structure, AVRL  
(Source: AVRL 2008 annual report) 
While the existing structure at the time placed so much emphasis on hardware (i.e. 
engineering), the private Operator preferred a structure that is more commercial and 
customer focused (AVRL, 2008). The new structure was made less hierarchical and 
more emphasis was placed on strategies, processes and procedures. For instance, 
promotions were not done based on academic qualifications only but also on one’s 
attitude and performance which conforms to any modern management structure. 
The exit of AVRL in 2011 
The option of involving the private operator in the management of the public water 
utility was never welcomed by the general public and some civil societies. No doubts, 
its activities were never without suspicions with frequent attacks in the media on their 
performance. While most customers expected rapid improvements in service provision, 
unnecessary bureaucratic processes such as long procurement processes kept 
delaying various projects and programmes, a concern that featured frequently and 
prominently in most reports of the private operator. Even though “internal sabotage” 
was something that most of the staff denied, somewhat, the operator faced the 
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challenge of ‘internal sabotage’ from some senior officers who were ‘in charge’ prior to 
the involvement  of the private operator as a result of the introduction of a new 
structure that was very unpopular among this category of staff. Evidently, four years 
into the arrangement, workers began agitating and demonstrating against the 
performance of the private operator. The figure below was one of the placards 
displayed during one of such demonstrations. 
 
Figure 5-295 Trade Union scoring of AVRL Key Performance Indicators 
(Source: Franceys, (2011) 
According to the workers, the Operator abysmally failed in all of its obligations and 
therefore did not deserve to enjoy any form of contract extension – a situation which 
was very much envisaged at the inception of the contract. Meanwhile, further 
investigations revealed that, the agitating workers who called for the head of the 
Operator including some other senior officers who did not participate in the 
demonstration physically, somewhat disliked the management style and for that matter 
the new management structure introduced by the expatriate managers. 
With the new management structure and style, the power of the “established order” 
was seen to be waning. A specific case in point was when all Regional Chief Managers 
who earlier on were in charge of their respective regions controlling so much resources 
(i.e. both human and financial) were brought to the Head Office of AVRL in Accra, re-
designated as General Managers and re-assigned. Here, these senior officers could 
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hardly enjoy the very privileges they used to enjoy in their respective regions as Chief 
Managers. No doubts, it met a stiff opposition which was fiercely fought eventually 
resulting in their restoration.  
5.5.3 Customer perception of AVRL 
From Tamale, Kumasi and Accra, the views of customers were investigated with regard 
to the private sector operation from amongst different categories of customers drawn 
from the questionnaires administered to consumers in the three cities. Overall, more 
than 82 percent of respondents used for the survey in the three cities were already 
living in their respective communities prior to the engagement of AVRL in 2006. Out of 
the 82 percent, approximately 87 percent of respondents were customers of GWCL 
with piped connections with the remaining using standpipes and 
 
Table 5-2 Length of stay of consumers in the community  
 
 Length of stay in the community          Total 
less than 4 
years 
   more than 4   
years 
    4 years 
Cities  
Accra 17 119 14 150 
Tamale 15 120 15 150 
Kumasi 4 172 24 200 
Total 36 411 53 500 
 
 
 
Figure 5-36 Access route to water 
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other alternative sources of water. This provides a good representation of those who 
are capable of comparing performances of the private operator and that of the earlier 
regimes. With the large proportion of respondents enjoying piped connections provides 
somewhat a good platform for fair assessment of the performance of AVRL by these 
customers even though results have shown that while majority of respondents knew 
and understood the mandate of AVRL, a good number also did not.  
 
Quality of water supplied 
Conducting a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare the differences in quality 
of water supplied in the three cities; Accra, Tamale and Kumasi in terms of taste, colour 
and smell, the results showed that there was no significant difference in taste [F(2, 468) 
= 1.311, p = 0.270]  and smell [F(2, 468) = 1.366, p = 0.256] among the three cites at 
the p < 0.05 level.  
However, there was a significant difference in colour of water between Tamale and 
Accra at the p < 0.05 level [F (2, 468) = 3.583, p = 0.29]. Probing further with a Post 
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that, the mean score for colour of 
water in Tamale (Mean = 1.7, SD = 0.587) was significantly different from  that of Accra 
(Mean = 1.96, SD =0.860).   
 
 
Table 5-3 Water quality                                                     
                                                                                            ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Quality of water (Taste) 
Between Groups 1.317 2 .659 1.311 .270 
Within Groups 235.057 468 .502   
Total 236.374 470    
Quality of water (Colour) 
Between Groups 4.969 2 2.485 3.583 .029 
Within Groups 324.500 468 .693   
Total 329.469 470    
Quality of water (Smell) 
Between Groups 1.577 2 .789 1.366 .256 
Within Groups 270.159 468 .577   
Total 271.737 470    
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Table 5-4 Water quality 
Multiple Comparisons 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent Variable (I) Towns (J) Towns Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Quality of water 
(Taste) 
Accra 
Tamale .109      .085 .408 -.09 .31 
Kumasi -.012     .078 .987 -.20 .17 
Tamale 
Accra -.109     .085 .408 -.31 .09 
Kumasi -.122     .079 .276 -.31 .06 
Kumasi 
Accra  .012     .078   .987 -.17 .20 
Tamale  .122     .079 .276 -.06 .31 
Quality of water 
(Colour) 
Accra 
Tamale  .261
*
      .100 .026 .02 .50 
Kumasi .077     .092 .684 -.14 .29 
Tamale 
Accra -.261
*
     .100 .026 -.50 -.02 
Kumasi -.184     .093 .119 -.40 .03 
Kumasi 
Accra -.077     .092 .684 -.29 .14 
Tamale .184     .093 .119 -.03 .40 
Quality of water 
(Smell) 
Accra 
Tamale .116     .092 .414 -.10 .33 
Kumasi -.018      .084 .974 -.22 .18 
Tamale 
Accra -.116      .092 .414 -.33 .10 
Kumasi -.135     .085 .254 -.33 .07 
Kumasi 
Accra .018     .084 .974 -.18 .22 
Tamale .135     .085 .254 -.07 .33 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
But generally, respondents from all three cities expressed satisfaction in respect of 
quality of water supplied in terms of colour, smell and taste. 
Continuity of flow 
 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the differences in 
daily duration of flow of water among the three cities; Accra, Tamale and Kumasi. From 
table 5-5 below, the results showed that statistically, there were significant differences 
in the number of hours water flowed in the three cities in a day [F(2, 468) = 101.182, p 
= 0.000]  at the p < 0.05 level. But with a Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD 
test indicated that, the mean score for number of hours that water flowed daily in 
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Tamale (Mean = 3.01, SD = 1.215) and Kumasi (Mean = 3.05, SD =0.763) were 
significantly different from  Accra (Mean = 1.66, SD =0.935). Generally, majority of 
respondents in Accra reported of poor water supply services and non-flow. 
 
 
Table 5-5 Continuity of water flow in a day 
                                                                                   ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 187.231 2 93.615 101.182 .000 
Within Groups 433.003 468 .925   
Total 620.234 470    
 
 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Table 5-6 Continuity of water flow in a day 
 Tukey HSD 
(I) Towns (J) Towns Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Accra 
Tamale -1.358
*
 .116 .000 -1.63 -1.08 
Kumasi -1.394
*
 .106 .000 -1.64 -1.14 
Tamale 
Accra 1.358
*
 .116 .000 1.08 1.63 
Kumasi -.036 .108 .939 -.29 .22 
Kumasi 
Accra 1.394
*
 .106 .000 1.14 1.64 
Tamale .036 .108 .939 -.22 .29 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Among the three cities, according to majority of respondents in Tamale, 
they enjoyed a 24-hour water f low. This was as a result of system 
expansion works undertaken on the Tamale water supply system just before 
the contract was executed. While more than 60 percent of respondents  in 
Accra received water for less than 4 hours in a day, in Kumasi water f lowed 
between 8 and 16 hours in a day as shown in figure 5-37. Accra continued 
to experience water rationing mostly along the western corridor of Accra 
due to an ongoing rehabilitation work at the time.  
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Figure 5-37 Continuity of water flow  
 
It must however be pointed out that a strange phenomenon existed in 
Accra. Here, albeit the main water pipelines run through Adenta through to East 
Legon, customers in East Legon were enjoying a 24-hour water supply services, 
residents of Adenta Trotro station, Commando, SNNIT flats and Housing area could 
hardly enjoy water flowing through their taps up to 4 hours in a day. Again, water could 
hardly flow under sufficient pressure in these communities. This challenge was traced 
to some “Water-Lords” in these communities who were illegally diverting the water from 
the main pipelines into their private reservoirs and later sell at usurious prices to 
consumers. It was however reported that some staff of the water utility were involved in 
this dubious and clandestine activities. This is because the phenomenon was known to 
the water utility staff but failed to act.  
Four years into the operations of the private operator, more than 66 percent of 
respondents in Accra saw no improvement in the services of the operator probably due 
to water rationing in Accra at the time. Meanwhile, majority of consumers in Tamale 
stated that, services improved during the period of AVRL as shown in figure 5-38. 
Water supply services could be said to be relatively good in Tamale.  
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Figure 5-38 Improvement in services 
Respondents’ position on the renewal of contract 
Overwhelmingly, respondents in Accra were opposed to the renewal of the contract as 
depicted in figure 5.39 below. Similarly in Kumasi, respondents were not in support of 
the renewal of the contract upon expiration. It is however worthy to state that several 
factors accounted for this position held by respondents especially in Accra. For 
instance, in addition to the shortfall in water supply in Accra at the time the 
researcher was undertaking the survey, there was a major rehabilitation 
work taking place along the western corridor of Accra and this further 
worsened the water supply situation. During the period of this survey, water 
supply services (i.e. water f low) were very irregular in Accra resulting in long 
periods of water rationing. It is therefore believed that this situation largely influenced 
some of the customers in Accra who vehemently opposed the renewal or extension of 
the contract. Other factors that also influenced respondents’ positions were people’s 
political affiliations and orientation. Apparently many respondents also assigned the 
responsibility of capital investments for infrastructural development to the private 
operator, and this also might have influenced their judgements against the operator 
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since they were expecting more from the operator than what the arrangement 
stipulated. 
Meanwhile, a good number of respondents also failed to state whether or not the 
contract should be renewed as in the case of consumers in Kumasi who remained 
indifferent in respect of the need for the private operator to be engaged in the 
urban water supply sector of Ghana by Government.    
 
Figure 5-39 Renewal of contract 
While respondents in Tamale observed significant improvements in service 
delivery including billing,  bill collection and attitude of staff towards customers, 
respondents in Accra complained of lack of notification towards service interruptions 
and sluggish attitude of staff towards customer complaints. 
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Figure 5-40 Service interruption notification 
Metering and bill collection 
In all three cities, majority of the respondents’ account were metered and billing was 
done monthly. But interestingly, while majority of the respondents in both Accra and 
Kumasi would prefer their accounts to be metered, same could not be said about 
responts in Tamale. However, further investigation revealed that most of the 
consumers whose accounts were not metered but given flat rates to pay, sell water to 
other consumers who are not connected in their communities or get water through 
other alternative sources. This is one of the reasons why a customer will prefer his or 
her account to be unmetered.  
Customers at Adenta Trotro station, Commando, SNNIT flats and Housing were in 
default for more than two months. This situation was however blamed on poor service 
delivery in these areas and lack of adequate revenue collection points and also the 
unaggressive attitude of the water utility towards bill collection. Meanwhile, non-
payment of bills and illegal connections were two main reasons why customers or 
consumers were disconnected in all three cities. 
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Figure 5-42 Metering preference 
Overall, non-flow and irregular flow of water, long delays in responding to customer 
complaints and wrongful disconnections were major areas of concern to majority of 
the customers. About 73 percent of respondents stated that adequate investment 
towards infrastructural development in the urban water supply sector of Ghana is 
crucial and critical. Customers however believed that, the water utility must remain 
strictly a public utility.  
 
Perceptions after the exit of the Private operator (AVRL) in 2011 
A post-mortem assessment was finally conducted in 2013 on the performance of 
AVRL employing different categories of customers in two of the three cities, Tamale 
and Accra through sixty household surveys. Additionally, some staff of AVRL, 
GWCL and PURC were interviewed in order to cover a broad spectrum of 
perceptions held on the performance of AVRL. In Tamale, 86.7%, 76.7% and 83.3% 
interviewees indicated that billing, bill collection and staff-customer relations 
respectively improved during the period of AVRL but observed a slight decline from 
2012. While 43% of the customers in Tamale felt that AVRL did its best under the 
circumstance, 60% believed that the involvement of AVRL made water tariffs to go 
up during the period. Generally, the interviewees expressed satisfaction in respect 
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of their operations and added that as long as the old staffs were still in place, it will 
take more time than five years to effect any significant changes. 
In Accra, more than 67% of the interviewees indicated that water supply improved 
towards the end of the tenure of AVRL and this observation was corroborated by staff 
of AVRL, PURC and GWCL. It was explained that, most of the repair and rehabilitation 
works took place in the ATMA area and these projects were either completed or near 
completion towards the end of 2010 and hence the improvement in water supply in 
2011. About 57% of interviewees also observed that the private operator adopted more 
efficient and aggressive approach to billing and bill collection during the period. 
Customers however bitterly complained of frequent interruptions in water supply 
without prior notice and even if they are informed of when water would be restored, the 
water utility fails to honour its own promise. Generally, interviewees did not see much 
difference between the number of hours that water flowed through their taps before and 
during the period of AVRL. In view of this, the interviewees were not very much 
enthused about the decision of Government to engage the private operator but 
intimated that it would require more years to effect the need change.      
While some staff of AVRL somewhat praised and believed that the private operator did 
the best it could under the circumstance, others said that the expatriates came only “to 
make money for themselves and left”. The engagement of AVRL was also condemned 
vehemently by majority of staff of the Grantor (i.e. GWCL) interviewed stating that, it 
was a worthless venture since GWCL could have performed better if the same amount 
of resources were made available to GWCL. They further intimated that the Grantor 
could hardly monitor the activities of the private operator to ascertain the true picture on 
the ground especially in respect of water treatment, chemical usage and quality of 
water produced. It was however revealed that, officers responsible for monitoring these 
activities of the private operator were inadequately resourced logistically to undertake 
their tasks. In addition, the challenge of salary disparities between staff of GWCL on 
secondment to AVRL and staff of GWCL featured prominently - a major source of 
worry and frustration to many staff of the Grantor (GWCL). Consequently, some 
workers of GWCL simply and angrily described the contract as “vague, bogus and 
suppressive”. Finally, the staff of PURC interviewed intimated that the policy 
environment was unfavourable for successful private participation in the urban water 
supply sector and added that vested interests were not carefully and strategically dealt 
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with in the contract. They concluded that there were some marginal improvements in 
respect of staff training, bill collection and staff-customer relations.  
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6 Performance Comparison GWSC (1992-1998), GWCL 
(1998-2005) and Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (2006-2011) 
This Chapter compares the key performance indicators that best assess the 
performance of AVRL during its 5-year contract period as against a 7-year period each 
of Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation and Ghana Water Company Limited. This 
is to ensure that the 7-year operations of GWCL were fully considered and the 
performance of the public utility before Ghana entered into its fourth republic in 1993 
(GWSC) is also covered. In performing the t-tests on all three regimes (i.e. GWSC, 
GWCL and AVRL), the possibility of having a family-wise error rate became apparent. 
In this case, at least there could be a false positive result and in mitigating the risk and 
control for false positives for reliability, Bonferroni correction was employed. 
Additionally, paired analyses of the three regimes were done, two at a time to 
determine specific differences since Microsoft Office Excel does not include standard 
multiple comparison test in its ANOVA output. The t-test and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) were used to compare the performance of the three regimes of the public 
utility operators in Ghana. 
 
6.1.1 Water production 
Water production slowly increased from 195Mm3 to 211Mm3 during the 7-year period of 
GWCL. Similarly, it consistently increased during the 5-year period of AVRL from 
212Mm3 to 249Mm3. .Urban water coverage in 2006 was 56 percent with a production 
level of 212Mm3 when AVRL was engaged. Generally, water production lagged far 
behind the rate of growth of the urban population in Ghana. From 1987 to 1998, water 
production levels fluctuated between 159.3Mm3 in 1988 and 185.86Mm3 in 1997. 
Except in 2000, production increased consistently under GWCL as a result of 
installations of higher capacity plants during the period. Similarly under the AVRL, 
production successively increased from 211.7Mm3 in 2006 to 248.98Mm3. During 
regimes of all the service entities, water production lagged behind the rate of growth of 
the urban population due to lack of prudent management and investment in the sector.  
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Figure 6-1 Water production rates comparison 
In the ANOVA Table 6-1 below, the test statistics F (2, 15) is 26.82 and p<0.001 
(p=1.11292E-05). This shows that there is strong evidence that there are significant 
differences in the means of volume of water produced per annum across the groups at 
5% level of significance. Furthermore, with the 3-pairwise comparisons among GWSC, 
GWCL and AVRL as depicted in the t-Test Tables 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4 below confirm the 
above result. A paired test performed for GWSC and GWCL to determine if water 
production per annum increased when the public utility became a limited liability 
company, shows that  (M = 16.58, S.D = 12.97, N = 6) was significantly greater than  
Table 6-1 ANOVA output for water production 
SUMMARY 
    Groups Count Sum Average  Variance 
GWSC 6 1100.23 183.3716667 33.06193667 
GWCL 6 1199.72 199.9533333 112.4989867 
AVRL 6 1377.584 229.5973333 222.5228827 
Source 
of 
variance 
 
SS df      MS        F    P-value      F crit 
Between 
Groups 
   
6581.061328 2 3290.530664 26.81887068 1.11292E-05 3.682320344 
Within 
Groups 
 
1840.41903 15 122.694602 
   Total  8421.480358 17 
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Table 6-2 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
   GWSC GWCL 
Mean 183.3716667 199.9533333 
Variance 33.06193667 112.4989867 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.773581012 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat -5.676129555 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001181529 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.002363058 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
 
 
 
 
 
 Column1 
  Mean -16.58166667 
Standard Error 2.921298132 
Median -16.41 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 7.155689811 
Sample Variance 51.20389667 
Kurtosis 0.519681201 
Skewness 0.072297312 
Range 21.15 
Minimum -27 
Maximum -5.85 
Sum -99.49 
Count 6 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 7.509435913 
  zero, t (5) = -5.68, two tail p = 0.0024, providing the evidence that water production 
levels per annum improved between 1999 and 2006. At 95% confidence interval, mean 
increase in water produced per annum is (24.09, 9.07). 
  
Similarly, a paired test conducted for GWSC and AVRL to determine if water 
production during the period of the private operator saw some improvements over that 
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of GWSC, shows that the mean increase in water production per annum (M =46.23, 
S.D = 12.97, N = 6) was significantly greater than zero, t(5) = -8.73, two tail p = 0.0003, 
providing evidence that water production levels per annum improved during the period 
of AVRL over that of GWSC. At 95% Confidence Interval, mean increase in water 
produced per annum is (32.61, 59.84) 
 
Table 6-3 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     GWSC AVRL 
Mean 183.3716667 229.5973333 
Variance 33.06193667 222.5228827 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.508928784 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat -8.728560535 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000163436 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000326871 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
 
Column1 
  
Mean 
-
46.22566667 
Standard Error 5.295909501 
Median -42 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 12.972276 
Sample Variance 168.2799447 
Kurtosis 
-
1.221600351 
Skewness 
-
0.741080316 
Range 32.78 
Minimum -65.38 
Maximum -32.6 
Sum -277.354 
Count 6 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 13.61356876 
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A paired test conducted for GWCL and AVRL to determine if water produced per 
annum during the period of the private operator saw some improvements over that of 
GWCL shows that the mean increase in water production per annum (M = 29.64, S.D = 
7.87, N = 6) was significantly greater than zero, t(5) = -9.23, two tail p = 0.0003, 
providing evidence that water production levels per annum improved during the period 
of AVRL over that of GWCL. At 95% Confidence Interval, mean increase in water 
produced per annum is (37.90, 21.41) 
 
Table 6-4 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     GWCL AVRL 
Mean 199.9533333 229.5973333 
Variance 112.4989867 222.5228827 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.863173478 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat -9.230824151 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000125301 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000250603 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
 
Column1 
  Mean -29.644 
Standard Error 3.211414226 
Median -28.2 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 7.866326207 
Sample Variance 61.879088 
Kurtosis -0.61902559 
Skewness 0.169275396 
Range 20.564 
Minimum -38.534 
Maximum -17.97 
Sum -177.864 
Count 6 
Confidence Level(95.0%) 8.255203074 
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In conclusion, there is a strong evidence that successively, the interventions of 
Managements and Governments over the years improved water production levels with 
the private operator (AVRL) recording the highest average water production level of 
229.597 Mm3 per annum over the 5-year period.   
6.1.2 Non-revenue water 
Even though high non-revenue water figures were recorded during the three regimes, 
the most intriguing feature is the inability of all three regimes to substantially reduce 
non-revenue water. Somewhat, AVRL steadily but marginally reduced its non-revenue 
water from 52.72% in 2006 to 49.22 in 2011 even though by the contract, it was 
expected to exit with a non-revenue water of not more than25 percent, it failed 
abysmally. Surprisingly, a marginal increase in metering from 48% in 2005 to 59.2% in 
2011also failed to produce a corresponding effect on non revenue water.  
Finally, lack of planning in the cities over the years has culminated into springing up of 
all sorts of structures and buildings everywhere in the cities without requisite 
documentation and approval from city authorities. Thus promoting various classes of 
slams in the cities where people could easily connect water to their homes illegally a 
coupled with low metering make it most unlikely for non-revenue water to be ever 
reduced below 40% in Ghana.  
 
Figure 6-2 Non-revenue water comparison 
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From 1987 to 1998, high non-revenue water values were recorded under GWSC 
ranging between 50.98% and 62.71%. However, the trend of high non-revenue water 
remained unchanged under GWCL with fluctuating ratios between 48.3% in 2005 and 
58.2% in 2002. No improvement could be seen under the private operator during the 5-
year period. Non-revenue water values were high ranging between 52.72% in 2006 
and 49.22% in 2011.  
 
Table 6-5 ANOVA output for Non-revenue Water 
Groups             Count Sum Average Variance 
             GWSC                 6 322.1656054 53.69426756 5.622413118 
             GWCL                 6 321.9068812 53.65114687 14.25669467 
             AVRL                   6 307.286154 51.214359 1.95089089 
Source of 
variance 
 
SS df      MS        F    P-value      F crit 
Between 
Groups 
 
24.17948204 2 12.08974102 1.661439544 0.222962371 3.682320344 
Within 
Groups 
 
109.1499934 15 7.276666227 
   Total  133.3294754 17 
     
In the ANOVA Table 6-5 above, the test statistics F (2, 15) is 1.66 and p>0.001 
(p=0.22). This shows that there is no strong evidence that there are significant 
differences in the means of non-revenue water across the three groups at 5% level of 
significance. Investigating further with 3-pairwise comparisons among the regimes as 
depicted in the t-Test Tables 6-6, 6-7 and 6-8. 
 
Table 6-6 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     GWSC GWCL 
Mean 53.69426756 53.65114687 
Variance 5.622413118 14.25669467 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.880758614 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat 0.052111967 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.480228686 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
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P(T<=t) two-tail 0.960457372 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Column1 
  Mean 0.04312069 
Standard Error 0.827462341 
Median 0.366556079 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 2.026860518 
Sample Variance 4.10816356 
Kurtosis 
-
1.007872179 
Skewness 
-
0.543599066 
Range 5.245121687 
Minimum 
-
2.987034821 
Maximum 2.258086866 
Sum 0.258724142 
Count 6 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 2.127059664 
 
A paired test performed for GWSC and GWCL to determine if non-revenue water 
improved after the public utility became a limited liability company shows that mean 
non-revenue water reduction (M = 0.04, S.D = 2.03, N = 6) was insignificantly greater 
than zero, t (5) = 0.05, two tail p = 0.96, providing the evidence that GWCL recorded no 
significant improvement in non-revenue water from 1999 and 2006. A 95% confidence 
interval, about mean improvement in non-revenue water is (2.08, 2.17). 
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Table 6-7 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     GWSC AVRL 
Mean 53.69426756 51.214359 
Variance 5.622413118 1.95089089 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.558623445 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat 3.086615867 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.013631987 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.027263975 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
Column1 
  Mean 2.479908564 
Standard Error 0.803439323 
Median 2.013113469 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 1.968016381 
Sample Variance 3.873088478 
Kurtosis 
-
1.154154038 
Skewness 0.649456991 
Range 4.824508922 
Minimum 0.679503338 
Maximum 5.50401226 
Sum 14.87945138 
Count 6 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 2.06530653 
 
Similarly, a paired test conducted for GWSC and AVRL to determine if non-revenue 
water levels were better during the period of the private operator than that of GWSC, 
shows that the mean improvement in non-revenue water (M =2.48, S.D = 1.97, N = 6) 
was insignificantly greater than zero, t(5) = 3.09, two tail p = 0.03, providing evidence 
that non-revenue water marginally improved during the period of AVRL over that of 
GWSC. A 95% Confidence Interval, about mean improvement in non-revenue water is 
(0.42, 4.55) 
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Table 6-8 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     GWCL AVRL 
Mean 53.65114687 51.214359 
Variance 14.25669467 1.95089089 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.295949461 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat 1.650021791 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.079925637 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.159851273 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
 
Column1 
  Mean 2.436787873 
Standard Error 1.476821632 
Median 2.304273926 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 3.617459439 
Sample Variance 13.08601279 
Kurtosis -2.80405815 
Skewness 0.084570521 
Range 8.122031975 
Minimum 
-
1.361687586 
Maximum 6.760344389 
Sum 14.62072724 
Count 6 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 3.79629086 
 
Finally, a paired test conducted between GWCL and AVRL to determine if non-revenue 
water during the period of the private operator was lower than that of GWCL, shows 
that the mean improvement in non-revenue water (M =2.44, S.D = 3.62, N = 6) was 
insignificantly greater than zero, t(5) = 1.65, two tail p = 0.16, providing the evidence 
that averagely, non-revenue water marginally improved by 2.4% during the period of 
AVRL over that of GWCL. A 95% Confidence Interval, about mean improvement in 
non-revenue water is (1.36, 6.23). But overall, all three regimes displayed high levels of 
operational inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. 
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6.1.3 Days receivables ratio and bill collection efficiency 
In Ghana, bill collection has always been a major challenge to most public utilities that 
provide post-paid services including the Volta River Authority (VRA), Electricity 
Company of Ghana and Water utilities. Evidently, average number of days used in 
receiving revenues worsened from 108 days in 2005 to159 days in 2006. Nonetheless, 
this could be tolerated since the expatriates began work in June, 2006 and therefore 
knew little about the system they were managing at the time. Meanwhile, AVRL failed 
to record lower ratios in subsequent year though Management contract is usually 
considered as a model that is effective in respect of revenue collection. From 1992 to 
2011, the best ratio was registered in 2005 (i.e. 108 days) under GWCL.  
The Corporation’s introduction of Arrears Recovery Programme (ARP) to improve its 
commercial operations in meter reading, bill distribution, arrears collection and 
prepayment metering engaged a private company, Messrs Delaram and this led to the 
collection of 563 million cedis within six months from June 1998 (GWSC, 1998). In 
1998 alone, over 2 billion cedis was collected as part of the arrears of MDAs. A tariff 
increase of 130 percent granted to GWSC by the newly established PURC in 1998 
improved both billing and collection performances during the year in terms of cash 
compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, overall collection efficiency further declined 
in 1998 due to government’s failure to honour about 65 percent of its bills. As shown in 
figure 5-3, bill collection efficiency for private customers has been more than that of 
Government, a situation that has continued to affect the operations of the water utility 
greatly. Albeit, government pays its bills full, payments are usually unduly delayed. 
Somewhat, while one may agree with the above reasons, lack of adequate bill 
collection centres also contributed to the low bill collection in respect of private 
customers.  
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Figure 6-3 Days receivables ratio comparison 
 
Table 6-9 ANOVA output for days receivables 
Groups                      
Count Sum Average Variance 
GWSC                            
6 1220.606289 
203.43438
14 
2419.7931
18 
GWCL                             
6 1253.205287 
208.86754
78 
3951.5961
12 
AVRL                              
6 1303.080068 
217.18001
13 
1671.6717
63 
Source 
of 
varianc
e 
 
SS df      MS        F    P-value      F crit 
Betwee
n 
Groups 
 
575.117370
8 2 
287.558685
4 
0.10725718
2 
0.89897731
7 
3.6823203
44 
Within 
Groups 
 40215.3049
7 
1
5 
2681.02033
1 
   Total  40790.4223
4 
1
7 
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In the ANOVA Table 6-9 above, the test statistics F (2, 15) is 0.1073 and p>0.001 
(p=0.90). This shows that there is no strong evidence that there are significant 
differences in the means of days receivables across the three groups at 5% level of 
significance. Investigating further, 3-pairwise comparisons among the regimes reveal 
that all three regimes failed to improve the days receivables as shown in the t-Test 
Tables 6-10, 6-11 and 6-12. 
 
Table 6-10 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     GWSC GWCL 
Mean 203.4343814 208.8675478 
Variance 2419.793118 3951.596112 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation -0.138181301 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat -0.156559872 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.440858465 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.881716929 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
 
 
Column1 
  
Mean 
-
5.433166341 
Standard Error 34.70344135 
Median 
-
32.65193091 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 85.00572363 
Sample Variance 7225.97305 
Kurtosis 
-
1.133226917 
Skewness 0.489931858 
Range 224.0453782 
Minimum 
-
110.7693699 
Maximum 113.2760083 
Sum 
-
32.59899804 
Count 6 
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Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 89.20803594 
 
Using the paired test between GWSC and GWCL to determine whether or not GWCL 
took shorter periods in collecting its revenue than GWSC, the result shows that mean 
days receivable (M = 5.43, S.D = 85.01, N = 6) was insignificantly greater than zero, t 
(5) = -0.16, two tail p = 0.88, providing the evidence that GWCL failed to improve the 
days receivables between 1999 and 2006. A 95% confidence interval about mean 
improvement in days receivables is (83.78, 94.64). 
 
Table 6-11 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     GWSC AVRL 
Mean 203.4343814 217.1800113 
Variance 2419.793118 1671.671763 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.884107855 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat -1.455463684 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.102652933 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.205305865 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
 
Column1 
  
Mean 
-
13.74562984 
Standard Error 9.444158577 
Median 
-
10.09331032 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 23.13336956 
Sample Variance 535.1527874 
Kurtosis 
-
1.727639385 
Skewness 
-
0.379736477 
Range 56.13616515 
Minimum 
-
44.77572419 
Maximum 11.36044096 
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Sum 
-
82.47377901 
Count 6 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 24.27698248 
 
Using the paired test between GWSC and AVRL to determine whether or not AVRL 
took shorter periods in collecting its revenue than GWSC, the result shows that mean 
days receivable (M = 13.18, S.D = 23.13, N = 6) was insignificant, t (5) = -1.46, two tail 
p = 0.21, providing the evidence that AVRL failed to reduce the number of days it took 
to collect its revenues than GWSC between 2006 and 2011. A 95% confidence interval 
about mean improvement in days receivables is (10.53, 38.02). Also, between GWCL 
and AVRL the result shows that mean days receivable (M = 8.31, S.D = 71.27, N = 6) 
was insignificant, t (5) = -0.29, two tail p = 0.79, providing the evidence that AVRL 
failed to reduce the number of days it took to collect its revenues than GWCL between 
2006 and 2011. A 95% confidence interval about mean improvement in days 
receivables is (83.10, 66.48).  
 
Table 6-12 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
                     GWCL               AVRL 
Mean 208.8675478 217.1800113 
Variance 3951.596112 1671.671763 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.105930271 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat -0.285710988 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.393278867 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.786557735 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
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Column1 
  Mean -8.312463495 
Standard Error 29.09395801 
Median 3.34615016 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 71.26535172 
Sample Variance 5078.750355 
Kurtosis -0.19993061 
Skewness 0.043130089 
Range 201.5674289 
Minimum -105.1418658 
Maximum 96.42556308 
Sum -49.87478097 
Count 6 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 74.78839995 
Further probing has revealed that delays in the payment of bills by Government greatly 
accounted for the high days receivable ratios. Sometimes, it took Government more 
than a year to pay bills of MDAs. For instance, bills of 2005 were paid in 2006 leading 
to a bill collection efficiency over 100% in 2006.  
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Figure 6-4 Bill collection efficiency comparison 
 
Table 6-13 ANOVA output for bill collection efficiency 
Groups                      Count Sum Average Variance 
GWSC                         6 530.3776631 88.39627719 93.5310051 
GWCL                         6 473.6343205 78.93905341 23.61507519 
AVRL                          6 551.7662166 91.9610361 150.6207207 
Source of 
variance 
 
SS df      MS        F    P-value      F crit 
Between 
Groups 
 
543.4372414 2 271.7186207 3.044275313 0.77684424 3.682320344 
Within 
Groups 
 
1338.834005 15 89.25560034 
   Total  1882.271246 17 
     
In the ANOVA Table 6-13 above, the test statistics F (2, 15) is 3.04 and p>0.001 
(p=0.78) showing that there is no strong evidence that there are significant differences 
in the means of bill collection efficiency across the three groups at 5% level of 
significance. Further investigation conducted using 3-pairwise comparisons among the 
three regimes as shown in the t-Test Tables 6-14, 6-15 and 6-16 also reveal that all 
three regimes woefully failed to increase bill collection efficiency  
 
Table 6-14 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
  GWSC GWCL 
Mean 88.39627719 78.93905341 
Variance 93.5310051 23.61507519 
Observations 6     6 
Pearson Correlation 0.268925569 
 Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat 2.416884234 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.030174491 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.060348982 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
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Column1 
  Mean 9.457223777 
Standard Error 3.912981699 
Median 5.655129606 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 9.584808535 
Sample Variance 91.86855465 
Kurtosis 
-
1.607586711 
Skewness 0.701049421 
Range 23.42169017 
Minimum 
-
0.878782842 
Maximum 22.54290733 
Sum 56.74334266 
Count 6 
Confidence Level 
(95.0%) 10.05863967 
 
Using the paired test between GWSC and GWCL to determine whether or not GWCL 
was more efficient in collecting its bill than GWSC, the result shows that mean bill 
collection efficiency (M = 9.46, S.D = 9.59, N = 6) was significantly greater than zero, t 
(5) = 2.42, two tail p = 0.0604, providing the evidence that bill collection marginally 
worsened when the public water utility became a limited liability company between 
1999 and 2006. A 95% confidence interval about mean improvement in bill collection 
efficiency is (0.60, 19.52). 
Now, between GWSC and AVRL the result shows that mean bill collection efficiency (M 
= 3.57%, S.D = 17.20, N = 6) was insignificantly greater than zero, t (5) = -0.51, two tail 
p = 0.63, providing the evidence that there was no significant difference between the 
bill collection efficiency of GWSC and that of AVRL. A 95% confidence interval about 
mean improvement in bill collection efficiency is (14.49, 21.62). 
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Table 6-15 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
  GWSC AVRL 
Mean 88.39627719 91.9610361 
Variance 93.5310051 150.6207207 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation -0.217994435 
 Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat -0.507613697 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.316658212 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.633316423 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
Column1 
  
Mean 
-
3.564758907 
Standard Error 7.022582189 
Median 
-
6.899724507 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 17.20174304 
Sample Variance 295.8999636 
Kurtosis 1.082296103 
Skewness 1.175053125 
Range 45.06497981 
Minimum 
-
18.61602385 
Maximum 26.44895597 
Sum 
-
21.38855344 
Count 6 
Confidence Level 
(95.0%) 18.05212221 
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Table 6-16 t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
  GWCL AVRL 
Mean 78.93905341 91.9610361 
Variance 23.61507519 150.6207207 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0.48252224 
 Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat -2.952931467 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.015888731 
 t Critical one-tail 2.015048372 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.031777463 
 t Critical two-tail 2.570581835   
 
Column1 
  
Mean 
-
13.02198268 
Standard Error 4.409849274 
Median 
-
17.69199209 
Mode #N/A 
Standard Deviation 10.80188056 
Sample Variance 116.6806237 
Kurtosis 1.392284105 
Skewness 1.439277477 
Range 28.36485575 
Minimum 
-
22.15044129 
Maximum 6.214414452 
Sum -78.1318961 
Count 6 
Confidence Level 
(95.0%) 11.33587844 
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Finally, the improvement AVRL made in bill collection efficiency is shown in Table 6-16 
above. The test shows mean improvement in bill collection efficiency (M = 13.02%, S.D 
= 10.80, N = 6) was significantly greater than zero, t (5) = -2.95, two tail p = 0.032, 
providing the evidence that there was significant improvement in bill collection 
efficiency during the period of private operator (AVRL). A 95% confidence interval 
about mean improvement in bill collection efficiency is (1.69, 24.38). Overall, the 
average bill collection efficiency increased by 13% during the period of AVRL. 
 
6.1.4 Staffing levels 
Staff per 1,000 persons served obviates all distortions associated with cases of one 
single point serving several households. It is evident that overstaffing predated the era 
of GWCL. 
 
Figure 6-5 Staffing levels comparison 
There were 65 staff per 1,000 connections in 1968 but had since declined through 
system expansions and reforms over the years. As depicted in the figure 6-5 above, 
the assertion that there is excess labour in the water sector in developing countries 
was confirmed by the Ghanaian situation. Here, staffing levels marginally improved 
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under the management of the private operator. Overstaffing greatly rocked the water 
utility under GWSC as a result of institutionalised political patronage, tribalism, 
cronyism and nepotism which still exist presently in Ghanaian .  
Apparently, labour productivity significantly improved from 26 staff per 1,000 
connections in 1991 to 18 staff per 1,000 connections in 1998 and further improved to 
15 staff per 1,000 connections in 2003. Labour productivity improved year after year 
from 18 staff per 1,000 connections in 1999 to 8 staff per 1,000 connections in 2006 
when AVRL took over from GWCL. With the increases in staff numbers and the 
corresponding increases in customer strengths during the 5-year period of AVRL, staff 
per 1,000 connections improved from 8 in 2006 to 7 in 2011.   
 
Figure 6-6 Personnel costs per total operating costs comparison 
Generally, the water utility was poorly run through loose employment practices, political 
patronage, tribalism, nepotism and cronyism leading to overstaffing. GWCL had the 
lowest (i.e. less than 30%) personnel costs per total operating costs with the highest 
under GWSC over 47%. However, the per capita personnel costs calculated as a share 
of total operating costs were highest under AVRL.  
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6.1.5 Financial ratios 
Ensuring an efficient billing posed major challenges to all regimes to the extent that 
billings were done based on guesstimates due to low metering and illegal connections. 
Bill collection efficiency was fairly high from 1991 until it dropped to 79.4% in 1995. It 
however improved significantly in 1996 and worsened again till GWCL took over in 
1999. Nevertheless, GWCL performed poorly in its bill collection functions. Bill 
collection efficiency under AVRL was fairly high with GWCL recording the worst or 
lowest collection efficiencies among the three service entities. Generally, days 
receivables ratios were high in all cases partly due to long delays in the payment of 
bills of government entities. 
6.1.6 Operating ratio 
High operating ratios were recorded during the three regimes making it impossible for 
the water utility to take care of its non-operating expenditures. Electricity and Chemical 
costs constitute the two major cost components of the production costs. Averagely, 
electricity and chemical costs constituted 51% and 18% of the total cost of production 
respectively under the AVRL while that of GWCL were 45.9% and 16.7% respectively.  
Personnel costs also increased significantly under AVRL and this may explain the large 
negative net margins recorded over the years. Evidently, AVRL failed to reduce both 
chemical and electricity costs also as stipulated in the agreement. 
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Figure 6-7 Operating ratio comparison 
Chemical and electricity costs constituted two major cost components of the total 
operating expenditure that significantly affected the operating ratios of all three service 
entities. Therefore, any attempt to reduce these costs would automatically improve the 
operating costs of the utility. Now, while GWSC operated with the minimum operating 
ratio of 66.3% in 1995 and the maximum of 205% in 1985, GWCL operated between 
77% and 99% in 2004 and 1999 respectively. Albeit AVRL the reduction of chemical 
and electricity costs was stipulated in the agreement; it failed to reduce the hence 
operating with ratios ranging between 83% and 98% which were unacceptable.  
6.1.7 Liquidity 
The liquidity positions of all three regimes were bad with a lot of funds tied up in cash 
as a result of high receivables. Usually, inflation, exchange rates and losses have 
always been used by both the regulator and the water utility to justify for tariffs 
increases. It is however intriguing to observe that current ratio sharply declined from 
2.02 in 2005 to 0.96 in 2006 and further worsened to 0.75 in 2011. For the two 
decades, the utility failed to gain financial independence and always struggled to repay 
its foreign loans and pay for its imports.  
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Figure 6-8 Current ratio comparison 
From 1984 to 1998, the short-term solvency of GWCL could best be described as 
extremely low except in 1988 when it had a current ratio of 2.52. Albeit the liquidity 
position was bad initially under GWCL, it significantly improved after 2003 till AVRL 
took over in 2006. The liquidity position of AVRL was very low. AVRL achieved the best 
current ratio of 1.03 during the five years in 2007.  
6.1.8 Profitability 
For lack of data in 1992 and 1993, the utility’s profitability could only be assessed after 
1993. Nonetheless, from 1994 to 1998, GWSC recorded deficits with the explanation 
that, in the case of 1994 with a ROFA of 9.69%, the utility’s assets were overvalued by 
800 percent in the year. For three consecutive years prior to the Management contract, 
GWCL made positive returns on its fixed assets. AVRL recorded marginal profits with 
losses in 2007 and 2008.  
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Figure 6-9 Profitability ratio – ROFA comparison 
From 1994 to 1998, GWSC failed to make returns on its fixed assets and therefore 
recorded deficits throughout the period. GWCL and AVRL also failed to reduce their 
operating ratios, non-revenue water and increase their bill collection efficiencies, and 
thus posed a serious challenge to the utility’s profitability at any given time.   
6.1.9 Creditworthiness 
The utility’s debt to equity ratio was very high under GWCL indicating that majority of 
the water utility’s assets from 1999 to 2003 were financed through debts. The utility’s 
creditworthiness during this period could therefore be described as very low forcing 
government to engage private hands in 2006. It is however worthy to note that the debt 
to equity ratios began to exceed 100% two years before GWSC was converted into a 
limited liability company in 1999. 
Clearly, the utility’s leverage significantly improved under the private operator with 
12.54% at the end of the contract. Majority of the utility’s assets were financed through 
debts during the three regimes. For instance, the debt to equity ratios of GWSC 
exceeded 100% in 1997 and 1998 while in 2001, the ratio was 312.87%. The long-term 
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debt to shareholder’s equity improved during the period of AVRL with a ratio of 12.54% 
in 2011. 
 
Figure 6-10 Leverage ratio comparison 
6.1.10 Investment levels 
Generally, investment has been both slow and low in the urban water supply sector in 
Ghana. Evidently, from the figure below, investment in the sector continued to lag 
behind the urban population. For lack of data on investment from 1992 to 1994, only 
four years was employed for GWSC. However, investments from 1995 to 2002 were 
very low until 2003 when investment seemed to begin again until 2006. From 2007, not 
much investment could be said to be done in the sector. The author may therefore 
attempt to speculate by asking whether the chunk of the funds voted for the 
management contract truly went into infrastructural development or not since very little 
could be seen to done after 2007?  
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Figure 6-11Investment comparison (all in 2011 prices) 
In most cases, it is observed that performances of the three regimes improved in their 
last years of operation. Perhaps, these performances were exhibited to justify 
management’s inclusion in subsequent arrangements. 
Even though some investments were undertaken during the three regimes, it was 
evident that investments had not been systematic and consistent. Secondly, since the 
utility was not capable of financing its own capital projects. However, it is worth noting 
that AVRL was limited by the arrangement in terms of the body that controls funds for 
investment. 
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6.1.11 Public demonstrations against the Operator 
Prior to the engagement of the private operator, civil society groups, opinion leaders and 
opposition parties opposed the policy of engaging a private operator and stated publicly 
that Ghanaians are equally capable and competent enough to manage the public water 
utility. Somewhat, a point must also be made that the process of engaging the private 
operator was one major source of public agitation. This is because the reform process 
was not consultative enough. Not only that but also, many people who hate to hear of 
policy stance of the World Bank, multilateral and bilateral donors on public utility services 
opposed the decision vehemently because, they believed it was at the behest of the World 
Bank. Unfortunately for the private operator, the biggest opposition party, the National 
Democratic Congress that also fiercely opposed the contract won the 2008 national 
elections. His Excellency Professor John Evans Atta Mills at a presidential debate leading 
to the 2008 presidential elections registered his opposition to privatisation. This also made 
the renewal of the contract very uncertain – that is, if they were going to allow the 5 years 
to elapse at all. It therefore made it difficult for his government that came into power in 
January, 2009 to show the needed commitment towards the arrangement but to wait 
patiently for the contract to end in June, 2011. Overall, arrangement therefore suffered 
institutionally, culturally and politically. 
Administratively, a power struggle between the private operator and the grantor (the 
erstwhile GWCL) was inevitable and evident considering the oversight responsibility of the 
Grantor. As indicated in an earlier chapter, procurement of materials sometimes were 
unduly delayed even though a senior officer at the Grantor denied the Grantor’s 
responsibility for the delay and said during the interview that “they know the procurement 
laws of Ghana and if they failed to begin the process in good time, we cannot be blamed 
for it”. Again, the engagement of private operator was considered as a threat to the “old 
order”, undermining and disgraceful to some staff of the erstwhile utility that saved as staff 
of the Grantor.  
Apparently, some who opposed the arrangement did so for fear of high tariffs that are 
usually associated with privatisation. However, for several years, some Ghanaians took 
advantage of the inefficiencies that had engulfed the public water utility including lack of 
attention for massive illegal connections and non-payment of bills for months and years. 
205 
 
Figure 6-12 Demonstrating against AVRL Source: Adam, (2011) 
It is therefore worth mentioning that the opposition by some Ghanaians to the 
arrangement were merely selfish. Not only that but also, some seconded-staff from 
GWCL to AVRL did not support the arrangement since they were disempowered 
financially and administratively. Placards displayed in the photo above vividly confirmed 
the level and forms of agitations employed against the private operator. 
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7 Discussion of Results 
This chapter highlights the implications of this research for all urban water supply 
sector players in terms of policy and practice. It presents major limitations of the 
research pondering over other ways of undertaking the research that could have been 
employed in order to achieve the objectives of this research in a typical African setting. 
Lastly, further research implications are highlighted. 
7.1 Conclusion about the research proposition 
Considering the proposition underlying the study, stating that: 
 “A management contract does not provide the necessary level of empowerment, 
incentives, commitment and access to resources for a private operator to 
adequately and efficiently perform, even where there is an established economic 
regulator with a clear mandate”  
the researcher somewhat finds the above statement to be true for the management 
contract between GWCL and AVRL to the extent that major decisions could only be taken 
in consultation with the Grantor whose staff had vested interests and some politically 
appointed. For instance, tariff increases were sometimes delayed for several months or 
not approved by the regulator due to political reasons. Procedurally, the private operator 
was also frustrated by the Grantor through procurement processes by deliberately 
delaying the procurement of certain items. Not only that but also, the contract failed to set 
clear performance targets. For instance, its baseline data was doubtful and contested by 
the private operator leading to unnecessary delays in agreeing on the SNAG items 
identified by the private operator.  
Finally, the political capital made out of the arrangement prior to the engagement by the 
then main opposition party - the National Democratic Congress, made it difficult for the 
National Democratic Congress government to show total commitment and support for the 
management contract while in power. In view of the facts above, the proposition could be 
said to contain at least a valid level of foresight even if it has not subsequently been 
provable beyond reasonable doubt by the data available. 
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7.2 Status of the water sector 
For every country and region, safe and efficient water supply is a challenge. Albeit 
governments, private sector and water utilities around the world continue to inject 
substantial amount of resources into the sector, technical, technological, financial, 
environmental, managerial, socio-cultural and political challenges still abound - a 
situation that calls for more systematic, aggressive and deliberate efforts towards 
addressing the challenges. According to Nield (2011), as cited in IBNET, (2014), water 
service coverage from a protected source is practically non-existent in newly 
established countries including South Sudan. Intriguingly, in more advanced countries 
such as the United States of America, approximately 177 million of its citizens access 
water from sources that lack adequate protection. Essentially, all reports on water 
supply management identify lack of proper maintenance, negative effects of “reduced” 
maintenance practices, challenge of reducing high electricity and chemical costs and 
high unaccounted-for water or high non-revenue water. Additionally, late and non-
payments of bills by customers are major challenges for water managers in most low-
income countries leading to high days receivable figures and loss of revenue. On the 
one hand, while water utilities complain about low water tariff levels, consumers cry 
against tariff increases on the other hand irrespective of prevailing tariff levels.  
 
Data collected on more than 4,400 utilities from 135 countries by the International 
Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities in December, 2013 which was 
intensively analysed and assessed for the period, 2006 to 2011 reports of similar 
challenges mentioned above. According to IBNET, (2014), water coverage declined in 
both low and middle-income countries. The decline was however recorded more in the 
low-income countries. It also revealed that the share of utilities that could not cover 
their basic Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs increased from 34% in 2000 to 
37% in 2010 - challenges that the urban water supply utility in Ghana continues to 
grapple with over three decades. Meanwhile, the share of utilities that could not cover 
their O&M costs increased from an average of 28 percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2010 
and occurred more in low-income countries. Furthermore, non-revenue water improved 
from 31% in 2000 to 27% in 2011 with the highest non-revenue water figures recorded 
in low-income countries and the lowest non-revenue water figures in high-income 
countries. 
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Table 7.1   Performance indicators of water supply services, 20006- 2011 
INDICTOR/YEAR 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Prelim 
Number of utilities reporting 
on Non-Revenue Water 
589  
 
1,242  1,448  1,349  1,403  1,488  1,253 
Median Non-revenue water (%) 31  26  31  29  29  28  27 
Average nonrevenue water (%) 32  33  
 
32  31  31  31  30 
Number of utilities reporting 
on staff productivity 
598  
 
 
1,421  888  1,440  1,679  1,803  1,574 
Median staff productivity 1.36 1.06 1.21 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 
 
Average staff productivity 2.02  1.37  1.51  1.28  
 
1.26  1.29  1.29 
Number of utilities reporting 
on collection period 
594  1,437  1,521  1,476  1,600  1,633  1,383 
Median collection period (days) 154  96  
 
87  82  76  70  66 
Average collection period 
(days) 
233 
 
157  142  139  125  116  121 
Number of utilities reporting 
on water coverage 
630  
 
1,454  1,534  1,507  1,725  1,686  1,453 
Median water coverage (%) 82  92  
 
92  92  90  88  89 
Average water coverage (%) 77  84  
 
83  83  81  81  80 
 
Source: IBNET (2014)     Note: Prelim represents preliminary 
 
Comparatively, Ghana’s non-revenue water figures are far higher than the global 
averages as shown in table 7.1 and marginally improved from 51.35% in 2000 to 
49.22% in 2011. Both electricity and chemical costs increased from 18% and 13% in 
2000 respectively to 56% and 15% in 2011 respectively leading to high operating costs 
and the utility’s inability the cover its O&M costs. Apparently, staff productivity improved 
from 9 employees per 1,000 connections in 2000 to 7 employees in 2010 and varied 
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widely from about 11 employees per 1,000 connections in low-income countries to 
slightly more than 3 in upper middle-income countries partially as a result of connection 
practices (IBNET, 2014). Progressively staff productivity improved from 17 staff per 
1,000 connections in 2000 to 7 in 2011 in the case of Ghana. As shown in the table 
7.1, while days receivables improved from 154 days in 2000 to 70 days in 2010 and 
therefore achieving the commonly used benchmark of a 90-day collection, it worsened 
from 180 days in 2000 to 213 days in 2011.  
 
Universally, this research closely corroborates the findings in the 2014 report of the 
International Benchmark Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities which reveals that 
low-income countries still need to more in the water sector by way of injecting more 
resources, efficiency, effectiveness and managerial competences into the urban water 
supply sector. 
 
7.3 Research limitations 
Seldom would writers explicitly exhaust various ways or strategies of describing every 
challenge that researchers face during data collection. In these books, albeit 
challenges faced by researchers during data collection are mentioned authors do not 
necessarily prescribe specific remedies to all since every research environment has its 
own peculiar challenge(s) and remedies. It is in this vein that the researcher’s 
experience during data collection in Ghana is worth recounting in this report. The rich 
experience gathered by the researcher during data collection in Ghana could serve as 
a guide to other fellow researchers who might want to undertake similar activities in 
Ghana and in some other countries in Africa in future most especially foreigners. 
Prior to the researcher’s departure from the United Kingdom to Ghana for data 
collection, he ensured that all necessary arrangements were made with eligible 
institutions and individuals through telephone calls, emails. In addition, application 
letters were submitted on arrival to ensure that permission to collect information from 
the institutions and individuals was sought before embarking on data collection 
activities in all the eligible organisations. This was done to avoid earlier challenges the 
researcher encountered during the first fieldwork in 2008, taking into consideration the 
usual bureaucratic processes that exist in the Ghanaian public service. On arrival, 
further consultations were undertaken to explain to some of the principal officers of the 
water utility what the research was seeking to do and where dates were fixed for the 
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visits. However, on the first day of the visit, it became very evident that more had to be 
done in order to access any relevant information that was required since it was difficult 
to meet with any of the officers except one. All efforts made to meet the officers proved 
futile in the beginning. Reasons assigned for their inability to honour these meetings 
were that they were attending meetings and workshops while some did not come to the 
office at all.  
This challenge or frustration persisted for weeks until one day the researcher met one 
of the staff who then assisted him to meet with the officers and asked them to help him 
with the information he needed. Afterwards, the researcher was advised to submit a 
letter to seek permission and approval from the Managing Director of GWCL to 
undertake the research activity. On one of the researcher’s usual unfruitful visits to the 
water company, a staff said to him   
“gentleman, you will not be able to do anything here if you continue to wait for the 
approval of your request letter before commencing your data collection, this letter will 
not come today or tomorrow, forget about it, go ahead and do what you want to do”. 
At the time of doing this report, the researcher’s letter had still not been acknowledged 
by the Managing Director by either writing or word of mouth. The advice given by the 
staff served as an eye-opener to the researcher leading to the adaptation of alternative 
but “unorthodox” strategies of collecting data from all the stakeholders in Ghana which 
proved very effective – a method that are not explicitly stated in the books researchers 
read. In short, different research environments will pose different challenges during 
data collection and can only be overcome when the researcher knows and understands 
the strategy or methods that best suits the environment.   
In spite of all the necessary initial contacts and arrangements made with the eligible 
institutions and individuals through visits, telephone calls, and letters and confirming 
dates of visits, almost everything had to be rescheduled making planning very difficult 
and data collection very costly. For instance, the driving distances from the 
researcher’s home base in Tamale to Accra is 660 kilometers and from Accra to 
Kumasi 270 kilometers, and required travelling hours of approximately 12 and 5 hours 
respectively. In summary, data collection in Ghana had been a tedious task fraught 
with a lot of bureaucratic and cultural challenges. Lack of time consciousness and 
unnecessary bureaucratic processes were identified as major challenges that 
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affected the smooth collection of data during the fieldwork. Meanwhile, further 
investigations revealed that the challenges were encountered as a result of: 
 The political season in Ghana at the time of data collection which was 
unfavourable ( i.e. the political party in government at the time of data 
collection, the National Democratic Congress opposed the management 
contract arrangement with AVRL while in opposition between 2001 and 2008) 
 Fear of government using the researcher to investigate the performance of both 
the private operator and the grantor so as to abrogate the management contract 
with AVRL which at the time was lobbying or seeking for extension of its 
contract period. 
 An on-going investigation of the water utility by Serious Fraud Office (SFO) at 
the time of data collection 
 The usual attitude of most Ghanaian public/civil servants towards ‘outsiders’ 
seeking information about their jobs or organisations (lack of transparency) 
 The uncertainty of government’s position regarding the extension of the contract 
period after 2011. 
 Agitation of some sections of the public against private sector participation in 
the urban water sector at the time of this investigation.  
 
Nothing could be said to be predictable or certain in the urban water supply 
environment in Ghana regarding data gathering since there was a lot of suspicions on 
the part of both the grantor and the private operator at the time. The key limitation of 
this research therefore has been the difficulty in gaining access to the detailed 
performance information of both public and private companies. Access might have 
been more readily available if the researcher had been employed as a staff member 
within the utility but would then have been liable to bias in assessment of what would in 
effect have been researcher’s own performance. 
Finally, the study would have benefited from using more a sophisticated analysis 
approach to bring together the range of different performance indicators in to a single 
analysis or composite, either through a DEA type approach or through a ranking 
procedure. 
7.5 implications for theory and contribution to knowledge  
Uniquely, the research investigated and compared performances of three different 
regimes of management models in a single urban water supply system of Ghana 
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including a corporatised entity (GWSC), a limited liability company (GWCL) and a 
private operator (AVRL) over a 27-year span. Further, it assessed the suitability of the 
form of private participation and the net improvement the management contract 
brought to the urban population. The study confirmed the proposition that management 
contract would not be enough to make any significant difference. In addition, the study 
showed that the two previous reorganisations also failed to make any significant 
difference and thus provide a unique contribution to academic knowledge and 
understanding. This implies that the success or failure of the Ghana urban water supply 
system is independent of the management models employed as the performances of 
all three regimes showed no significant differences. Instead, it may be dependent upon 
other factors such as the competence of system Managers engaged, political will of 
governments, institutional culture, level of investments, quality of management 
contractor, leadership style and finally the attitude of consumers towards such reforms 
as in the case of Uganda.   
7.6 Implications for further research 
Since the start of this research it became clear that the possible role of private sector 
engagement in lower-income countries is no longer being promoted so actively by the 
international finance institutions and donors. There are other examples of 
management contracts being undertaken during this period, such as that of Suez 
Environment in Algiers, but they appear to be the exception. It appears therefore that 
further research into the role of the private sector and the capabilities, or otherwise, of 
the particular approach of management contracts is not required. However, the 
underlying challenge of delivering potable water to all urban consumers in a 
sustainable manner remains. The extent to which this can be facilitated, encouraged 
and achieved, by default ahead of the socio-economic development trend line 
(Franceys & Gerlach, 2010), is clearly an area deserving of further research. Also, 
further research is required to determine the extent to which managerial performance 
and the local environment of a water utility influence non-revenue water. 
 
7.7 Implications for policy makers or government 
According to (Marin, 2009), reforms in the water sector in the 1990s were badly 
necessitated by the sector’s growing challenges. During this period, the reforms relied 
heavily on the private sector and since 1990, governments in developing and emerging 
countries have signed not less than 260 PPP contracts in the water sector. In spite of 
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the successes chalked in the water sector by the private sector, one thing that has 
remained uncertain and controversial is the suitability or unsuitability of the approach 
for developing countries as in the case of Ghana. But while it seems so difficult to inject 
the needed level of efficiency and effectiveness into the operations of many poorly 
performing public water utilities in low-income countries through PPP, others have 
succeeded in doing so. In the case of Ghana, the urban water utility has undergone 
various phases of reforms including the involvement of the private sector but failed to 
realise the fundamental objectives of those reforms. Generally, the research has 
revealed that political patronage and interference, corruption, nepotism, tribalism and 
poor management remain the stumbling blocks to the development and survival of the 
urban water utility. Another major challenge has been the inability of the regulator to 
periodically increase water tariffs due to political interference. It is crucial and 
significant to allow the  PURC to periodically apply the automatic tariff adjustment 
formula so as to ensure that realistic tariffs are paid by consumers taking into account 
the pillars of sustainability (i.e. social, economic and environmental) and ensuring that 
the urban poor are adequately catered for through a deliberate policy. By creating a 
favourable environment, will attract increased public and private sector investments 
that will ultimately lead to system expansions. A major defect of the arrangement was 
the supervisory role that was assigned to the erstwhile GWCL (i.e. Asset Holding 
Authority) over the private operator. It was a complex and difficult task for staff of the 
grantor to perform because some of the senior officers of the erstwhile GWCL on 
secondment to AVRL could hardly be effectively monitored since they were previously 
their superiors. In addition, due to salary disparities between staff of the grantor and 
seconded staff of AVRL, relationship between the two entities was quite hostile which 
the researcher considers technically and administratively inappropriate. As indicated 
above, the relation between AVRL and the Grantor could not be described as cordial to 
the extent that the two parties could not agree on the operator’s definition of customer 
response time over the five years of its operation. This therefore makes more 
significant for all key sector players in the urban water supply sector including system 
managers, policy makers, policy implementers, politicians and regulators understand 
the fundamental principles of good water governance which is crucial and critical in 
overcoming the major challenges in the urban water sector.  
Furthermore, the gross failure of the contracting authority to gather sufficient and 
accurate baseline data to be able to set achievable performance targets for the private 
operator thus exposes the sloppy and unrealistic performance targets set in the 
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contract leading to a number of SNAG items that the operator took advantage of, 
coupled with poor supervision. In most cases, performance targets were either 
unrealistic or left open. Finally, the research has shown that issues of high non-revenue 
water, water rationing, low coverage, poor asset management, high operating ratio, 
bankruptcy, corruption, illegal connection, high unaccounted for water, low water tariffs 
and poor water governance can be addressed by either public or private operator 
provided the needed political will, investment and strong leadership are available. The 
results of this research elucidate the point that a management model works in the right 
environment and fails in the wrong environment provided the contract or arrangement 
is adequately designed, coordinated and implemented. This research attempts to 
create the needed awareness among policy makers and implementers and consumers 
regarding the herculean task that faces the urban water sector in Ghana. 
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8 Conclusions 
The major conclusions of the research which are drawn from literature and results of 
the fieldwork conducted in Ghana are presented in this chapter including the research 
hypothesis, investigated objectives and problems. 
8.1 Conclusions about the research problem 
Ghana is endowed with so much water resources, yet many urban and rural dwellers 
continue to lack potable water especially people living in the urban slums. 
Governments have attempted to address these challenges through policy and 
institutional reforms such as capital injection, forgiveness of debts, establishment of a 
regulator, conversion of the public water utility from a corporatised institution into a 
limited liability company and the engagement of a private operator through a 
management contract, the woes of the utility will still not just go away. The urban water 
supply sector of Ghana has gone through series of reforms by way of its policies and 
management models since its inceptions all in the attempt to ensure efficiency, 
accountability, equity and sustainability. However, in the mist of these reforms lies a 
barrage of challenges including lack of transparency, lack of accountability, political 
interference and patronage and improper pricing of water. 
These challenges called for a new management model that brought AVRL to manage 
the urban water utility for five years. Apparently, the challenges faced by Ghana’s 
urban water utility are not too different from the challenges that confront most low-
income or developing countries in the urban water supply sector except that their 
solutions could best be found within the environments in which they exist. The reason 
being that, same management models may produce different results in different 
jurisdictions depending on the nature of the contract, the political environment, the 
institutional framework, the legal framework, the regulatory framework, institutional 
culture, the operator and consumers among others.  
Through a set of objectives, the research problem was addressed and some specific 
conclusions drawn.  The objectives of this research were to; 
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 Investigate the context within which Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation 
(GWSC), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), Aqua Vitens Rand Limited 
(AVRL) and Public Utilities Regulatory Commission(PURC) operated in Ghana; 
 Evaluate the performance of Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation/Ghana 
Water Company Limited (Public utility) over the period preceding the 
management contract; 
 Evaluate the performance of Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (management contract); 
 Investigate the effectiveness of the Public Utility Regulatory Commission; 
 Evaluate the level of empowerment, incentive, commitment and access to 
resources necessary for efficient service delivery by service providers. 
The research therefore attempted to answer the following questions: 
 To what extent have the activities of the economic regulator influenced the 
performance of GWCL or AVRL by way of ensuring that service delivery is 
efficient, effective and sustainable? 
 How have national policies and institutional frameworks in the past influenced 
the service delivery of the public utility? 
 What is the appropriate set of evaluation indicators for public and privatised 
water utility and could there be a new way of assessing or evaluating the 
performance of the urban water utility under the present management contract 
in Ghana? 
 How could data be effectively generated to populate the performance indicators 
for analysis?  
 What aspects of, and possibly to what extent, the management contract have 
empowered or conflicted with the organisational behaviour of service provision? 
With respect to the context, it is apparent that the development of an economic 
regulator has been well received by consumers and informed participants as a good 
thing in principle. Largely due to political interference, the regulator somewhat failed to 
perform some of its roles fairly, effectively and efficiently. The regulator failed to adhere 
to some of the regulatory principles and exhibits its weaknesses in the area of 
transparency, consistency, independence and water supply services for the urban 
poor. Even though the existing regulatory framework is acceptable to all stakeholders, 
it is said that the regulator must be seen to be exhibiting more transparency and 
independence in its operations. It was therefore generally suggested that the way 
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forward is by financing its budget through a regulatory fee that is imposed on utilities 
that it regulates rather than depending on the central government for funding thereby 
compromising its independence. The overall approach of national policies and the 
varying institutional frameworks appear to have addressed appropriate issues in 
principle with little benefit in practice. A point could be made that the split in 
responsibility between asset ownership and asset management was a political 
compromise with regard to institutional frameworks that delivered a compromise in 
performance – but there is no evidence to prove this point. In addition, there is no 
evidence to suggest that it has made any significant difference to either the 
performance or financial viability of the two different management models associated 
with its existence since 1999.  
The urban water supply system has gone through various developmental phases in the 
attempt to extend water supply services to all. Though erratic, it helped somewhat in 
increasing the water production levels over the years. However, a major challenge that 
has perennially confronted the managers of the water utility has been the high non-
revenue water levels. With respect to the performance of the operators, the research 
revealed that all three regimes recorded notorious levels of non-revenue water 
stemming from leakages due to ageing and obsolete networks, pipe bursts, illegal 
connections, lack of effective monitoring, lack of regular updating of customer data. 
For instance, from 1987 to 1998, non-revenue water levels ranged between 51 and 63 
percent. Also, GWCL failed to reduce the high non-revenue water over the seven years 
that it operated. Furthermore, a mapping strategy employed by the private operator 
which significantly exposed the sources of both commercial and physical losses 
marginally addressed the challenge of the high reduce non-revenue. Albeit in the 
arrangement, the private operator was tasked to reduce non-revenue water in the 
service areas by at least 5 percent per year per service area, it could only reduce the 
non-revenue water by 2.4% over its 5-year period leaving it at 49.22% in 2011. 
Generally, all three regimes exhibited high levels of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in 
reducing non-revenue water.  
Furthermore, bill collection posed a major challenge to the public water utility and all 
three regimes recorded high days receivables. Intriguingly, the study revealed that no 
significant differences were recorded in the means of days receivables among the 
three regimes. Furthermore, GWCL and AVRL failed to improve on the high days 
receivables of GWSC and GWCL respectively. The high days receivables stemmed 
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from Government’s delay in paying bills of its MDAs, lax enforcement and consumers’ 
refusal to pay for the poor services rendered. While bill collection deteriorated between 
1999 and 2006, the private operator on the average increased bill collection by 13% 
during the 5-year period of its operation. Financially, no significant gains were made 
under any of the three regimes. The liquidity position of the utility was very bad and 
unacceptable during the three regimes with the minimum operating ratio of 66.3%. 
Technically, for water utility such as this operating above the acceptable limit of 60% 
hardly could have sufficient funds to take care of its non-operating expenditures. 
Electricity and Chemical costs were very high and thus constituted the two major cost 
components of the production cost. Apparently, AVRL failed to reduce chemical and 
electricity costs as stipulated in the agreement. The long-term debt to shareholder’s 
equity of the utility improved under the private operator with a ratio of 12.54% in 2011 
but generally, the utility’s creditworthiness has been very low during the three regimes.  
Assessments of technical and financial and audit reports of GWCL, AVRL including the 
Fichtner/Hytsa/Watertech and State Enterprise Commission revealed that the level of 
performance of the private operator was generally poor in areas including non-review 
water reduction, treatment plant operations, account receivables, bill collection, power 
consumption, chemical usage and public water consumption which corroborates the 
findings of this research. 
For decades, political patronage, nepotism, cronyism, tribalism and corruption have 
eaten deep into the fabrics of the public water utility leading to a high labour 
productivity. Labour productivity in 1999 stood at 28 staff per 1000 connections and 18 
in 1998. However, through several institution reforms and gradual expansion of the 
water supply systems, it was reduced to 8 staff per 1000 connections in 2006 when 
AVRL took over the management and operations of the water utility from GWCL. 
Thanks to the private operator as it further reduced it to 7 staff per 1000 connections by 
2011 – a figure that could compare fairly well with some well-performing utilities around 
the globe now. Meanwhile, investments in the water sector had not been systematic 
and consistent and therefore lagged behind the rate of growth of the urban population. 
The set of evaluation indicators used in this study, based on those that have become 
global best practice for water utilities, appear to work equally well for both public and a 
partially privatised water utility. Hence, no new way is needed for assessing or 
evaluating the performance for a management contract. The researcher has 
approached the analysis of the performance data using the analysis of variance (i.e. 
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ANOVA), t-Tests, Tukey HSD and straightforward longitudinal comparison of an 
extensive range of indicators. During the study it became clear that sufficient 
information would not be available to undertake a more sophisticated statistical 
analysis of utility performance indicators. It would be possible to investigate the 
performance through the use of techniques such as Data Envelopment Analysis, 
combining all the indicators into a form of composite score and comparison through the 
DEA ‘linear programming’ approach. DEA is normally used to determine relative 
efficiencies between operating units rather than the same unit over time though this 
approach has also been used. In the end, resource constraints precluded the use of 
this methodology. 
 
The planned comparison with other forms of management contract models 
implemented in other countries was not achieved in any depth due to the limited 
academic research data reported in the literature and lack of resources to approach 
those contractors at a distance. 
 
The question as to how the activities of the urban water supply sector were coordinated 
among all sector players to ensure effectiveness, efficiency, equity and sustainability in 
its operations and management was mainly addressed through the detailed analysis of 
the role of PURC. Quite a number of stakeholders saw a more autonomous and 
empowered PURC as the natural coordinator and overseer of the urban water supply 
sector. Otherwise it was unclear as to how the activities of the other actors in the urban 
water sector influenced the performance of GWSC/GWCL and AVRL. The utility 
appeared to take its own path and, in effect, managed to reject the imposition of private 
sector outsiders in its management. It could be suggested that it is even more resistant 
to influence from other stakeholders. The key determinant of its success, to be 
delivered by external agents, appears to be an agreed tariff and the increases in that 
tariff required to deliver and support investment in capital maintenance and capital 
expansion. Tariff policy did not appear to be able to influence access expansion and 
waste reduction. It might be therefore that tariffs should not be expected to shoulder 
the burden of improvement and that, taxes, and maybe transfers, should be given a 
more significant role. Taxes are now particularly relevant in the context of the discovery 
of viable levels of oil in the country during the period of this research. 
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Therefore the relatively minor incentives delivered to the private sector, through the 
deliberate in-built limitations of a management contract, and perhaps through that 
contract to some of the staff, did not appear to be sufficient to deliver improvement in 
performance, in the context of the lack of adequate investment. The contractual 
framework has not been adequate to address issues of procurement, investment and 
project implementation. The mechanisms to enforce the contract and resolve disputes 
were sufficient to maintain the contract during its five year life but were not sufficient to 
deliver an adequately empowered utility that might be required to extend into a second 
contract period. 
 
One of the key promises of a management contract is that it might be possible to 
challenge and transform the organisational culture of an organisation, irrespective of 
the availability of investment to deliver transformed services. In the example of AVRL it 
appears that the short tenure of several of the senior AVRL personnel and, apart from 
the significant transformation of staff training in the early years, a rather clumsy 
approach to staff re-organisation led the majority of the staff to see no benefit in 
maintaining the contract. Disempowerment rather than empowerment seems to be the 
conclusion of the staff. 
 
The overall aim of the research was to assess the suitability of the form or model of 
private sector participation that was introduced in the regulated urban water supply 
sector in Ghana and to assess the net improvement that the contract brought to the 
urban population.  
Within the regulatory environment, lack of institutional autonomy and government’s 
interference made it extremely difficult for the regulator to effectively and efficiently 
perform its functions. To the extent that requests for tariff increases could delay for 
months simply because politicians felt that, increasing tariffs at a given time would 
negatively affect the fortunes of their parties also posed a major challenge to the 
financial sustainability of the public utility. Due to long days in approving new tariffs for 
implementation, which sometimes lead eventually to high percentages in tariff increases 
leading to agitations and rejection of tariffs by consumers. Consequently, people 
describe the actions and consultations of PURC with sector stakeholders as hypocritical 
and fictitious. It is however believed that if tariffs could be adjusted but staggered over a 
certain period of time, customers would not have problems with it. Therefore, in 
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assessing the performance of the urban water utility under the management contract, in 
addition to the operational, financial and managerial indicators that are usually 
considered, it is equally significant to situate the evaluation within the context of the 
political, social, economic and institutional environment or conditions within which the 
arrangement operated. In view of the aforementioned, the researcher concludes that; the 
model employed was highly unsuitable as the existing conditions and environment 
inevitably worked against the service goals set.  
Also, this study has found no significant improvement in potable water supply to the 
urban population or to the viability of the utility attempting to serve that population. The 
extent to which that is a result of a failure in choice or suitability of the model of private 
sector participation cannot be proven. However, the hypothesis underlying this study that 
“a management contract does not provide the necessary level of empowerment, 
incentives, commitment and access to resources for a private operator to adequately 
and efficiently perform, even where there is an established economic regulator with a 
clear mandate” could be said to contain at least a valid level of foresight even if it has not 
subsequently been provable beyond reasonable doubt by the data available. 
The people living in the cities of Ghana continue to wait for an adequate water supply. 
The institutions and institutional framework could well be described to be ‘good enough’ 
with the imposition of a private sector management contract being an unsuitable attempt 
to solve the wrong problem at this time. The overwhelming need to invest at a suitable 
level, beyond the affordability of the present urban population, is likely to have been a far 
more significant challenge. 
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The researcher seeks to investigate the performance of Ghana Water Company 
Limited in Urban water supply management in Ghana.  
Please, any information provided will be treated strictly confidential. 
    Background data  
Name of city and community……………………………………………………… 
Economic activity…………………………………………………………………… 
Date …………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
1. What is the size of your family? 
2. How long have you lived in this community? 
i. Less than 4 years.                ii. More than 4 years.             iii.  4 years 
3. Do you get water from Ghana Water Company Limited? 
i.  No                                  ii.    Yes 
4. If yes, what is your access route? 
i. Piped connection (direct connection) 
ii. standpipe 
iii. Other sources (please specify) 
5. What is the average volume of water you consume in a month? 
6. How will you rate the quality of water from GWCL? 
Taste:   i. Excellent.    ii. Good      iii. Fair      iv. Poor           v. Very poor 
Color:  i. Excellent.    ii. Good      iii. Fair      iv. Poor           v. Very poor 
Smell:  i. Excellent.    ii. Good      iii. Fair      iv. Poor           v. Very poor 
7. Do you have a meter or is your account metered? 
i. No                            ii.     Yes  
8. How often is the reading done? 
i.  Monthly          ii.   Every two months      iii.     More than two months 
9. How much do you pay monthly for water? (Please crosscheck with water bills) 
10. Does water flow under sufficient pressure? 
i. Yes                          ii.     No 
11. How will you describe the way you pay your water bills? 
i. Promptly 
ii. Always in arrears 
iii. Difficult to pay 
iv. Others (please specify) 
12. If you do not have a meter, how much do you pay monthly? 
13. How is this amount determined without a meter? 
14. Will you prefer your account to be metered? 
i. Yes                             ii.     No 
Please state the reason(s) 
............................................................................................................................. .........
................................................................................................................................... ...
............................................................................................................................. ......... 
15. How many hours do you receive water in a day? 
i. Less than 4 hours 
ii. Between 4-8 hours 
iii. Between 8-16 hours 
iv. Throughout the day 
16. How many days in a week do you receive water? 
17. Are you notified prior to service interruption? 
i. No                       ii.   Yes                    iii.     Sometimes 
18. What is your impression of GWCL regarding service interruption notification? 
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 i.         Excellent.        ii. Good          iii. Fair         iv. Poor           v. Very poor 
19. Do you receive your bills regularly? 
i. Yes                            ii.        No 
20. How often do you receive your bills? 
i. Monthly 
ii. Every two months 
iii. More than two months 
21. How long does it take you to pay your monthly bills? 
i.   1 month                      ii.   2months            iii.  3months or more 
22. Have you ever suffered a disconnection before? 
23. What was the cause of the disconnection? 
i. Non-payment of bills 
ii. Wrongful disconnection 
iii. Illegal connection 
iv. Others (please specify) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………...............................................
.......................................................................... 
24. Have you ever complained to GWCL? 
i. No                            ii.     Yes 
25. What was the complaint about? Please tick 
TYPE OF COMPLAINT  
Over-billing  
Late or no bill delivery   
Wrong categorization of customer  
Poor accessibility to company  
Stolen/Faulty meter  
Pipe burst or leakage  
Estimated water bills  
Delay in connecting a customer  
 Poor water quality  
Non-reflection of payment  
Wrong disconnection  
Complex tariff structure  
No flow  
 
26. How will you rate the response of GWCL? 
i.         Excellent.        ii. Good          iii. Fair         iv. Poor           v. Very poor 
27. How long did it take GWCL to respond to your complaints? 
28. How will you describe the attitude of GWCL workers towards customers? 
i.         Excellent.        ii. Good          iii. Fair         iv. Poor           v. Very poor 
29. Within the last four years, have you seen some improvements in service 
delivery of GWCL? 
i. No                     ii.     Yes                iii.   Don’t know 
Please specify the area(s) where you experienced or observed improvements or 
deterioration within the four years. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
30. How will you describe the services of GWCL within the last four years in terms of 
value for money? 
239 
i.         Excellent.        ii. Good          iii. Fair         iv. Poor           v. Very poor 
Please explain  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
31. In what area will you like to see GWCL improve its services? 
i. Customer orientation and education 
ii. Continuous water supply 
iii. Prompt service provision 
iv. Good customer relations 
Please select any three of the above 
32. Are you aware that a private operator manages GWCL now? 
i. Yes                        ii.      No 
33. If yes, do you think the decision of Government to involve the private operator was 
necessary and crucial? 
i. Yes                        ii.     No                     iii.     Don’t know 
Please explain  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
34. Which of the following do you think is the responsibility of the private operator? 
i. Provision of reliable and clean drinking water 
ii. Investing in infrastructural development of the utility 
iii. Maintaining pipes, treatment works and other infrastructure 
iv. Others (please specify) 
............................................................................................................................ ..........
............................................................................................................................. .........
........ 
35. Which of the following services do you consider as the most important?  
Please select only one 
i. Provision of reliable and clean drinking water 
ii. Provision of cheap drinking water 
iii. Provision of meters  
36.  In your opinion how will you rank the following demands of customers? 
i. Accessibility of service 
ii. Reliability of service 
iii. Affordability of service 
iv. Duty of care 
v. Community involvement 
(Please use numbers 1-5 where 1 indicates the highest and 5 the least) 
37. The contract with the private operator will end in the year 2011; will you 
recommend     that the contract is renewed considering the level of performance? 
i. No                         ii.     Yes                 iii.     Don’t know 
Please give reasons 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
38. What advice do you have for Government on urban water supply? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………. 
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FINAL BALANCE SHEET
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real 
Conversion factor 14000.00 14000.00 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000
US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000
ASSETS
FIXED ASSETS(published) 389,728 373,463 372,088 406,880 404,706 749,071 602,586 378,561 355,745 352,340 323,595 336321 433,165 473185 490377 480601
Intangible assets 1,128 671 366 158
CURRENT ASSETS
Stocks(inventory) 5,841 4,805 4,038 6,150 10,867 9,004 8,004 7,518 8,073 7,053 5,325 5246 5,817 6436 6115 7149
Receivables 16,193 15,419 19,416 25,799 27,645 20,217 34,016 55,242 46,188 44,729 22,305 31388 45,185 52889 55546 81839
Investments 1,907 2,414 875 571 146 13 14 42 3,578 7,510 12,977 7941 623 1202 896 998
Cash and Bank balances 2,610 2,652 1,976 4,271 3,620 2,451 6,501 4,433 5,276 5,728 7,525 8737 6,155 7745 5658 5717
Other debtors
Prepayments
Total current assets-reworked 26,551 25,290 26,305 36,791 42,278 31,686 48,535 67,235 63,115 65,020 48,133 53311.49 57,781 68272 68216 95702
Total current assets-published 26,551 25,290 26,305 36,791 42,278 31,686 48,535 67,235 63,115 65,020 48,133 53311.49 57,781 68272 68216 95702
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Bank overdraft 520 437 466 82 1,047 1,064 1,904 899 821 1,553 1,003 15.52 0 11 15 0
Payables 16,584 27,193 18,794 34,388 85,278 135,773 71,765 115,166 59,634 43,268 22,808 45414.18 46,473 63438 55129 73792
Cross debt 0 0 22,464 31,866 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10246.79 9,877 6547 14954 24948
Total current liabilities-reworked 17,104 27,630 41,724 97,757 86,325 136,837 73,669 116,066 60,455 44,821 23,812 55676.49 56,350 69996 70097 98739
Total current liabilities-published 17,104 27,630 41,724 97,757 86,325 136,837 73,669 116,066 60,455 44,821 23,812 55676.49 56,350 69996 70097 98739
Net Current assets/Liabilities(Working capital) 9,446 -2,340 -15,420 -43,539 -44,047 -105,151 -25,134 -48,831 2,660 20,199 24,321 -2365.00 1,431 -1724 -1882 -3037
Long Term Loans -87,918 -131,984 -182,334 -317,732 -261,316 -374,811 -437,590 -208,365 -184,589 -144,313 -115,832 -85113.19 -70,818 -81832 -75120 -61514
NET ASSETS(EQUITY)-reworked 312,385 239,809 174,700 238,574 99,342 269,108 139,863 121,365 173,815 228,226 232,084 248842.73 363,777 389629 413376 416049
NET ASSETS(EQUITY)-published 312,385 239,809 174,700 238,574 99,342 269,108 139,863 121,365 173,815 228,226 232,084 262223.97 364,197 389629 413376 416049
Financed by:
Stated capital 11,793 9,468 7,752 9,869 5,270 3,750 3,092 2,685 2,173 1,944 1,693 1525.93 1,353 1146 988 893
Government grants 25,481 26,831 31,639 73,828 44,215 19,137
Government equity 0 235,065 226,538 232,940 218,137 210582.20 199,486 177095 152704 138019
Development financing 24,762 21,697 78,692 111,801 117,052 148233.65 261,308 325527 367742 368716
Foreign grants 6,019 14,319 13,719 32,553 27,291 14,683 35,251 17,465 14,134 12,645 12,898 11627.71 10,313 8730 8346 7543
Capital surplus 308,985 244,987 200,577 255,363 152,281 545,702 449,923 254,955 206,336 184,596 160,745 144915.64 128,531 108801 93816 84793
Community water fund 26,667 21,143 17,311 22,039
Income surplus(deficit) -66,012 -76,939 -96,298 -155,078 -129,715 -314,164 -373,165 -410,500 -354,058 -315,700 -278,441 -254661.16 -237,214 -231670 -210219 -183915
EQUITY (Audited and published) 312,385 239,809 174,700 238,574 99,342 269,108 139,863 121,365 173,815 228,226 232,084 -254661.16 -363,777 -389629 413376 416049
 EQUITY(NET ASSET) reworked 312,934 239,809 174,700 238,574 99,342 269,108 139,863 121,365 173,815 228,226 232,084 262223.97 363,777 389629 413376 416049
Capital employed-reworked 400,302 371,794 357,034 556,306 360,659 643,920 577,452 329,731 358,404 372,539 347,916 333955.92 434,596 471460 488496 477563  
Figure 0-16 Final Balance Sheet
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INCOME AND EXPENDITURE STATEMENTS 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real
Coversion factor 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000
US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000
COMMERCIAL & MARKETING
Personnel cost 1439.48 1636.30 2212.73 1798.78 2715.48 2199.49 2694.01 3347.98 3178.81 3913.13 4758.79 4721.01 7027.87 6808.56
Electricity 3.93 4.47 10.46 0.40 7.92 2.27 5.24 8.96 55.85 27.36 19.32 165.62 27.76 87.09
Fuel & Lubricant 81.04 92.12 102.08 118.19 189.96 149.53 225.55 193.66 227.63 247.72 257.15 349.56 314.69 327.36
Material cost 24.56 279.42 503.26 207.17 47.52 12.18 9.49 11.76 46.21 18.14 15.33 11.06 27.04 32.06
Overheads 2132.03 2418.54 2202.23 1988.86 3484.95 4207.94 3566.80 3456.02 3212.36 728.29 1371.21 5165.96 2249.72 4713.98
Repairs & Maintenance 59.43 67.55 111.37 207.54 119.06 227.84 258.05 210.65 152.07 163.19 143.06 210.40 447.94 281.51
Hiring of equipment 0.29 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.51 118.40 87.80 86.70
Depreciation 139.56 135.02 322.76 255.84 191.53 147.78 112.74 95.13 73.66 63.36 51.69 41.65 42.63 32.28
Loss on sale of fixed asset 0.00 0.00 1128.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sub-total(reworked) 3880.31 4633.75 6593.82 4576.78 6756.42 6947.02 6871.88 7324.17 6946.59 5161.19 6631.04 10783.66 10225.44 12369.53
Sub-total(published) 3880.31 4633.75 6593.82 4576.78 6756.42 6947.02 6871.88 7324.17 6946.59 5161.19 6631.04 10783.66 10225.44 12369.53
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
Personnel cost 4013.89 5213.40 5838.99 3002.71 5277.85 5664.05 6432.82 7232.26 7713.70 7805.50 9409.70 9102.53 10547.45 10645.25
Electricity 345.93 446.05 429.34 106.34 413.71 424.73 297.60 334.64 342.25 355.58 302.34 750.77 726.01 692.99
Fuel & Lubricant 643.84 830.19 652.51 367.75 823.86 807.16 1121.12 931.34 1192.04 1277.55 1476.72 1820.73 1356.70 1271.07
Material cost 159.70 205.92 311.36 415.04 275.03 226.27 161.18 397.40 332.21 369.70 341.49 484.33 328.45 371.14
Overheads 4659.81 6060.19 4562.66 2019.51 3146.00 4871.18 4254.58 4643.26 6026.96 9187.48 15281.17 15294.41 6420.31 10424.55
Repairs & Maintenance 941.73 1214.30 1310.64 952.08 1184.67 1705.93 1129.65 1712.11 1905.91 2209.25 2087.27 2694.30 2240.97 2016.11
Bank charges 630.67 813.21 516.69 315.71 1301.24 1237.08 686.75 300.06 267.16 336.20 317.06 357.86 444.86 379.06
Audit fees 33.32 33.58 44.69 42.00 58.13 73.02 69.53 62.20 54.16 63.56 64.96 60.88 57.30 60.71
Directors fees/Allowance 20.04 29.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Depreciation 697.79 675.10 1508.11 1716.86 2043.43 1087.68 825.34 749.47 557.38 501.85 614.12 1243.78 640.36 520.55
Interest on loans 0.00 0.00 10.80 4052.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1103.21 1573.66 883.54 1592.75
Sub-total(reworked) 12146.72 15521.51 15185.80 12990.73 14523.92 16097.12 14978.56 16362.75 18391.77 22106.68 30998.04 33383.26 23645.94 27974.18
Sub-total(published) 12146.72 15521.51 15185.80 12990.73 14523.92 16097.12 14978.56 16362.75 18391.77 22106.68 30998.04 33383.26 23645.94 27974.18
PRODUCTION
Personnel cost 1047.37 1723.50 2411.16 2144.49 2532.54 2509.71 3077.86 3585.71 3548.82 4121.97 5033.61 4772.82 7065.66 6519.16
Water treatment Chemical cost 2265.57 3728.12 5141.08 4625.96 6761.19 6870.92 6842.17 4929.80 5804.92 6632.77 5937.71 5356.16 7367.45 7134.55
Electricity 4723.73 7773.16 12895.79 9641.76 12598.24 18169.82 18529.25 17670.69 23328.55 15067.99 16290.05 26525.64 12095.93 19553.15
Fuel & Lubricant 89.89 147.92 122.68 138.56 145.87 146.29 189.46 163.64 190.11 227.88 271.73 271.37 268.65 280.11
Material cost 59.03 161.13 300.39 78.32 62.87 124.24 46.98 43.67 23.82 24.35 62.45 21.41 41.67 61.87
Overheads 222.47 339.71 281.02 312.12 319.94 326.63 543.96 493.39 8.36 561.36 439.00 467.03 7.83 14.89
Hiring of Equipment 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.00 1.87 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 3.20 40.29 32.79 80.86
Lab. Analytical & reagents 0.79 1.30 26.17 14.58 6.03 1.70 10.43 6.84 680.01 49.87 22.22 41.61 587.04 558.95
Repairs & Maintenance 179.84 295.94 384.68 453.05 436.55 591.73 689.37 999.21 794.82 958.57 1205.61 1471.60 1735.75 2436.02
Depreciation 4256.53 4118.10 3749.95 17397.35 13024.25 10048.98 7666.47 6468.67 5008.75 4216.22 3514.74 2831.90 2898.92 2195.15
Sub-total(reworked) 12845.28 18288.97 25313.07 34806.20 35889.35 38790.13 37595.96 34361.63 39388.17 31861.71 32780.32 41799.84 32101.70 38834.71
Sub-total(published) 12845.28 18288.97 25313.07 34806.20 35889.35 38790.13 37595.96 34361.63 39399.00 31861.71 32780.32 41799.84 32101.70 38834.71  
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INCOME AND EXPENDITURE STATEMENTS 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real Real
Coversion factor 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000
US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000
TRANSMISSION/BOOSTERING
Personnel cost 123.60 229.24 359.86 316.33 397.51 375.51 447.35 615.56 509.56 725.00 849.29 821.69 720.39 663.16
Water treatment Chemical cost 31.97 58.77 186.26 114.68 131.95 35.88 21.81 3.24 77.00 3.48 12.76 41.69 0.00 0.00
Electricity 663.79 1220.13 2050.66 1294.48 1791.42 3009.81 2226.37 2515.35 678.14 1746.14 1941.35 2482.50 250.73 1046.16
Fuel & Lubricant 7.95 14.62 20.86 21.01 24.43 10.65 22.26 15.70 23.32 19.23 24.06 15.44 14.04 61.30
Material cost 13.17 24.20 37.95 44.68 5.00 2.81 4.32 10.37 1.39 11.16 5.36 5.13 5.37 2.29
Lab. Analytical & reagents 1.84 3.39 0.53 29.06 7.22 2.32 7.09 7.40 8.15 2.41 1.85 29.87 11.94 6.27
Hiring of equipment 0.00 0.00 6.50 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 8.35 28.01 2.85 5.29
Overheads 15.52 24.60 27.58 22.71 25.88 64.46 38.70 54.64 35.41 39.80 59.10 50.86 46.29 48.20
Repairs & Maintenance 19.44 33.70 24.99 54.95 39.29 116.84 48.99 72.29 54.21 79.38 158.78 385.24 119.03 122.14
Depreciation 488.45 472.57 409.23 1715.67 1281.30 1034.45 789.20 665.89 515.61 443.52 361.81 291.52 298.42 225.97
Sub-total(reworked) 1365.75 2081.21 3124.44 3613.70 3704.02 4652.74 3606.09 3960.44 1902.78 3070.42 3422.71 4151.94 1469.05 2180.78
Sub-total(published) 1365.75 2081.21 3124.44 3613.70 3704.02 4652.74 3606.09 3960.44 1902.78 3070.42 3422.71 4151.94 1469.05 2180.78
DISTRIBUTION
Personnel cost 989.04 1154.66 1653.32 1459.41 1721.05 1782.75 2121.10 2583.83 2598.08 3171.77 3599.80 3599.28 5223.65 5151.25
Electricity 3.90 4.56 15.77 121.91 124.29 17.01 93.44 30.75 106.81 32.44 50.68 171.18 28.49 76.34
Fuel & Lubricant 105.64 123.33 164.72 192.94 212.28 206.02 324.72 324.32 427.03 381.53 348.61 468.91 508.12 470.54
Material cost 587.29 685.63 1132.62 2138.91 1656.03 1189.62 851.51 1330.13 1212.86 1316.36 1531.64 1572.97 1753.14 1437.66
Hiring of Equipment 3.94 4.60 0.89 0.00 16.85 1.42 0.00 0.37 22.55 87.29 34.01 104.50 221.28 53.88
Overheads 196.14 224.81 333.03 288.62 228.62 336.08 347.87 344.91 448.15 385.78 493.43 591.63 679.35 587.28
Repairs & Maintenance 157.98 184.43 528.88 224.20 477.56 707.91 738.13 928.88 620.11 673.34 937.91 1352.40 2226.57 2150.79
Depreciation 1395.58 1350.20 864.04 5116.87 3830.66 2955.58 2254.85 1902.55 1473.16 1267.21 1033.75 832.91 852.62 645.63
Sub-total(reworked) 3439.51 3732.21 4693.26 9542.85 8267.34 7196.40 6731.61 7445.74 6908.75 7315.72 8029.82 8693.78 11493.22 10573.37
Sub-total(published) 3439.51 3732.21 4693.26 9542.85 8267.34 7196.40 6731.61 7445.74 6908.75 7315.72 8029.82 8693.78 11493.22 10573.37
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 33677.57 44257.66 54910.38 65530.26 69141.05 73683.42 69784.09 69454.72 73538.06 69515.72 81861.93 98812.47 78935.36 91932.57
OVERALL DEPRECIATION 6977.91 6750.99 6854.10 26202.59 20371.17 15274.48 11648.60 9881.71 7628.56 6492.16 5576.10 5241.76 4732.96 3619.59
OVERALL PERSONNEL COST 7613.37 9957.09 12476.06 8721.72 12644.43 12531.50 14773.14 17365.34 17548.98 19737.37 23651.18 23017.31 30585.02 29787.38
OVERALL CHEMICAL COST 2297.54 3786.89 5327.34 4740.64 6893.15 6906.79 6863.98 4933.04 5881.92 6636.25 5950.46 5397.85 7367.45 7134.55
OVERALL ELECTRICITY COST 5741.28 9448.36 15402.01 11164.88 14935.57 21623.64 21151.90 20560.40 24511.61 17229.50 18603.74 30095.72 13128.92 21455.74
Operating Exp(Total exp. -Depreciation) 26699.66 37506.68 48056.28 39327.67 48769.87 58408.94 58135.49 59573.01 65909.50 63023.55 76285.82 93570.71 74202.40 88312.98  
Figure 0-37 Final Income and Expenditure Statement parts I & II 
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